

POL 601: FOUNDATIONS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

Fall 2018

Mondays 2.00 – 5.00 pm

Room: SBS S740

Stony Brook University

Instructor: Vittorio Mérola

Office: SBS N721

Office Hours: Mondays 10-12, and by appointment

Email: vittorio.merola@stonybrook.edu

Course Description

This course aims to provide an overview of some of the major theoretical debates and approaches in the field of political economy. Since the field of political economy is vast and multifaceted, we will focus on a subset of empirical issues, chosen both due to their importance and their connection to the scholarship prevalent in the department of political science at Stony Brook University. The topics of this course are approached by focusing on seminal pieces of research – generally older classics which informed most current work – and broader summaries of the literature. In doing so, great attention will be devoted to discussing what it means to conduct political economy research, from the research questions that are asked, to the theoretical and methodological perspectives adopted when tackling such questions. Students should come out of this course with a better understanding of how a political economist thinks, and what kind of puzzles they generally find interesting. What this course will not do, given the obvious time limitations, is to provide an up-to-date summary of the current state of field, nor compare and contrast this research vein with others prevalent in political science. However, extensive lists of recommended readings are provided in the syllabus for most weeks, in order to guide those students interested in diving deeper into any specific topic covered in the course.

While this course will cover some game theoretic and formal theories, previous knowledge of such methods are not required nor expected. I will at times go over the main logic and basic mathematical structure of certain models, but this is categorically *not a formal theory course*. The course is designed to provide students with the conceptual tools and theoretical background needed to independently engage with recent work in political economy, and ultimately integrate political economy perspectives into their own research. Students wanting to learn the methodology of formal modeling and game theory should come see me at my office or take an appropriate course (such as the game theory course offered in the Spring semester in the department).

Requirements and Grading

The class meets once a week for almost three hours, which will provide us with sufficient time to think about and discuss the issues at hand. Vigorous classroom participation will be essential to making the course a success. As such, completing the readings before attending class is critical for the course. The classes will *not be lectures*. At times I will go over some vital concepts and arguments, but the vast majority of class time will be spent debating the

topic of the week, using the readings as the primary material.

The student's final grade in the course will be based on the following requirements:

- **Class Participation (30%).** Every student is required to participate in the class discussions. The aim is not necessarily the quantity of the participation, but the quality. Grades will be based on students' engagement with the course material, which can be anything from asking questions about things which remain unclear, relating the readings to one's own interests and work, comparing readings and making sense of the bigger picture, or critically evaluating any part of the material. If you are shy and do not feel comfortable speaking in class, please come see me or email me, and we can figure out an alternative way for you to satisfy this course requirement (such as by writing very short weekly memos on the readings).
 - The questions that you should try to answer as you read the material, and which we will attempt to answer in class, are the following objective questions:
 1. What is the **puzzle**?
 2. What is the **answer** to the puzzle?
 3. What is the **mechanism** driving this theoretical answer?
 4. What are the **assumptions** which underlie the answer and its mechanism?
 5. What is the **purpose** of the paper?
 6. What is **missing** from the argument?
 7. What **evidence** is used to support the argument?
- **Theoretical reaction paper (10%).** Students will submit 3 separate reaction papers during the semester. The first is a theoretical reaction paper, which will be based on one of the three articles listed below. The goal of this paper is to critically evaluate the theory and conceptualization provided in the paper. Please disregard the empirics, instead focusing on the strength and logic of the theoretical argument. Is the theory clear? What is the question that the author is seeking to answer, and what is their answer? Is the question interesting and important? Are the theoretical propositions falsifiable? Have alternative views been clearly stated? Are all the theoretical moving parts clearly defined? Are there any scope conditions? Is the argument persuasive or plausible? In short, what are the strengths and weakness of the theory presented, and how could it have been improved? This paper is due no later than **11/12**, and should be around 5 pages long (double-spaced).
 - Write your paper on one of these three articles:
 1. North, Douglass and Barry Weingast. 1989. "Constitution and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England." *Journal of Economic History* 49(4): 803-832.
 2. Sokoloff, Kenneth L. and Stanley L. Engerman. 2000. "History Lessons: Institutions, Factors Endowments, and Paths of Development in the New World." *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 14(3): 217-232.

3. Moene, Karle Ove, and Michael Wallerstein. 2001. "Inequality, social insurance, and redistribution." *American Political Science Review* 95(4): 859-874.

- **Empirical reaction paper (10%).** The second reaction paper will focus on the empirical evidence presented in one of the three articles listed below. The goal of this paper is to critically evaluate the operationalization and research design provided in the paper. Please disregard the strength of the theory, and instead focus on the methodological approach taken to test and support the theory. Are the variables clearly and adequately measured? Were the theoretical propositions properly tested? Was the evidence compelling? Did the authors make causal inferences, and if so was it appropriate? Is the choice of data (from surveys to cases selected) suited to the question and test? Was the data clearly described? In short, what are the strengths and weaknesses of empirics presented, and could they have been improved? The purpose is not necessarily to engage with the validity of the statistical techniques, and certainly not to discuss the strengths of the empirical findings, but to evaluate the adequacy of the empirical design that the authors utilized. This paper is due no later than **11/26**, and should be around 5 pages long (double-spaced).

– Write your paper on one of these three articles:

1. Ross, Michael. 2006. "Is Democracy Good for the Poor?" *American Journal of Political Science* 50(4): 860-874.
2. Dunning, Thad, and Lauren Harrison. 2010. "Cross-cutting cleavages and ethnic voting: An experimental study of cousinage in Mali." *American Political Science Review* 104(1): 21-39.
3. Wright, John R. 2012. "Unemployment and the Democratic Electoral Advantage." *American Political Science Review* 106(4): 685-702.

- **Critical book review (20%).** The third and last reaction paper consists of a critical review of a book. Students can choose any book they would like to read, as long as it generally follows a political economy perspective. I have provided a list of potential books at the end of the syllabus, but this list is by no means exhaustive. *Please confirm your book choice with my first.* The critical book review will effectively replicate the theoretical and empirical critiques discussed above, but in this case apply them together to a longer research manuscript. In addition to the above-mentioned questions, students should also consider the broader implications of the work in question. Can we generalize the argument or the results to other areas of political science? What does this piece of work tell us about politics, and what does it mean for future work in the discipline? This paper is due no later than 12/10 (the last day of class), and should be around 10 pages long (double-spaced).

- **Final exam (30%).** A week after the last class, students will complete a final exam. At around 2 pm, students will be emailed 3 broad questions, based on the materials for the course, and will answer 2 of them. The students will have 4 hours to answer these 2 questions, even though 3 hours should provide more than enough time. The purpose of the exam is not for students to regurgitate as much information as possible,

but to critically reflect on and synthesize the readings covered in the course. The exam questions will mirror the non-mathematical questions used in standard political economy qualifying exams. As long as students have done the readings for the course, have attended and participated in class, and have thought further about the readings, the exam will pose no problems. It is simply designed to encourage students to connect together the readings and discussions in the course, and will thus focus on bigger picture questions, not on the specifics of any particular readings.

Readings

Week 1 (8/27): Introduction

Week 2 (9/3): Labor Day - No Class

Week 3 (9/10): What is Political Economy?

Required:

- Friedman, Milton. 1953. "The Methodology of Positive Economics." In *Essays in Positive Economics*, University of Chicago.
- Becker, Gary. 1986. "The Economic Approach to Human Behavior". In Jon Elster, ed., *Rational Choice*. New York University Press.
- Alt, James E., and Kenneth Shepsle. 1990. "Editor's introduction." In Alt, James A., and Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds., *Perspectives on Positive Political Economy*. Cambridge University Press.
- Riker, William H. 1990. "Political science and rational choice." In Alt, James A., and Kenneth A. Shepsle, *Perspectives on Positive Political Economy*. Cambridge University Press.
- Arrow, Kenneth J. 1994. "Methodological Individualism and Social Knowledge." *The American Economic Review* 84(2): 1-9.
- Blyth, Mark. 2009. "An Approach to Comparative Analysis or a Subfield within a Subfield? Political Economy." In Lichbach, Mark Irving, and Alan S. Zukerman, eds., *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure*. Cambridge University Press. [Skim pages 201-216]

Recommended:

- Harsanyi, John c. 1986. "Advances in understanding rational behavior." In Jon Elster, ed., *Rational Choice*. New York University Press.
- Arrow, Kenneth J. 1986. "Rationality of self and others in an economic system." *Journal of Business* 59(4): 385-399.

- Ordeshook, Peter C. 1990. "The emerging discipline of political economy." In Alt, James A., and Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds., *Perspectives on Positive Political Economy*. Cambridge University Press.
- Hall, Peter 1997. "The Role of Interests, Institutions, and Ideas in the Comparative Political Economy of the Industrialized Nations." In Lichbach, Mark Irving, and Alan S. Zukerman, eds., *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure*. Cambridge University Press.
- Shepsle, A. Kenneth, and Mark S. Bonchek. 1997. *Analyzing politics: rationality, behavior, and institutions*. W.W. Norton.
- Przeworski, Adam. 2003. *States and markets: a primer in political economy*. Cambridge University Press.
- Besley, Tim, 2004, "The New Political Economy" (Keynes Lecture in Economics). <http://econ.lse.ac.uk/staff/tbesley/papers/keyneslecturetext.pdf>

Week 4 (9/17): Pathologies of Rational Choice?

Required:

- Green, Donald P., and Ian Shapiro. 1994. *Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science*. Yale University Press. [Chapters 1-3]
- Cox, Gary W. 1999. "The Empirical Content of Rational Choice Theory: A Reply to Green and Shapiro." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 11(2): 147-169.
- MacDonald, Paul K. 2003. "Useful Fiction or Miracle Maker: The Competing Epistemological Foundations of Rational Choice Theory." *American Political Science Review* 97(4): 551-565.
- Green, Donald, and Ian Shapiro. 2005. "Revisiting the Pathologies of Rational Choice." In Ian Shapiro, ed., *The Flight From Reality in the Human Sciences*. Princeton University Press. [Skim p. 56-78]
- Lovett, Frank. 2006. "Rational Choice Theory and Explanation." *Rationality and Society* 18(2): 237-272.

Recommended:

- Simon, Herbert A. 1955. "A behavioral model of rational choice." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 69(1): 99-118.
- Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman. 1986. "Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions." *The Journal of Business* 59(4): 251-278.
- Smelser, Neil J. 1992. "The Rational Choice Perspective: A Theoretical Assessment." *Rationality and Society* 4(4): 381-410.

- Friedman, Jeffrey, ed.. 1996. *The Rational Choice Controversy: Economic Models of Politics Reconsidered*. Yale University Press.
- Fearon, James and Alexander Wendt. 2002. "Rationalism vs. Constructivism: A Skeptical View". In Carlsnaes, Walter, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons, eds. *Handbook of International Relations*. Sage.
- Lichbach, Mark Irving. 2003. *Is Rational Choice Theory All of Social Science?* University of Michigan Press.

Week 5 (9/24): Why Institutions?

Required:

- Olson, Mancur. 1967. *The Logic of Collective Action*. Cambridge University Press. [Chapters 1-2]
- Williamson, Oliver. 1981. "The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes." *Journal of Economic Literature* 19(4): 1537-1568.
- Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. *Governing the Commons*. Cambridge University Press [Chapters 1-2]
- North, Douglass C. 1993. "Institutions and Credible Commitment." *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics* 149(1): 11-23.
- Olson, Mancur. 1993. "Dictatorship, Democracy and Development," *American Political Science Review* 87(3):567-76.

Recommended:

- Coase, R. H. 1988. *The Firm, the Market, and the Law*. The University of Chicago Press
- Kuran, Timur. 1989. "Sparks and Prairie Fires: A theory of unanticipated political revolution." *Public Choice* 61(1): 41-74.
- Shepsle, Kenneth A. 1989. "Studying institutions: Some lessons from the rational choice approach." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 1(2): 131-147.
- Kreps, David M. 1990. "Corporate culture and economic theory." In Alt, James A., and Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds., *Perspectives on Positive Political Economy*. Cambridge University Press.
- Greif, Avner. 1994. "Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies." *Journal of Political Economy* 102(5): 912-50.
- Calvert, Randall L. 1995. "The Rational Choice Theory of Social Institutions: Cooperation, Coordination, and Communication." In Banks, Jeffrey, and Eric Hanushek, eds., *Modern Political Economy*. Cambridge University Press.

- Peter R. Hall and Rosemary C.R. Taylor. 1996. “Political Science and Three New Institutionalisms.” *Political Studies* 44(5): 936-957.
- Carey, John M. 2000. “Parchment, Equilibria, and Institutions”. *Comparative Political Studies* 33(6-7): 735-61.
- Weingast, Barry R. 2002. “Rational Choice Institutionalism.” In Katznelson, Ira and Helen Milner, eds., *Political Science: The State of the Discipline*. Norton Press.
- Acemoglu, Daron. 2003. “Why Not a Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Commitment and Politics.” *Journal of Comparative Economics* 31(4): 620-652.
- Ostrom, Elinor. 2003. “How Types of Goods and Property Rights Jointly Affect Collective Action”. *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 15(3): 239-270.
- Przeworski, Adam. 2004. “Institutions Matter?” *Government and Opposition* 39(4): 527-540.

Week 6 (10/1): Economic Models of Elections

Required:

- Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. Harper Row Publishers. [Chapters 1-8]
- Schattschneider, E. E. 1957. *The Semisovereign People: A Realist’s View of Democracy in America*. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich College Publishers. [Chapters 1-4, 8]

Week 7 (10/8): Fall Break – No Class

Week 8 (10/15): Economic Models of Elections – Extensions I

Required:

- Riker, William H. 1980. “Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions.” *American Political Science Review* 74(2): 432-446.
- Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Barry R. Weingast. 1981. “Political Preferences for the Pork Barrel: A Generalization.” *American Journal of Political Science* 25(1): 96-111.
- Tullock, Gordon, and Geoffrey Brennan. 1981. “Why so Much Stability.” *Public Choice* 37(2): 189-204.
- Ansolabehere, Stephen. 2006. “Voters, candidates, and parties.” In Weingast, Barry R., and Donald A. Wittman, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*. Oxford University Press.
- Dewan, Torun, and Kenneth A. Shepsle. 2011. “Political economy models of elections.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 14: 311-330

Recommended:

- Romer, Thomas, and Howard Rosenthal. 1978. "Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo." *Public Choice* 33(4): 27-43.
- Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Barry R. Weingast. 1987. "The institutional foundations of committee power." *The American Political Science Review* 81(1): 85-104.
- Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Barry R. Weingast. 1981. "Political Preferences for the Pork Barrel: A Generalization." *American Journal of Political Science* 25(1): 96-111.
- Calvert, Randall L. 1985. "Robustness of the multidimensional voting model: Candidate motivations, uncertainty, and convergence." *American Journal of Political Science* 29(1): 69-95.
- Austen-Smith, David, and Jeffrey S. Banks. 1988. "Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes," *American Political Science Review* 82(2): 405-422.
- Weingast, Barry, and William Marshall. 1988. "The Industrial Organization of Congress." *Journal of Political Economy* 96(1): 132-163.
- Baron, David P., and John A. Ferejohn. 1989. "Bargaining in Legislatures." *American Political Science Review* 83(4): 1181-1206.
- Baron, David P. 1991. "Majoritarian incentives, pork barrel programs and procedural control." *American Journal of Political Science* 35(1): 57-90.
- Levitt, Steven and James Snyder. 1995. "Political Parties and the Distribution of Federal Outlays." *American Journal of Political Science* 39(4): 958-80.
- Austen-Smith, David and Jeffrey S. Banks. 1996. "Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem," *American Political Science Review*, 90(1): 34-45.
- Morelli, Massimo. 1999. "Demand competition and policy compromise in legislative bargaining." *American Political Science Review* 93(4): 809-820.
- Duggan, John. 2000. "A bargaining model of collective choice." *American Political Science Review* 94(1): 73-89.
- Ansolabehere, Stephen, James M. Snyder Jr, and Charles Stewart III. 2001. "Candidate positioning in US House elections." *American Journal of Political Science* 45(1): 136-159.
- Groseclose, Timothy. 2001. "A Model of Candidate Location When One Candidate Has a Valence Advantage." *American Journal of Political Science* 45(4): 862-886.
- Dahlberg, Matz and Eva Johansson. 2002. "On the Vote-Purchasing Behavior of Incumbent Governments," *American Political Science Review* 96(1): 27-40.

- Ansolabehere, Stephen, John M. De Figueiredo, and James M. Snyder Jr. 2003. “Why is there so little money in US politics?.” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 17(1): 105-130.
- Palfrey, Thomas R. 2006. “Laboratory Experiments.” In Weingast, Barry R., and Donald A. Wittman, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*. Oxford University Press.

Week 9 (10/22): Economic Models of Elections – Extensions II

Required:

- Stigler, George J. 1971. “The theory of economic regulation.” *The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science* 2(1): 3-21.
- Meltzer, Allan and Scott Richard. 1981. “A Rational Theory of the Size of Government.” *Journal of Political Economy* 89(5): 914-927
- Becker, Gary. 1983. “A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence.” *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 98(3):371-400.
- Aldrich, John H. 1995. *Why parties?: The origin and transformation of political parties in America*. University of Chicago Press. [Chapters 1-2].
- Gailmard, Sean. 2014. “Accountability and principal-agent models.” In Bovens, Mark, Robert E. Goodin, and Thomas Schillemans, eds. *The Oxford handbook public accountability*. Oxford University Press

Recommended:

- Barro, Robert J. 1973. “The control of politicians: An economic model.” *Public Choice* 14(1): 19–42.
- Miller, Gary and Terry Moe. 1983. “Bureaucrats, Legislators, and the Size of the Government.” *The American Review of Political Science* 77(2): 293-308.
- Cox, Gary and Matthew McCubbins. 1986. “Electoral Politics as a Redistributive Game.” *Journal of Politics* 48(2): 370-89.
- Ferejohn John. 1986. “Incumbent performance and electoral control.” *Public Choice* 50(1-3):5–26.
- Alesina, Alberto. 1988. “Credibility and Policy Convergence in a two-party system with rational voters.” *American Economic Review* 7(4): 706-805.
- Katz, Richard S., and Peter Mair. 1995. “Changing models of party organization and party democracy: the emergence of the cartel party.” *Party politics* 1(1): 5-28.
- Alesina, Alberto, and Guido Tabellini. 1990 “A positive theory of fiscal deficits and government debt.” *Review of Economic Studies* 57(3): 403–414.

- Grossman, Gene M., and Elhanan Helpman. 1994. "Protection for Sale." *American Economic Review* 84(4):833-850.
- Dixit, Avinash and John Londregan. 1996. "The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics." *Journal of Politics* 58(4): 1132-55.
- Dixit, Avinash, Gene Grossman, and Elhanan Helpman 1997. "Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Applications to Government Policymaking." *Journal of Political Economy* 105(4): 752-769.
- Persson, Torsten, Gerard Roland and Guido Tabellini. 1997. "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 112(4): 1163-1202.
- Dal Bo, Ernesto, Pedro Dal Bo, and Raphael DiTella 2006. "Plata o Plomo: Bribe and Punishment in a Theory of Political Influence." *The American Political Science Review* 100(1): 41-53.
- Weingast, Barry R., and Donald Wittman. 2006. "The Reach of Political Economy." In Weingast, Barry R, and Donald A. Wittman, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*. Oxford University Press. [Skim specific discussions of prior work in sections I-IV.]
- Patty, John W. 2008. "Equilibrium Party Government." *American Journal of Political Science* 52(3): 636-655.
- Harstad, Bard, and Jakob Svensson 2011. "Bribes, Lobbying, and Development." *The American Political Science Review* 105(01): 46-63.

Week 10 (10/29): Models of Institutions

Required:

- Axelrod, Robert. 1981. "The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists." *American Political Science Review* 75(2): 306-318.
- Wittman, Donald. 1989. "Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results." *The Journal of Political Economy* 97(6): 1395-1424.
- Milgrom, Paul, Douglass North and Barry Weingast. 1990. "The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: the Law Merchant, Private Judges and the Champagne Fairs" *Economics and Politics* 2(1): 1-23.
- Pierson, Paul. 2000. "Increasing Returns, Path Dependency, and the Study of Politics." *American Political Science Review* 94(2): 251-67.
- Greif, Avner and David Laitin. 2004. "A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change." *American Political Science Review* 98(4): 633-52.

Recommended:

- Tiebout, Charles. 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," *Journal of Political Economy* 64(5):416-24.
- Hirschman, Albert O. 1970. *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to decline in firms, organizations, and states*. Harvard University Press.
- North, Douglass and Barry Weingast. 1989. "Constitution and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England." *Journal of Economic History* 49(4): 803-832.
- Levi, Margaret. 1990. "A Logic of Institutional Change." In Cook and Margaret Levi, eds., *The Limits of Rationality*. Chicago University Press.
- Krehbiel, Keith. 1991. *Information and Legislative Organization*. University of Michigan Press
- Greif, Avner, Paul R. Milgrom, and Barry R. Weingast. 1994. "Coordination, Commitment and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild." *Journal of Political Economy* 102(4): 754-76.
- March, James G. and Johan P. Olsen. 1984. "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life." *The American Political Science Review* 78(3): 734-749.
- Tsebelis, George. 1995. "Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism." *British Journal of Political Science* 25(3):289-326.
- Persson, Torsen, and Guido Tabellini. 1996. "Federal fiscal constitutions: Risk sharing and moral hazard." *Econometrica* 64(3): 623-646.
- Rodden, Jonathan and Susan Rose-Ackerman. 1997. "Does Federalism Preserve Markets." *Virginia Law Review* 83(7): 1521-1572.
- Mahoney, James. 2000. "Path Dependence in Historical Sociology." *Theory and Society* 29(4): 507-548.
- Sokoloff, Kenneth L. and Stanley L. Engerman. 2000. "History Lessons: Institutions, Factors Endowments, and Paths of Development in the New World." *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 14(3): 217-232.
- Broz, J. Lawrence. 2002. "Political System Transparency and Monetary Commitment Regimes." *International Organization* 56(4): 861-88.
- Keefer, Philip, and David Stasavage. 2002. "Checks and Balances, Private Information, and the Credibility of Monetary Commitments." *International Organization* 56(4): 751-74.

Week 11 (11/5): Electoral Institutions

Required:

- Carey, John M., and Matthew Soberg Shugart. 1995. "Incentives to cultivate a personal vote: A rank ordering of electoral formulas." *Electoral studies* 14(4): 417-439.
- Boix, Carles. 1999. "Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies." *American Political Science Review* 93(3): 609-624.
- Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini. 1999. "The size and scope of government: Comparative politics with rational politicians." *European Economic Review* 43(4-6): 699-735.
- Cox, Gary. 1997. *Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems*. Cambridge University Press [Chapters 3-5]
- Cusack, Thomas, Torben Iversen, and David Soskice. 2007. "Economic Interests and the Origins of Electoral Systems." *American Political Science Review* 101(3): 373-91.

Recommended:

- Cox, Gary W. 1990. "Centripetal and centrifugal incentives in electoral systems." *American Journal of Political Science* 34(4): 903-935.
- Iversen, Torben. 1994. "The logics of electoral politics: spatial, directional, and mobilizational effects." *Comparative Political Studies* 27(2): 155-189.
- Moe, Terry M., and Michael Caldwell. 1994. "The institutional foundations of democratic government: A comparison of presidential and parliamentary systems." *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics* 150(1): 171-195.
- Sartori, Giovanni. 1997. *Comparative constitutional engineering: an inquiry into structures, incentives, and outcomes*. New York University Press.
- Lijphart, Arend. 1999. *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*. Yale University Press
- Powell, G. Bingham, and G. Bingham Powell Jr. 2000. *Elections as instruments of democracy: Majoritarian and proportional visions*. Yale University Press.
- Strom, Kaare. 2000. "Delegation and accountability in parliamentary democracies." *European Journal of Political Research* 37(3): 261-290.
- Lizzeri, Alessandro, and Nicola Persico. 2001. "The provision of public goods under alternative electoral incentives." *American Economic Review* 91(1): 225-239.
- Persson, Torsten, Guido Tabellini, and Francesco Trebbi. 2003. "Electoral rules and corruption." *Journal of the European Economic Association* 1(4): 958-989.

- Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria, Roberto Perotti, and Massimo Rostagno. 2002. "Electoral systems and public spending." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 117(2): 609-657.
- Clark, William Roberts, and Matt Golder. 2006. "Rehabilitating Duverger's theory: Testing the mechanical and strategic modifying effects of electoral laws." *Comparative Political Studies* 39(6): 679-708.
- Benoit, Kenneth. 2007. "Electoral laws as political consequences: Explaining the origins and change of electoral institutions." *Annual Review of Political Science* 10: 363-390.
- Persson, Torsten, Gerard Roland, and Guido Tabellini. 2007. "Electoral rules and government spending in parliamentary democracies." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 2(2): 155-188.
- Kreuzer, Marcus. 2010. "Historical knowledge and quantitative analysis: The case of the origins of proportional representation." *American Political Science Review* 104(2): 369-392.
- Cusack, Thomas, Torben Iversen, and David Soskice. 2010. "Coevolution of capitalism and political representation: The choice of electoral systems." *American Political Science Review* 104(2): 393-403.
- Boix, Carles. 2010. "Electoral markets, party strategies, and proportional representation." *American Political Science Review* 104(2): 404-413.
- Ferree, Karen E., G. Bingham Powell, and Ethan Scheiner. 2014. "Context, electoral rules, and party systems." *Annual Review of Political Science* 17: 421-439.
- Bechtel, Michael M., Dominik Hangartner, and Lukas Schmid. 2016. "Does compulsory voting increase support for leftist policy?" *American Journal of Political Science* 60(3): 752-767.

Week 12 (11/12): The Economy and the Vote

- Theoretical reaction paper is due

Required:

- MacKuen, Michael B., Robert S. Erikson, James A. Stimson. 1992. "Peasants or Bankers? The American Electorate and the U.S. Economy." *American Political Science Review* 86(3): 597-611.
- Powell, G. Bingham, Jr., and Guy Whitten. 1993. "A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context," *American Journal of Political Science* 37(2): 391-414.

- Fearon, James D. 1999. "Electoral accountability and the control of politicians: selecting good types versus sanctioning poor performance." In Przeworski, Adam, Susan C. Stokes, and Bernard Manin, eds., *Democracy, accountability, and representation. Vol. 2.* Cambridge University Press.
- Duch, Raymond M., Harvey D. Palmer, and Christopher J. Anderson. 2000. "Heterogeneity in perceptions of national economic conditions." *American Journal of Political Science* 44(4): 635-652.
- Franzese, Robert Jr. 2002. "Electoral and Partisan Economic Policy and Outcome Cycles". *Annual Reviews of Political Science* 5: 369-421.
- Healy, Andrew, and Neil Malhotra. 2013. "Retrospective Voting Reconsidered." *Annual Review of Political Science* 16: 285-306.

Recommended:

- Tufte, Edward. 1980. *Political Control of the Economy.* Princeton University Press.
- Kiewiet, R. 1983. *Macroeconomics and Micro Politics: The Electoral Effects of Economic Issues.* University of Chicago Press.
- Hibbs, Douglas A. 1987. *The Political Economy of Industrial Democracies.* Harvard University Press.
- Lewis-Beck, M. 1988. *Economics and Elections: The Major Western Democracies.* University of Michigan Press.
- Alesina, Alberto and Nouriel Roubini. 1992. "Political Cycles in OECD Economies." *Review of Economic Studies* 59(4):663-668.
- Remmer, Karen. 1993. "The Political Economy of Elections in Latin America, 1980-91," *American Political Science Review* 87(2): 393-407.
- Schultz, Kenneth. 1995. "The Politics of the Political Business Cycle." *British Journal of Political Science* 25(1): 79-99.
- Books, John, and Charles Prysby. 1999. "Contextual Effects on Retrospective Economic Evaluations the Impact of the State and Local Economy." *Political Behavior* 21(1): 1-16.
- Anderson, Christopher J. 2000. "Economic Voting and Political Context: A Comparative Perspective." *Electoral Studies* 19(2-3): 151-70.
- Erikson, Robert S., Michael B. MacKuen, and James A. Stimson. 2000. "Bankers or Peasants Revisited:: Economic Expectations and Presidential Approval." *Electoral Studies* 19(2): 295-312.
- Nadeau, Richard, and Michael S. Lewis-Beck. 2001. "National Economic Voting in U.S. Presidential Elections." *Journal of Politics* 63(1): 159-81.

- Kayser, Mark Andreas. 2005. “Who Surfs, Who Manipulates? The Determinants of Opportunistic Election Timing and Electorally Motivated Economic Intervention.” *American Political Science Review* 99(1):17-27.
- Norpoth, Helmut. 2001. “Divided Government and Economic Voting.” *Journal of Politics* 63(2): 414–435.
- Mughan, Anthony, and Dean Lacy. 2002. “Economic Performance, Job Insecurity and Electoral Choice.” *British Journal of Political Science* 32(3): 513-533.
- Lewis-Beck, Michael Steven, and Richard Nadeau. 2011. “Economic Voting Theory: Testing New Dimensions.” *Electoral Studies* 30(2): 288-294.
- Singer, Matthew M. 2011. “Who Says ”It’s the Economy“? Cross-National and Cross-Individual Variation in the Saliency of Economic Performance.” *Comparative Political Studies* 44(3): 284-312.
- Ashworth, Scott. 2012. “Electoral accountability: recent theoretical and empirical work.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 15: 183-201.
- Kayser, Mark, and Michael Peress. 2012. “Benchmarking Across Borders: Electoral Accountability and the Necessity of Comparison.” *American Political Science Review* 106(3): 661-648.
- Wright, John R. 2012. “Unemployment and the Democratic Electoral Advantage.” *American Political Science Review* 106(4): 685-702.

Week 13 (11/19): No Class

Week 14 (11/26): Modernization and Development

- Empirical reaction paper is due

Required:

- Huntington, Samuel. 1968. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. Yale University Press. [Chapter 1]
- Inglehart, Ronald. 1997. *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies*. Princeton University Press. [Chapter 1]
- Przeworski, Adam and Fernando Limongi. 1997. “Modernization: Theories and Facts.” *World Politics* 49(1): 155-193.
- Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2001. “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation.” *American Economic Review* 91(5): 1369-1401.
- Boix, Carles. 2003. *Democracy and redistribution*. Cambridge University Press. [Chapter 1]

Recommended:

- Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1959. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy." *American Political Science Review* 53(1): 69-105.
- Gerschenkron, Alexander. 1962. *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective*. Harvard University Press.
- Bates, Robert. 1981. *Markets and States in Tropical Africa*. University of California Press. [Introduction and Chapter 1]
- Przeworski, Adam and Michael Wallerstein. 1988. "The Structural Dependence of the State on Capital." *American Political Science Review* 82(1):11-30.
- Murphy, Kevin M., Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny. 1989. "Industrialization and the big push." *Journal of Political Economy* 97(5): 1003-1026.
- Przeworski, Adam and Fenando Limongi. 1993. "Political Regimes and Economic Growth." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 7(3): 51-69.
- Olson, Mancur. 1996. "Big Bills Left on the Sidewalk: Why Some Nations are Rich, and Others Poor." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 10(2): 3-24.
- Easterly, William and Ross Levine. 1997. "Africa's Growth Tragedy." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 112(4): 1203-1250.
- Barro, Robert J. 1999. "Determinants of Democracy." *Journal of Political Economy* 107(S6): 158-183.
- Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2000. "Political losers as a barrier to economic development." *American Economic Review* 90(2): 126-130.
- Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2000. "Why did the West extend the franchise? Democracy, inequality, and growth in historical perspective." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 115(4): 1167-1199.
- Mosley, Layna. 2000. "Room to Move: International Financial Markets and National Welfare States." *International Organization* 54(4): 737-773.
- Kaufman, Robert, and Alex Segura-Ubiergo. 2002. "Globalization, Domestic Politics, and Social Spending in Latin America." *World Politics* 53(4):553-587.
- Boix, Carles, and Susan Stokes. 2003. "Endogenous Democratization." *World Politics* 55(4): 517-549.
- Basinger, Scott J. and Mark Hallerberg. 2004. "Remodeling the Competition for Capital: How Domestic Politics Erases the Race to the Bottom." *American Political Science Review* 98(2): 261-276.

- Avelino, George, David S. Brown, Wendy Hunter. 2005. “The Effects of Capital Mobility, Trade Openness, and Democracy on Social Spending in Latin America, 1980–1999.” *American Journal of Political Science* 49(3): 625-641.
- Kurtz, Marcus. 2004. “The Dilemmas of Democracy in the Open Economy: Lessons from Latin America.” *World Politics* 56(2): 262-302.
- Rudra, Nita. 2005. “Globalization and the Strengthening of Democracy in the Developing World.” *American Journal of Political Science* 49(4): 704–730.
- Ross, Michael. 2006. “Is Democracy Good for the Poor?” *American Journal of Political Science* 50(4): 860-874.
- Wibbels, Eric. 2006. “Dependency Revisited: International Markets, Business Cycles, and Social Spending in the Developing World.” *International Organization* 60(2): 433-468.
- Mosley, Layna and Saika Uno. 2007. “Racing to the Bottom or Climbing to the Top? Economic Globalization and Labor Rights.” *Comparative Political Studies* 40(8): 923-48.
- Kurtz, Marcus J., and Sarah M. Brooks. 2008. “Embedding Neoliberal Reform in Latin America.” *World Politics* 60(2): 231-280.
- Boix, Carles. 2011. “Democracy, development, and the international system.” *American Political Science Review* 105(4): 809-828.

Week 15 (12/3): Welfare States, Redistribution and Inequality

Required:

- Lindblom, Charles E. 1982. “The Market as Prison,” *The Journal of Politics* 44(2): 3-11.
- Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. 1990. *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. Princeton University Press. [Chapters 1-3, Skim if needed]
- Iversen, Torben, and Thomas R. Cusack. 2000. “The causes of welfare state expansion: deindustrialization or globalization?” *World Politics* 52(3): 313-349.
- Hall, Peter A., and David Soskice, eds. 2001. *Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage*. Oxford University Press. [Introduction]
- Shayo, Moses. 2009. “A Model of Social Identity with an Application to Political Economy: Nation, Class, and Redistribution.” *American Political Science Review* 103(2): 147-174.
- Scheve, Kenneth, and David Stasavage. 2009. “Institutions, partisanship, and inequality in the long run.” *World Politics* 61(2): 215-253.

Recommended:

- Przeworski, Adam, and Michael Wallerstein. 1982. "The Structure of Class Conflict in Democratic Capitalist Societies." *American Political Science Review* 76(2): 215-38.
- Ruggie, John Gerard. 1982. "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order." *International Organization* 36(2): 379-415.
- Calmfors, Lars, and John Driffill. 1988. "Bargaining structure, corporatism and macroeconomic performance." *Economic policy* 3(6): 13-61.
- Baldwin, Peter. 1990. *The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class Bases in the European Welfare State, 1875-1975*. Cambridge University Press.
- Hicks, Alexander, Duane Swank. 1992. "Politics, Institutions, and Welfare Spending in Industrialized Democracies, 1960-82". *American Political Science Review* 86(3): 658-74.
- Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini. 1994. "Is inequality harmful for growth?" *The American Economic Review* 84(3): 600-621.
- Roemer, John. 1999. "The Democratic Political Economy of Progressive Income Taxation." *Econometrica* 67(1):1-19.
- Austen Smith, David. 2000: "Redistributing Income under Proportional Representation." *Journal of Political Economy* 108(6): 1235-69.
- Rueda, David, and Jonas Pontusson. 2000. "Wage inequality and varieties of capitalism." *World Politics* 52(3): 350-383.
- Benabou, Roland, and Efe A. Ok. 2001. "Social mobility and the demand for redistribution: the POUM hypothesis." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 116(2): 447-487.
- Iversen, Tobern, and David Soskice. 2001. "An Asset Theory of Social Policy Preferences." *American Political Science Review* 95(4): 875-893.
- Moene, Karle Ove, and Michael Wallerstein. 2001. "Inequality, social insurance, and redistribution." *American Political Science Review* 95(4): 859-874.
- Korpi, Walter and Joakim Palme. 2003. "New Politics and Class Politics in the Context of Austerity and Globalization." *American Political Science Review* 97(3): 425-46.
- Lindert, Peter. 2004. *Growing Public. Social Spending and Economic Growth Since the Eighteenth Century*. Cambridge University Press.

- Rueda, David. 2005. "Insider–outsider politics in industrialized democracies: the challenge to social democratic parties." *American Political Science Review* 99(1): 61-74.
- Korpi, Walter. 2006. "Power Resources and Employer-Centered Approaches in Explanations of Welfare States and Varieties of Capitalism." *World Politics* 58(2): 167-206.
- Mares, Isabela. 2006. *Taxation, Wage Bargaining, and Unemployment*. Cambridge University Press.
- Anderson, Christopher J., and Jonas Pontusson. 2007. "Workers, worries and welfare states: Social protection and job insecurity in 15 OECD countries." *European Journal of Political Research* 46(2):211-35.
- Iversen, Torben, and David Soskice. 2009. "Distribution and Redistribution: The Shadow of the Nineteenth Century." *World Politics* 61(3): 438-486.
- Kaufman, Robert R. 2009. "The Political Effects of Inequality in Latin America: Some Inconvenient Facts." *Comparative Politics* 41(3): 359-379.
- Rehm, Philipp. 2009. "Risks and redistribution: An individual-level analysis." *Comparative Political Studies* 42(7): 855-881.
- Ansell, Ben, and David Samuels. 2010. "Inequality and democratization: A contractionarian approach." *Comparative Political Studies* 43(12): 1543-1574.
- Scheve, Kenneth, and David Stasavage. 2010. "The Conscription of Wealth: Mass Warfare and the Demand for Progressive Taxation." *International Organization* 64(4): 529-561.
- Lupu, Noam, and Jonas Pontusson. 2011. "The structure of inequality and the politics of redistribution." *American Political Science Review* 105(2): 316-336.
- Rehm, Philipp, Jacob S. Hacker, and Mark Schlesinger. 2012. "Insecure alliances: Risk, inequality, and support for the welfare state." *American Political Science Review* 106(2): 386-406.
- Alt, James, and Torben Iversen. 2017. "Inequality, labor market segmentation, and preferences for redistribution." *American Journal of Political Science* 61(1): 21-36.

Week 16 (12/10): Clientelism/Conflict/Ethnicity

- Book review is due

Required:

- Ross, Michael. 1999. "The Political Economy of the Resource Curse." *World Politics* 51(1): 296-322.

- Fearon, James, and David Laitin. 2003. "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War." *American Political Science Review* 97(1): 75-90.
- Alesina, Alberto, Edward Glaeser, and Edward L. Glaeser. 2004. *Fighting poverty in the US and Europe: A world of difference*. Oxford University Press. [Chapter 6]
- Habyarimana, James, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel N. Posner, and Jeremy M. Weinstein. 2007. "Why does ethnic diversity undermine public goods provision?" *American Political Science Review* 101(4): 709-725.
- Stokes, Susan C., Thad Dunning, Marcelo Nazareno, and Valeria Brusco. 2013. *Brokers, voters, and clientelism: The puzzle of distributive politics*. Cambridge University Press. [Chapter 1]

Recommended:

- Fearon, James D. 1994. "Domestic Political Audiences and The Escalation of International Disputes." *American Political Science Review* 88(3): 577-592.
- Alesina, Alberto, Reza Baqir, and William Easterly. 1999. "Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 114(4): 1243-1284.
- Akerlof, George A., and Rachel E. Kranton. 2000. "Economics and identity." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 115(3): 715-753.
- Sambanis, Nicholas. 2001. "Do Ethnic and Non-Ethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45(4): 259-282.
- Reynal-Querol, Marta. 2002. "Ethnicity, political systems, and civil wars." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46(1): 29-54.
- Varshney, Ashutosh. 2003. "Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Rationality." *Perspectives on Politics* 1(1): 85-99.
- Wantchekon, Leonard. 2003. "Clientelism and Voting Behavior: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Benin." *World Politics* 55(3): 399-422.
- Fearon, James D. 2004. "Why do some civil wars last so much longer than others?" *Journal of Peace Research* 41(3): 275-301.
- Alesina, Alberto, and Eliana La Ferrara. 2005. "Ethnic Diversity and Economic Performance." *Journal of Economic Literature* 43(3): 721-761.
- Roemer, John, and Woojin Lee. 2006. "Race and Redistribution: A Solution to the Problem of American Exceptionalism." *Journal of Public Economics* 90(6-7): 1027-1052.
- Keefer, Philip. 2007. "Clientelism, credibility, and the policy choices of young democracies." *American journal of political science* 51(4): 804-821.

- Kitschelt, Herbert, and Steven Wilkinson, eds. 2007. *Patrons, Clients, and Policies*. Cambridge University Press.
- Posner, Daniel N. 2007. "Regime change and ethnic cleavages in Africa." *Comparative Political Studies* 40(11): 1302-1327.
- Nichter, Simeon. 2008. "Vote buying or turnout buying? Machine politics and the secret ballot." *American political science review* 102(1): 19-31.
- Dunning, Thad, and Lauren Harrison. 2010. "Cross-cutting cleavages and ethnic voting: An experimental study of cousinage in Mali." *American Political Science Review* 104(1): 21-39.
- Robinson, James A., and Thierry Verdier. 2013. "The political economy of clientelism." *The Scandinavian Journal of Economics* 115(2): 260-291.

Final Exam (12/17): Take home, 2-6 pm

Book Suggestions (not exhaustive list):

- Polanyi, Karl. 2001 [1944]. *The Great Transformation*. Beacon Press.
- Schumpeter, Joseph. 1962. *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*. Perennial Publishing.
- Moore, Barrington Jr. 1966. *Social origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*. Beacon press.
- Myrdal, Gunnar. 1968. *Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations*. Twentieth Century Fund.
- Scott, James. 1976. *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia*. Yale University Press.
- Popkin, Samuel. 1979. *The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam*. University of California Press.
- Skocpol, Theda. 1979. *States and social revolutions: A comparative analysis of France, Russia and China*. Cambridge University Press.
- Fiorina, Morris. 1981. *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections*. Yale University Press.
- Skowronek, Stephen. 1982. *Building a new American state: The expansion of national administrative capacities, 1877-1920*. Cambridge University Press.
- Katzenstein, Pater J. 1985. *Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe*. Cornell University Press.
- Scott, James. 1985. *Weapons of the Weak*. Yale University Press.
- Gourevitch, Peter. 1986. *Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises*. Cornell University Press.
- Przeworski, Adam. 1986. *Capitalism and social democracy*. Cambridge University Press.
- Levi, Margaret. 1988. *Of Rule and Revenue*. University of California Press.
- Tilly, Charles. 1990. *Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1992*. Blackwell.
- Krehbiel, Keith. 1991. *Information and Legislative Organization*. University of Michigan Press.
- Arnold, R. Douglas. 1992. *Logic of Congressional Action*. Yale University Press.
- Putnam, Robert. 1993. *Making Democracy Work*. Princeton University Press.

- Evans, Peter B. 1995. *Embedded autonomy: States and industrial transformation*. Princeton University Press.
- Laver, Michael, and Kenneth A. Shepsle. 1996. *Making and breaking governments: Cabinets and legislatures in parliamentary democracies*. Cambridge University Press.
- Western, Bruce. 1997. *Between Class and Market, Postwar Unionization in the Capitalist Democracies*. Princeton University Press.
- Garrett, Geoffrey. 1998. *Partisan politics in the global economy*. Cambridge University Press.
- Lupia, Arthur, and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1998. *Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need To Know?*. Cambridge University Press.
- Scott, James C. 1998. *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*. Yale University Press.
- Yates, Michael. 1998. *Why Unions Matter*. Monthly Review Press.
- Rose-Ackerman, Susan. 1999. *Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences and Reform*. Cambridge University Press.
- Herbst, Jeffery I. 2000. *States and Power in Africa: comparative lessons in authority and control*. Princeton University Press.
- Poole, Keith and Howard Rosenthal. 2000. *Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting*. Oxford University Press.
- Powell, G. Bingham. 2000. *Elections as instruments of democracy: Majoritarian and proportional visions*. Yale University Press.
- Erem, Suzan. 2001. *Labor Pains: Inside America's New Union Movement*. Monthly Review Press.
- Huber, Evelyne and John D. Stephens. 2001. *Development and Crisis of the Welfare State: Parties and Policies in Global Markets*. The University of Chicago Press
- Murillo, Maria Victoria. 2001. *Labor Unions, Partisan Coalitions, and Market Reforms in Latin America*. Cambridge University Press.
- van de Walle, Nick. 2001. *African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999*. Cambridge University Press.
- Fligstein, Neil. 2002. *The architecture of markets: An economic sociology of twenty-first-century capitalist societies*. Princeton University Press.
- Franzese Jr, Robert J. 2002. *Macroeconomic policies of developed democracies*. Cambridge University Press.

- Swenson, Peter. 2002. *Capitalists against Markets: The Making of Labor Markets and Welfare States in the United States and Sweden*. Oxford University Press.
- Tsebelis, George. 2002. *Veto players: How political institutions work*. Princeton University Press.
- Chandra, Kanchan. 2003. *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed*. Cambridge University Press.
- Chibber, Vivek. 2003. *Locked in Place: State Building and Late Industrialization in India*. Princeton University Press.
- Culpepper, Pepper D. 2003. *Creating Cooperation: How States Develop Human Capital in Europe*. Cornell University Press.
- Lieberman, Evan S. 2003. *Race and regionalism in the politics of taxation in Brazil and South Africa*. Cambridge University Press.
- Mares, Isabela. 2003. *The politics of social risk: Business and welfare state development*. Cambridge University Press.
- Mosley, Layna. 2003. *Global capital and national governments*. Cambridge University Press.
- Varshney, Ashutosh. 2003. *Ethnic conflict and civic life: Hindus and Muslims in India*. Yale University Press.
- Wood, Elisabeth Jean. 2003. *Insurgent collective action and civil war in El Salvador*. Cambridge University Press.
- Kohli, Atul. 2004. *State Directed Development: Political Power and Industrialization in the Global Periphery*. Cambridge University Press.
- Thelen, Kathleen. 2004. *How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of Skills in Germany, Britain, the United States, and Japan*. Cambridge University Press.
- Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2005. *Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy*. Cambridge University Press.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce Alastair Smith, Randolph Siverson, and James Morrow. 2005. *The Logic of Political Survival*. MIT Press.
- Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2005. *Setting the agenda: Responsible party government in the US House of Representatives*. Cambridge University Press.
- Pontusson, Jonas. 2005. *Inequality and Prosperity: Social Europe Vs. Liberal America*. Cornell University Press.
- Posner, Daniel. 2005. *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa*. Cambridge University Press.

- Besley, Timothy. 2006. *Principled Agents? The Political Economy of Good Government* Oxford University Press.
- Greif, Avner. 2006. *Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy*. Cambridge University Press.
- Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2006. *The logic of violence in civil war*. Cambridge University Press.
- McCarty, Nolan, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. 2006. *Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches*. MIT Press.
- Weinstein, Jeremy M. 2006. *Inside rebellion: The politics of insurgent violence*. Cambridge University Press.
- Cammett, Melani. 2007. *Globalization and Business Politics in Arab North Africa: A Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge University Press.
- Chandra, Kanchan. 2007. *Why ethnic parties succeed: Patronage and ethnic head counts in India*. Cambridge University Press.
- Roemer, John E., S. Elizabeth, Woojin Lee, U-jin Yi, and Karine van der Straeten. 2007. *Racism, xenophobia, and distribution: Multi-issue politics in advanced democracies*. Harvard University Press.
- Tomz, Michael. 2007. *Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries*. Princeton University Press.
- Duch, Raymond M., and Randolph T. Stevenson. 2008. *The economic vote: How political and economic institutions condition election results*. Cambridge University Press.
- Dunning, Thad. 2008. *Crude Democracy* Cambridge University Press.
- Haggard, Stephan, and Robert R. Kaufman. 2008. *Development, democracy, and welfare states: Latin America, East Asia, and eastern Europe*. Princeton University Press.
- Gehlbach, Scott. 2008. *Representation through taxation: revenue, politics, and development in postcommunist states*. Cambridge University Press.
- Kenworthy, Lane. 2008. *Jobs with Equality*. Oxford University Press.
- Rudra, Nita. 2008. *Globalization and the Race to the Bottom in Developing Countries*. Cambridge University Press.
- Rueda, David. 2008. *Social Democracy Inside Out: Partisanship and Labor Market Policy in Advanced Industrialized Democracies*. Cambridge University Press.
- Wilkinson, Steven. 2008. *Votes and Violence*. Cambridge University Press

- Gelman, Andrew. 2009. *Red State, Blue State, Rich State, Poor State: Why Americans Vote the Way They Do-Expanded Edition*. Princeton University Press.
- Bendor, Jonathan, Daniel Diermeier, David A. Siegel, Michael M. Ting. 2011. *A Behavioral Theory of Elections*. Princeton University Press.
- Beramendi, Pablo. 2012. *The political geography of inequality: regions and redistribution*. Cambridge University Press.
- Gailmard, Sean, and John W. Patty. 2012. *Learning while governing: Expertise and accountability in the executive branch*. University of Chicago Press.
- Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2013. *Why nations fail: The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty*. Broadway Business.
- North, Douglass, John Joseph Wallis, and Barry Weingast. 2013. *Violence and Social Orders*. Cambridge University Press.
- Ansell, Ben W., and David J. Samuels. 2014. *Inequality and democratization : an elite-competition approach*. Cambridge University Press.
- Boone, Catherine. 2014. *Property and political order in Africa: Land rights and the structure of politics*. Cambridge University Press.
- Rehm, Philipp. 2016. *Risk inequality and welfare states: Social policy preferences, development, and dynamics*. Cambridge University Press.
- Holland, Alisha C. 2017. *Forbearance as redistribution: The politics of informal welfare in Latin America*. Cambridge University Press.