

Online Appendix

*When poor students attend rich schools:
Do affluent social environments increase or decrease participation?*

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Description of Sample

The data used in this study is collected by the Cooperative Institutional Research Program (CIRP) and housed by the Higher Education Research Institute (HERI) at UCLA. The data consists of two annual surveys, which are conducted in hundreds of colleges and universities across the United States. These include “The Freshman Survey,” (1989-2009) which is typically administered during orientation before the academic year begins, and “The College Senior Survey” (1994-2013), which is typically administered upon college exit, at events like graduation rehearsal. CIRP invites schools to administer the survey using a stratified sampling frame, recruiting across levels of selectivity within public and private universities, public four-year colleges, private nonsectarian four-year colleges, Catholic four-year colleges, other religious four-year colleges, two-year colleges, and historically black colleges and universities.¹

The sample includes individuals who are: 1) full-time students, 2) entering postsecondary four-year institutions for the first time in the year that they completed the TFS, 3) US citizens, 4) in the same institution in both waves, 5) spent at least four academic years at the institution regardless of whether they graduated, or spent three years at the institution and indicate they are graduating seniors, and 6) 20 years or younger at the start of their freshman year of college. (The citizenship variable is missing in 1996, 1999, and 2003. All students in these years are coded as “citizens” to avoid losing data.)

When calculating cohort-level variables in freshman year we pool consecutive pairs of freshman cohorts, drawing from a larger, supplementary freshman sample with approximately eight million respondents. (Two school-level predictors: *Mostly female* and *Mostly Black*, are also constructed this way.) This dataset is larger because it includes respondents interviewed in their freshman year regardless of whether they were re-interviewed. It also includes students who are not full-time first-time students, not citizens, and those older than 20 as of freshman year. We combine students in the respondent’s freshman year and the preceding year’s cohort. We do not use the year after, because we want to measure the norms set by the older and thus higher-status cohort. We only include cases where we have self-reported family income data from at least 100 respondents from the school across these two cohorts.


Income is measured using the following question from the freshman year survey: “What is your best estimate of your parents’ total income last year? Consider income from all sources before taxes.” Students then choose a category aligning with their best estimate. For each year, we identify a category that best approximates the 20th percentile of the national income distribution. Students within or below this category are labeled “low-income.” Students identified as “low-income” have parental incomes of no more than \$15,000 in TFS years 1989 and 1990, \$20,000 in TFS years 1991 through 1999, and \$25,000 in TFS years 2000 to 2009. For each year, we also identify a category that best approximates the 90th percentile of the national income distribution. Students within or above this category are labeled “high-income.” Students identified as “high-income” have incomes of at least \$60,000 in TFS years 1989 through 1994, \$75,000 in TFS years 1995 through 2005, and \$100,000 in TFS years 2006 to

¹Lists of colleges and universities that participated in the [TFS](#) and [CSS](#), information about [when the TFS is administered](#), and information about [the sampling frame](#) are available on the HERI website.

2013. Students who are neither “low-income” nor “high-income” are labeled “middle-income.” We bin income into three categories in order to ensure that we have enough variance at the extreme values of income for our interaction models, while also potentially capturing non-linear effects (see Hainmueller, Mummolo, and Xu 2019), as well as providing an operationalization of income consistent with the conceptualization in the literature (Gilens 2012). In other work (Redacted), we show that there is no difference in results obtained using this national measure of affluence as opposed a regional measure of affluence. Specifically, we find that whether we measure income relative to the national or regional distribution, or by adding information on zip code median income, does not make a difference.

Figure 1 shows the distribution of low-income (LIS), middle-income (MIS), and high-income (HIS) students from the HERI sample across the categories of school affluence (i.e. the percentage of high-income students in the cohort). The affluence categories are created by separating the low-income student sample into quintiles. Our sample contains about 7% low-income students, equal to national samples (Carnevale and Strohl 2010, 73). Low-income students attend schools from across the affluence distribution. However, the typical university is increasingly affluent (Bailey and Dynarski 2011). This suggests that those low-income students who attend college are becoming increasingly likely to attend affluent universities.

Figure 1: Distribution of Students across Levels of Cohort Affluence (HERI)



We considered using other datasets to supplement our analysis of the HERI data. For example, Dale and Krueger (2002) use the College and Beyond dataset to estimate the payoff to college selectivity. The strategy used by Dale and Krueger (2002) offers useful ways of dealing with selection bias in studies of education. However, it does not reduce selection bias from students' choice among the schools to which they are admitted. It thus does not entirely solve the problem of selection bias from student choice. In addition, Dale and Krueger (2002) were unable to control on the actual lagged dependent variable and had to use proxies. We are able to use some actual lagged dependent variables with the HERI data. Finally, the Dale & Krueger dataset includes only about 200 low-income students with complete data on our variables of interest. Thus it lacks the statistical power that the HERI dataset affords.

Variable Wording, Coding, and Distributions

All descriptive statistics are listed for (i) the full HERI sample and (ii) the sample of low-income students (LIS). Variables are coded based on their distributions and conceptual definitions. For control indicator variables, we collapse categories that have similar effects when this makes no difference to estimates of interest. The variables are listed as follows, with accompanying descriptive statistics and coding information in Tables 1 through 4: (i) dependent variables in Table 1, (ii) individual- and cohort-level control variables in Table 2, (iii) mediators, moderators, and intervening outcomes in Table 3, and (iv) selection bias variables, including those used for the subset analyses and the instrumental variables analysis, in Table 4. All variables are coded from 0 to 1 unless noted otherwise.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Coding Information for Dependent Variables (TFS and CSS)

<i>Stems</i>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Act in college: "Since entering college have you (Yes, or No):" Act in past year: "For the activities listed below, please indicate how often (Frequently, Occasionally, or Not at all) you engaged in each during the past year." Goal: "Indicate the importance (Essential, Very important, Somewhat important, or Not important) to you personally of each of the following:" Self-rated change: "Compared with when you entered this college, how would you now describe your (Much stronger, Stronger, No change, Weaker, or Much weaker):" 	
Dependent Variables	Years and Distributional Info
Passive Engagement Index	
Passive engagement index is the mean of the following variables, dropping observations with 5 or 6 items missing: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Goal: "Keeping up to date with political affairs" (TFS/CSS) Goal: "Influencing the political structure" (TFS/CSS) 	TFS years: 1989-2009 CSS years: 1994-2013 <u>Full Sample</u> TFS: Mean = .42; SD= .21 CSS: Mean = .43; SD=.22 <u>LIS Sample</u> TFS: Mean = .42; SD=.22

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Goal: “Influencing social values” (TFS/CSS) • Goal: “Participating in a community action program” (TFS/CSS) • Goal: “Becoming a community leader” (TFS/CSS) • Act in past year: “Discussed politics” (TFS/CSS) 	<p>CSS: Mean = .43; SD=.23</p> <p>TFS: Cronbach alpha = .79 for LIS and .78 for entire sample</p> <p>CSS: Cronbach alpha = .82 for LIS and .81 for entire sample</p>
<p>Goal: “Keeping up to date with political affairs” (TFS/CSS): 0=Not important, .33=Somewhat important, .66=Very important, 1=Essential</p>	<p>TFS years: 1989 –2009 CSS years: 1996 – 2013</p> <p><u>Full Sample:</u> TFS: Mean = .44; SD = .30 CSS: Mean = .48; SD = .30</p> <p><u>LIS Sample:</u> TFS: Mean = .41; SD = .31 CSS: Mean = .46; SD = .31</p>
<p>Goal: “Influencing the political structure” (TFS/CSS): 0=Not important, .33=Somewhat important, .66=Very important, 1=Essential</p>	<p>TFS years: 1989 – 2009 CSS years: 1994 – 2013</p> <p><u>Full Sample:</u> TFS: Mean = .28; SD = .28 CSS: Mean = .29; SD = .30</p> <p><u>LIS Sample:</u> TFS: Mean = .30; SD = .30 CSS: Mean = .31; SD = .30</p>
<p>Goal: “Influencing social values” (TFS/CSS): 0=Not important, .33=Somewhat important, .66=Very important, 1=Essential</p>	<p>TFS years: 1989 – 2009 CSS years: 1994 – 2013</p> <p><u>Full Sample:</u> TFS: Mean = .46; SD = .28 CSS: Mean = .50; SD = .30</p> <p><u>LIS Sample:</u> TFS: Mean = .49; SD = .29 CSS: Mean = .53; SD = .30</p>
<p>Goal: “Participating in a community action program” (TFS/CSS): 0=Not important, .33=Somewhat important, .66=Very important, 1=Essential</p>	<p>TFS years: 1989 – 2009 CSS years: 1994 – 2013</p> <p><u>Full Sample:</u> TFS: Mean = .38; SD = .28 CSS: Mean = .40; SD = .29</p> <p><u>LIS Sample:</u> TFS: Mean = .40; SD = .29 CSS: Mean = .42; SD = .30</p>
<p>Goal: “Becoming a community leader” (TFS/CSS): 0=Not important, .33=Somewhat</p>	<p>TFS years: 1989 – 2009 CSS years: 1996 – 2013</p>

important, .66=Very important, 1=Essential	<u>Full Sample:</u> TFS: Mean=0.42, SD=0.30 CSS: Mean=0.43, SD=0.31 <u>LIS Sample:</u> TFS: Mean=0.43, SD=0.31 CSS: Mean=0.44, SD=0.32
Act in past year: "Discussed politics" (TFS/CSS): 0=Not at all, .5=Occasionally, 1=Frequently	TFS years: 1989 – 2009 CSS years: 1996 – 2013 <u>Full Sample:</u> TFS: Mean = .54; SD = .33 CSS: Mean = .49; SD = .33 <u>LIS Sample:</u> TFS: Mean = .5; SD = .34 CSS: Mean = .45; SD = .33
Electoral Participation	
Participate in campaign (TFS/CSS) Act in past year: "Worked on a local, state, or national campaign": 0=Not at all, 1=Occasionally or Frequently	TFS years: 1992; 1995-1997; 2004; 2005; 2007; 2008 CSS years: 1996-1999; 2001, 2008-2013 <u>Full Sample:</u> TFS: Mean = .11; SD = .31 CSS: Mean = .10; SD = .30 <u>LIS Sample:</u> TFS: Mean = .10; SD = .29 CSS: Mean = .11; SD = .31
Voted in national election (CSS) Act in college: "Voted in a state/national election" (1995-1998): 0=No, 1= Yes Act in past year: "Voted in a state/national election" (2001): 0=Not at all, 1=Occasionally or Frequently Act in college: "Voted in a state/national election" (2005-2007): 0=Not at all, 1=Occasionally or Frequently Act in college: "Voted in the 2008 presidential election" (2009): 0=No, 1= Yes Act in college: "Voted in the 2012 fall election" (2013): 0=No, 1= Yes	CSS years: 1995-1998; 2001; 2005-2007; 2009; 2013 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .74; SD = .44 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .68; SD = .47

Non-Electoral Participation	
<p>Protest involvement (TFS/CSS)</p> <p>TFS: “What is your best guess as to the chances that you will participate in student protests or demonstrations”: 0=No chance, 0.34=Very little chance, 0.67=Some chance, 1=Very good chance</p> <p>CSS: Act in past year: “Participated in organized demonstrations” (1994-2006): 0=Not at all, 1=Occasionally or Frequently</p> <p>Act in past year: “Participated in political demonstrations” (2007-2008): 0=Not at all, 1=Occasionally or Frequently</p> <p>Act in past year: “Participated in student protests or demonstrations” (2009): 0=Not at all, 1=Occasionally or Frequently</p>	<p>TFS years: 1989-2009 CSS years: 1994-2009</p> <p><u>Full Sample:</u> TFS: Mean = .38; SD = .28 CSS: Mean = .20; SD = .40</p> <p><u>LIS Sample:</u> TFS: Mean = .40; SD = .29 CSS: Mean = .24; SD = .42</p>
Campus Leadership	
<p>Lead student organization (CSS)</p> <p>Act in college: “Been a leader in an organization”: 0=No, 1=Yes</p>	<p>CSS: 2010-2013</p> <p><u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .61; SD = .49</p> <p><u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .58; SD = .49</p>
<p>Elected to student government (CSS)</p> <p>Act in college: “Been elected to student government”: 0=No, 1=Yes</p>	<p>CSS years: 1995 – 2006</p> <p><u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .15; SD = .35</p> <p><u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .15; SD = .35</p>

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics and Coding Information for Control Variables (TFS)

Control Variables	Years and Distributional Info
Individual-level	
<p>High standardized test score² (TFS, based on SAT or converted ACT): “What were your scores on the SAT and/or ACT?”: 1=1220 or above (80th percentile for low-income students), 0=Below 1220</p>	<p>TFS years: 1989-2009</p> <p><u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .35; SD = .48</p> <p><u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .19; SD = .39</p>

² To avoid dropping cases where students are missing test scores, we code *high standardized test score* as 1 if student’s test score is above 1220 on the SAT and 0 if it is below that threshold or missing and include a dummy variable for students who are *missing test score*.

Missing test score (TFS): 1=Yes, 0=No	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .09; SD = .29 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .15; SD = .36
Female (TFS): “Your sex:” 1=Female, 0=Male	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .61; SD = .49 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .69; SD = .46
Asian (TFS): “Are you:” 1=Asian, 0=Otherwise	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .04; SD = .20 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .08; SD = .28
Latino (TFS): 1=Latino, 0=Otherwise	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .03; SD = .18 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .11; SD = .31
Black (TFS): 1=Black, 0=Otherwise	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .04; SD = .18 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .12; SD = .33
Other race (TFS) ³ : 1=Other race, 0=Otherwise	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .06; SD = .24 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .09; SD = .28
Jewish (TFS): 1 if Jewish, 0 if otherwise: “Current religious preference:” 1=Jewish, 0=Otherwise	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .02; SD = .13 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .01; SD = .09
Catholic (TFS): 1=Catholic, 0=Otherwise	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .43; SD = .49 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .33; SD = .47
Evangelical ⁴ (TFS): 1=Evangelical, 0=Otherwise	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .07; SD = .25 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .12; SD = .32
Other or no religion ⁵ (TFS): 1=Other or no religion, 0=Otherwise	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .17; SD = .38 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .24; SD = .43
English second language (TFS): “Is English your native language?”: 1=No, 0=Yes	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .04; SD = .19 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .14; SD = .35
Age 17 or less (TFS): “How old will you be on December 31 of this year?”: 1=Age 17 or less, 0=Otherwise	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .02; SD = .13 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .03; SD = .16
Age 19 (TFS): 1=Age 19, 0=Otherwise	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .26; SD = .44 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .25; SD = .43

³ Includes: “Other”, “Two or More Race/Ethnicity”, and “American Indian”

⁴ Includes: “Baptist” and “Seventh Day Adventist”

⁵ Includes: “Other religion”, “None”, “Muslim”, and “Buddhist”

Age 20 (TFS): 1=Age 20, 0=Otherwise	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .00 SD = .06 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .01; SD = .11
Social Science ⁶ (TFS): “Below is a list of different undergraduate major fields grouped into general categories. Mark only one oval to indicate your probable field of study.”: 1=Social Science, 0=Otherwise	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .23; SD = .42 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .25; SD = .43
Humanities ⁷ (TFS): 1=Humanities, 0=Otherwise	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .10; SD = .31 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .11; SD = .31
Science ⁸ (TFS): 1=Science, 0=Otherwise	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .34; SD = .47 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .32; SD = .47
Business (TFS): 1=Business, 0=Otherwise	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .17; SD = .37 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .15; SD = .36
Attend to make money (TFS): “In deciding to go to college, how important to you was each of the following reasons? To be able to make more money”: 1=Very important, 0=Not important or Somewhat important	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .63; SD = .48 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .65; SD = .48
Cohort-level: (Aggregate individual-level variables listed above)⁹	
Proportion high standardized test score (TFS): Continuous (0 to 1)	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .36; SD = .27 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .27; SD = .24
Proportion Asian (TFS): 1 if Asian is 5% or higher, 0 otherwise	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .34; SD = .47 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .36; SD = .48
Proportion Latino (TFS): 1 if Latino is 6% or higher, 0 otherwise	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .18; SD = .38 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .26; SD = .44

⁶ Includes: “Social Sciences”, “History or Political Science”, and “Education”

⁷ Includes: “Humanities (Other)”, “English”, and “Fine Arts”

⁸Includes: “Agriculture”, “Biological Sciences”, “Engineering”, “Health Professional”, “Mathematics/Statistics”, “Physical Sciences”, and “Other Technical”

⁹ Cohort-level control variables were coded categorically when they exhibited a skewed distribution. In a robustness check, we find that the main results are unchanged when we code all cohort-level control variables categorically.

Proportion Other race (TFS): 1 if other race is 10% or higher, 0 otherwise	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .18; SD = .38 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .24; SD = .43
Proportion Jewish (TFS): 1 if Jewish is 3% or higher, 0 otherwise	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .22; SD = .41 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .19; SD = .40
Proportion Catholic (TFS): 1 if Catholic is 50% or higher, 0 otherwise	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .39; SD = .49 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .34; SD = .47
Proportion Evangelical (TFS): 1 if Evangelical is 12.5% or higher, 0 otherwise	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .14; SD = .35 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .20; SD = .40
Proportion other or no religion (TFS): 1 if Proportion other or no religion is 25% or higher, 0 otherwise	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .23; SD = .42 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .26; SD = .44
Proportion English second language (TFS): Continuous (0 to 1)	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .06; SD = .06 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .08; SD = .10
Proportion starting college at 17 or younger (TFS): Continuous (0 to 1)	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .02; SD = .01 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .02; SD = .01
Proportion starting college at 19 (TFS): Continuous (0 to 1)	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .27; SD = .08 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .26; SD = .08
Proportion starting college at 20 (TFS): Continuous (0 to 1)	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .02; SD = .02 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .02; SD = .02
Proportion intending to major in social sciences (TFS): Continuous (0 to 1)	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .23; SD = .09 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .24; SD = .09
Proportion intending to major in humanities (TFS): Continuous (0 to 1)	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .11; SD = .09 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .11; SD = .10
Proportion intending to major in science (TFS): Continuous (0 to 1)	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .33; SD = .14 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .32; SD = .15
Proportion intending to major in business (TFS): Continuous (0 to 1)	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .17; SD = .09 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .16; SD = .08
Proportion attending to make money (TFS): Continuous (0 to 1)	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .63; SD = .10 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .65; SD = .12
School-level:	

Mostly Female (TFS): 1 if female proportion is higher than 90%, 0 otherwise	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .03; SD = .16 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .06; SD = .23
Mostly Black (TFS): 1 if black proportion is higher than 80%, 0 otherwise	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .01; SD = .11 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .04; SD = .20
Large Student body (IPEDS): 1 if student body greater than or equal to 920 (80 th percentile for low-income students), 0 otherwise	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .35; SD = .48 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .30; SD = .46
Public university (TFS): 1 if public school, 0 otherwise	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .13; SD = .33 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .15; SD = .36
Four-year college (TFS): 1 if four-year college, 0 if university	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .73; SD = .44 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .77; SD = .42
Northeast (TFS): 1 if in Northeast, 0 otherwise Schools in the following states are coded as being in the “Northeast”: Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont, New Jersey, New York, Connecticut, Pennsylvania.	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .37; SD = .48 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .38; SD = .48
Southern (TFS): 1 if in South, 0 otherwise Schools in the following states are coded as being “Southern”: Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, Alabama, Kentucky, Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas, Mississippi, Tennessee.	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .16; SD = .37 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .17; SD = .37

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics and Coding Information for Mediator, Moderator, and Intervening Variables (TFS and CSS)

<p><i>Stems</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Act in past year: “For the activities listed below, please indicate how often (Frequently, Occasionally, or Not at all) you engaged in each during the past year.” • Satisfaction: “Please rate your satisfaction (Very satisfied, Satisfied, Neutral, Dissatisfied, Very dissatisfied, or Can’t rate/no experience) with your current (or most recent) college in each area.” • Self-rating: “Rate yourself on each of the following traits as compared to the average person (Highest 10%, Above average, Average, Below average, or Lowest 10%) your age. We want the most accurate estimate of how you see yourself.” • Self-rated change: “Compared to when you first started college, how would you describe your
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(Much stronger, Stronger, No change, Weaker, or Much Weaker):”	
Intervening, Mediator and Moderator Variables	Years and Distributional Info
Psychological Mechanism – Individual	
Emotional health (TFS/CSS) Self-rating: “Emotional health”: 0=Lowest 10%, .25=Below average, .5=Average, .75=Above average, 1=Highest 10%	CSS years: 1994-2013 TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample</u> TFS: Mean = .69; SD = .22 CSS: Mean = .68; SD = .22 <u>LIS Sample</u> TFS: Mean = .65; SD = .22 CSS: Mean = .65; SD = .22
High self-rated emotional health (TFS): 1 if “Highest 10%”, 0 if not.	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample</u> : Mean = .21; SD = .41 <u>LIS Sample</u> : Mean = .17; SD = .38
Psychological health (CSS) Scale includes: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Experienced Depression (CSS) 2. Experienced Loneliness (CSS) 3. Self-rated Emotional Health (CSS) 	CSS years: 1994-2009 <u>Full Sample</u> : Mean = .45; SD = .15 <u>LIS Sample</u> : Mean = .46; SD = .16 CSS: Cronbach alpha = .62 for LIS and .64 for entire sample
Experienced loneliness (CSS) Act in past year: “Felt lonely or homesick”: 0=Frequently, .5=Occasionally, 1=Not at all	CSS years: 1994-2009 <u>Full Sample</u> : Mean = .31; SD = .29 <u>LIS Sample</u> : Mean = .33; SD = .30
Experienced depression (CSS) Act in past year: “Felt depressed”: 0=Frequently, .5=Occasionally, 1=Not at all	CSS years: 1994-2013 <u>Full Sample</u> : Mean = .35; SD = .30 <u>LIS Sample</u> : Mean = .39; SD = .31
Self-rated motivation to lead <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Self-rated drive to achieve (TFS/CSS) 2. Self-rated competitiveness (TFS/CSS) 3. Self-rated leadership ability (TFS/CSS) 4. Self-rated public speaking ability (TFS/CSS) 	TFS years: 1989-2001; 2007 CSS years: 1994-2007; 2011-2013 <u>Full Sample</u> TFS: Mean = .67; SD = .16 CSS: Mean = .69; SD = .16 <u>LIS Sample</u> TFS: Mean = .65; SD = .17 CSS: Mean = .67; SD = .17 TFS: Cronbach alpha = .71 for LIS and .68 for entire sample

	CSS: Cronbach alpha = .73 for LIS and .72 for entire sample
Self-rated drive to achieve (TFS/CSS): Self-rating: "Drive to achieve": 0=Lowest 10%, .25=Below average, .5=Average, .75=Above average, 1=Highest 10%	TFS years: 1989-2003; 2005-2009 CSS years: 1994-2013 <u>Full Sample</u> TFS: Mean = .78; SD = .19 CSS: Mean = .77; SD = .20 <u>LIS Sample</u> TFS: Mean = .78; SD = .20 CSS: Mean = .76; SD = .21
Self-rated competitiveness (TFS/CSS): Self-rating: "Competitiveness": 0=Lowest 10%, .25=Below average, .5=Average, .75=Above average, 1=Highest 10%	TFS years: 1989-2001; 2007 CSS years: 1994-2005 <u>Full Sample</u> TFS: Mean = .67; SD = .23 CSS: Mean = .67; SD = .23 <u>LIS Sample</u> TFS: Mean = .64; SD = .23 CSS: Mean = .67; SD = .23
Self-rated leadership ability (TFS/CSS): Self-rating: "Leadership ability": 0=Lowest 10%, .25=Below average, .5=Average, .75=Above average, 1=Highest 10%	TFS years: 1989-2003; 2005-2009 CSS years: 1994-2013 <u>Full Sample</u> TFS: Mean = .69; SD = .22 CSS: Mean = .71; SD = .21 <u>LIS Sample</u> TFS: Mean = .66; SD = .23 CSS: Mean = .69; SD = .22
Self-rated public speaking ability (TFS/CSS): Self-rating: "Public speaking ability": 0=Lowest 10%, .25=Below average, .5=Average, .75=Above average, 1=Highest 10%	TFS years: 1989-2003; 2005-2009 CSS years: 1994-2013 <u>Full Sample</u> TFS: Mean = .56; SD = .25 CSS: Mean = .62; SD = .23 <u>LIS Sample</u> TFS: Mean = .53; SD = .26 CSS: Mean = .60; SD = .23
Psychological Mechanism – Aggregate	
Aggregate self-rated emotional health (CSS)	CSS years: 1994-2013 <u>Full Sample</u> : Mean = .68; SD = .04
Cohort average of self-rated emotional health	<u>LIS Sample</u> : Mean = .67; SD = .04
Aggregate change in self-rated emotional health (CSS-TFS)	CSS years: 1994-2013 <u>Full Sample</u> : Mean = -.01; SD = .03 <u>LIS Sample</u> : Mean = .00; SD = .04

Cohort average of change in self-rated emotional health	
Aggregate self-rated motivation to lead (CSS)	CSS years: 1994-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .69; SD = .04
Cohort average of self-rated motivation to lead	<u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .69; SD = .04
Aggregate change in self-rated motivation to lead (CSS-TFS)	CSS years: 1994-2008 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .02; SD = .03
Cohort average of change in self-rated motivation to lead	<u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .02; SD = .03
Financial Mechanism – Individual	
Financial aid ratio (TFS) Percent of college costs paid for by grants and scholarships from the college (see further description of financial aid measurement on p. 27)	TFS years: 1989-2000 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .18; SD = .24 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .21; SD = .26
High financial aid ratio (TFS) 1 if financial aid percentage is above low-income median value, 0 if not.	TFS years: 1989-2000 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .44; SD = .50 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .50; SD = .50
Financial concern (TFS) “Do you have any concern about your ability to finance your college education?”: 0=None, 0.5=Some, 1=Major	TFS years: 1989; 1992; 1994-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .39; SD = .32 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .58; SD = .32
High financial concern (TFS) 0=None or Some, 1=Major	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .12; SD = .32 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .11; SD = .31
Working fewer hours for pay (CSS) “Please indicate the extent to which each of the following describes you: Working (for pay)” 0=Over 20 hours, 0.143=16-20 hours, 0.286=11-15 hours, 0.429=6-10 hours, 0.571=3-5 hours, 0.714=1-2 hours, 0.857=less than 1 hour, 1=None	CSS years: 1994-2004 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .45; SD = .34 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .32; SD = .30
Working fewer hours for pay (additional years) (CSS) Extends measure above from 2005 to 2013 using the sum of the following measures:	CSS years: 1994-2013 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .56; SD= .32 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .46; SD = .31

<p>“Please indicate the extent to which each of the following describes you: Working (for pay) on campus”</p> <p>0=Over 20 hours, 0.143=16-20 hours, 0.286=11-15 hours, 0.429=6-10 hours, 0.571=3-5 hours, 0.714=1-2 hours, 0.857=less than 1 hour, 1=None</p> <p>“Please indicate the extent to which each of the following describes you: Working (for pay) off campus”</p> <p>0=Over 20 hours, 0.143=16-20 hours, 0.286=11-15 hours, 0.429=6-10 hours, 0.571=3-5 hours, 0.714=1-2 hours, 0.857=less than 1 hour, 1=None</p>	
<p>Amount of aid from working part-time on campus (TFS)</p> <p>“How much of your first year’s educational expenses (room, board, tuition, and fees) do you expect to cover from each of the sources listed below? Part-time job on campus” (see further details on measurement of funding sources on p. 27)</p>	<p>TFS years: 1989-2000</p> <p><u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .85; SD = .23</p> <p><u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .80; SD = .25</p>
<p>Financial Mechanism – School Level</p>	
<p>Aggregate low-income financial concern (TFS)</p> <p>Average of low-income students’ self-reported financial concern at the school</p>	<p>TFS years: 1989-2009</p> <p><u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .85; SD = .05</p> <p><u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .86; SD = .05</p>
<p>High aggregate low-income student financial concern (TFS)</p> <p>1 if above low-income median (.87), 0 if not</p>	<p>TFS years: 1989-2009</p> <p><u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .40; SD = .49</p> <p><u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .50; SD = .50</p>
<p>Institutional Mechanism – School Level</p>	
<p>Low-income aid ratio (TFS)</p> <p>Ratio of the amount of financial aid received from the school in grants and scholarships relative to the total cost of attending the school, averaged across all low-income students in the</p>	<p>TFS years: 1989-2000</p> <p><u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .22; SD = .18</p>

cohort (see further description of financial aid measurement on p. 27)	
Dormitory and dining hall closing index (Original data) Index measuring whether dorms and dining halls are closed during break: 1 if both dorms and dining halls are closed during non-summer breaks, 0 if otherwise	Data were collected during the 2015-2016 academic year. <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .38; SD = .49 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .37; SD = .48
School loan ratio (CSS) Ratio of loan amounts taken up by low-income students over high-income students, on average per school ¹⁰	CSS years: 1994-2013 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .18; SD = .07 ¹¹ <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .18; SD = .08
High school loan ratio (CSS) 1 if loan amount ratio is above the low-income median (.17), 0 if not	CSS years: 1994-2013 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .51; SD = .5 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .48; SD = .5
Political Mechanism – Cohort Norm	
Cohort Political Norm (TFS) Cohort average of passive engagement index	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .42; SD = .05 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .41; SD = .05
Cohort Turnout Rate (CSS) Cohort average of voted in national election	CSS years: 1994-2013 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .74; SD = .11 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .73 SD = .12
Academic Mechanism – Individual	
High H.S. GPA (TFS) “What was your average grade in high school?”: 1 if A- or above, 0 if not	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .62 SD = 0.49 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .53 SD = 0.5
Academic competence (TFS/CSS): Scale includes: 1. Self-rated academic ability 2. Self-rated intellectual confidence TFS: Cronbach alpha =	TFS years: 1989-2003; 2005-2009 CSS years: 1994-2013 <u>Full Sample</u> TFS: Mean = .73; SD = .16 CSS: Mean = .74; SD = .16 <u>LIS Sample</u>

¹⁰ Based on the following individual-level CSS measure: If you borrowed money to help pay for college expenses, estimate how much you will owe as of June.

¹¹ When not rescaled to range from 0 to 1, this variable has a mean of 1.12 for all students and 1.11 for low-income students.

<p>.60 for LIS and .61 for entire sample</p> <p>CSS: Cronbach alpha = .64 for LIS and .63 for entire sample</p>	<p>TFS: Mean = .69; SD = .17 CSS: Mean = .71; SD = .17</p>
<p>High academic competence (TFS): 1 if above median low-income academic competence, 0 if not</p>	<p>TFS years: 1989-2003; 2005-2009 CSS years: 1994-2013 <u>Full Sample</u>: Mean = .29; SD = .46 <u>LIS Sample</u>: Mean = .24; SD = .43</p>
<p>Change in academic competence: (CSS-TFS) Scale includes:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Change in self-rated academic ability 2. Change in self-rated intellectual confidence 	<p>CSS years: 1994-2013 <u>Full Sample</u>: Mean = .01; SD = .16 <u>LIS Sample</u>: Mean = .02; SD = .17</p>
<p>Self-rated academic ability (TFS/CSS)</p> <p>Self-rating: "Academic ability": 0=Lowest 10%, .25=Below average, .5=Average, .75=Above average, 1=Highest 10%</p>	<p>TFS years: 1989-2003; 2005-2009 CSS years: 1994-2013 <u>Full Sample</u> TFS: Mean = .76; SD = .17 CSS: Mean = .76; SD = .18 <u>LIS Sample</u> TFS: Mean = .72; SD = .18 CSS: Mean = .72; SD = .18</p>
<p>Self-rated intellectual confidence (TFS/CSS):</p> <p>Self-rating: "Self-confidence (Intellectual)": 0=Lowest 10%, .25=Below average, .5=Average, .75=Above average, 1=Highest 10%</p>	<p>TFS years: 1989-2003; 2005-2009 CSS years: 1994-2013 <u>Full Sample</u> TFS: Mean = .69; SD = .20 CSS: Mean = .72; SD = .20 <u>LIS Sample</u> TFS: Mean = .67; SD = .21 CSS: Mean = .70; SD = .21</p>
<p>Self-rated change in academic competence 2, robustness measure (CSS):</p> <p>Scale includes:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Self-rated change critical thinking 2. Self-rated change analytical thinking and problem-solving skills 	<p>CSS years: 1994-2009 <u>Full Sample</u>: Mean = .83; SD = .14 <u>LIS Sample</u>: Mean = .83; SD = .14</p> <p>CSS: Cronbach alpha = .78 for LIS and .77 for entire sample</p>
<p>Self-rated change in critical thinking (CSS)</p> <p>Self-rated change: "Ability to think critically": 0=Much weaker, 0.25=Weaker, 0.5=No change,</p>	<p>CSS years: 1994-2009 <u>Full Sample</u>: Mean = .84; SD = .15 <u>LIS Sample</u>: Mean = .83; SD = .16</p>

0.75=Stronger, 1=Much stronger	
Academic Mechanism – Aggregate	
Aggregate academic confidence (CSS) Cohort average of academic competence	CSS years: 1994-2013 <u>Full Sample</u> : Mean = .74; SD = .03 <u>LIS Sample</u> : Mean = .73; SD = .03
Change in aggregate academic confidence (CSS-TFS) Cohort average of change in academic competence	CSS years: 1994-2013 <u>Full Sample</u> : Mean = .01; SD = .03 <u>LIS Sample</u> : Mean = .02; SD = .03
Social Mechanism – Individual	
Social satisfaction (CSS) Scale includes: 1. Satisfaction with college experience 2. Satisfaction with sense of community CSS: Cronbach alpha = .68 for LIS and .68 for entire sample	CSS years: 1994-2013 <u>Full Sample</u> : Mean = .75; SD = .19 <u>LIS Sample</u> : Mean = .72; SD = .20
Satisfaction with college experience (CSS) Satisfaction: “Overall college experience”: 0=Very dissatisfied, .25=Dissatisfied, .5=Neutral, .75=Satisfied, 1=Very satisfied	CSS years: 1994-2013 <u>Full Sample</u> : Mean = .80; SD = .19 <u>LIS Sample</u> : Mean = .77; SD = .2
Satisfaction with sense of community (CSS): Rating of satisfaction with overall sense of community among students Satisfaction: “Overall sense of community on campus”: 0=Very dissatisfied, .25=Dissatisfied, .5=Neutral, .75=Satisfied, 1=Very satisfied	CSS years: 1994-2013 <u>Full Sample</u> : Mean = .70; SD = .25 <u>LIS Sample</u> : Mean = .66; SD = .25
Self-rated social self-confidence (TFS/CSS) Self-rating: “Self-confidence (social)”: 0=Lowest 10%, .25=Below average, .5=Average, .75=Above average, 1=Highest 10%	TFS years: 1989-2003; 2005-2009 CSS years: 1994-2013 <u>Full Sample</u> TFS: Mean = .62; SD = .22 CSS: Mean = .66; SD = .22 <u>LIS Sample</u> TFS: Mean = .60; SD = .23 CSS: Mean = .65; SD = .23
High self-rated social self-confidence (TFS)	TFS years: 1989-2003; 2005-2009 <u>Full Sample</u> : Mean = .48; SD = .50

1 if self-rated social self-confidence is above low-income median (0.5), 0 otherwise.	<u>LIS Sample</u> : Mean = .44; SD = .50
Social Well-Being (TFS/CSS): Scale includes: 1. Self-rated social self-confidence (TFS/CSS) 2. Self-rated social popularity (TFS/CSS)	TFS years: 1989-2003; 2008-2009 CSS years: 1994-1995, 1999-2005 <u>Full Sample</u> TFS: Mean = .61; SD = .18 CSS: Mean = .63; SD = .18 <u>LIS Sample</u> TFS: Mean = .58; SD = .19 CSS: Mean = .62; SD = .19 TFS: Cronbach alpha = .69 for LIS and .70 for entire sample CSS: Cronbach alpha = .70 for LIS and .71 for entire sample
Self-rated social popularity (TFS/CSS) Self-rating: "Popularity": 0=Lowest 10%, .25=Below average, .5=Average, .75=Above average, 1=Highest 10%	TFS years: 1989-2003; 2008-2009 CSS years: 1994-1995, 1999-2005 <u>Full Sample</u> TFS: Mean = .59; SD = .18 CSS: Mean = .60; SD = .19 <u>LIS Sample</u> TFS: Mean = .56; SD = .20 CSS: Mean = .58; SD = .20
Social Mechanism – Aggregate	
Aggregate social self-confidence (TFS/CSS) Cohort average of self-rated social self-confidence	TFS years: 1989-2009 CSS years: 1994-2013 <u>Full Sample</u> TFS: Mean = .62; SD = .04 CSS: Mean = .66; SD = .03 <u>LIS Sample</u> TFS: Mean = .62; SD = .04 CSS: Mean = .66; SD = .04
High aggregate social self-confidence (TFS) 1 if cohort average is above low-income median (.62), 0 if not	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample</u> : Mean = .55; SD = .50 <u>LIS Sample</u> : Mean = .50; SD = .50
Change in aggregate social self-confidence (CSS-TFS): Cohort average of change in social self-	CSS years: 1994-2013 <u>Full Sample</u> : Mean = .04; SD = .04 <u>LIS Sample</u> : Mean = .05; SD = .04

confidence	
Additional Tests	
First-generation college student (TFS) “What is the highest level of formal education obtained by your parents?: 1= If neither of the student’s parents attended college, 0 otherwise	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .14, SD= 0.35 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .38, SD= .49
Political ideology (TFS) “How would you characterize your political views?”: 1= “conservative” or “far right”; 0 = “liberal” or “far left” (omits moderates)	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .51; SD = .50 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .43; SD = .49
Aggregate political ideology (TFS) Cohort average of political ideology	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .50; SD = .20 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .48; SD = .21
High cohort aggregate political ideology (TFS) 1 if above low-income median (.45), 0 if not	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .48; SD = .50 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .40; SD = .49

Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Subset and Instrumental Variables Analyses (TFS)

Stems	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Choose to attend: “Below are some reasons that might have influenced your decision to attend this particular college. How important (Very important, Somewhat important, or Not important) was each reason in your decision to come here?” 	
Variables	Years and Distributional Info
Continuous measure of distance from home to college that attended (TFS) “How many miles is this college from your permanent home?”: 1=10 mi or less, 2=11-50 mi, 3=51-100 mi, 4=101-500 mi, 5=more than 500 mi	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = 3.45; SD = 1.21 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = 3.11; SD = 1.32
Binary measure of distance from home to college (Less than 50 miles) (TFS) 1 = Less than 50 miles to home, 0 = If otherwise	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .25; SD = .44 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .37; SD = .48
Binary measure of distance from home to college (Less than 100 miles) (TFS)	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .41; SD = .49 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .53; SD = .50

1 = Less than 100 miles to home, 0 = If otherwise	
Binary measure of school affluence 1 = School is in top affluence category, 0 = If otherwise.	CSS years: 1994-2013 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .38; SD = .48 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .20; SD = .40
Chose to attend school because I wanted to live near home (TFS) Choose to attend: "I wanted to live near home": 1="Somewhat" or "Very" important, 0="Not at all important"	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .42; SD = .49 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .50; SD = .50
Chose to attend school because the athletics department recruited me (TFS) Choose to attend: "The athletic department recruited me": 1="Somewhat" or "Very" important, 0="Not at all important"	TFS years: 1989-1997; 2002; 2006-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .16; SD = .36 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .12; SD = .33
Chose to attend school because I could not afford first-choice (TFS) Choose to attend: "Could not attend first choice": 1="Somewhat" or "Very" important, 0="Not at all important"	TFS: 2006-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .16; SD = .37 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .23; SD = .42
Low Political Interest (TFS) Importance of "keeping up to date with political affairs": 1="Not important", 0="Somewhat important", "Very important", or "Essential"	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .19; SD = .49 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .24; SD = .42
Medium Political Interest (TFS) Importance of "keeping up to date with political affairs": 1="Somewhat important", 0="Not important", "Very important", or "Essential"	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .41; SD = .49 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .42; SD = .49
High Political Interest (TFS) Importance of "keeping up to date with political affairs": 1="Very important" or "Essential", 0="Not important" or "Somewhat important"	TFS years: 1989-2009 <u>Full Sample:</u> Mean = .40; SD = .49 <u>LIS Sample:</u> Mean = .35; SD = .48

Correlations Between Campus Affluence and Other Variables

Table 5 presents the correlation between a continuous measure of campus affluence and various individual-, cohort-, and school-level predictors. These predictors include the controls used in the main models and freshman-year levels of political outcomes. This analysis provides insight into the characteristics associated with school affluence and the nature of the college selection process among low and high-income students. As Table 5 shows, no school- and cohort-level variables are highly correlated with campus affluence except for “proportion high standardized test score.” This indicates that affluent schools also tend to be academically elite but do not differ substantially from non-affluent schools in terms of other measurable characteristics. Likewise, no individual-level factors are highly correlated with campus affluence among low- or high-income students. This suggests that students who attend schools across the distribution of campus affluence do not differ substantially in terms of pre-college factors like gender, race, religion, age, intended major, academic achievement, or political interest.

Table 5: Correlation between Campus Affluence and Pre-college Measures

School-level and cohort-level variables (TFS)	
Variable name	Correlation with campus affluence
Proportion high standardized test score (cohort)	0.57
Proportion Asian (cohort)	0.22
Proportion Latino (cohort)	-0.02
Proportion other race (cohort)	-0.01
Proportion Jewish (cohort)	0.27
Proportion Catholic (cohort)	0.24
Proportion Evangelical (cohort)	-0.28
Proportion other or no religion (cohort)	0.08
Proportion English second language (cohort)	0.21
Proportion age 17 or less (cohort)	0.07
Proportion age 19 (cohort)	-0.13
Proportion age 20 (cohort)	-0.45
Proportion social science major (cohort)	-0.23
Proportion humanities major (cohort)	0.07
Proportion science major perc. (cohort)	0.08
Proportion business major perc. (cohort)	0.25
Proportion attending to make money (cohort)	-0.26
Mostly female (school)	-0.16

Mostly Black (school)	-0.15	
Large student body (school)	0.25	
Public (school)	-0.14	
College (school)	-0.25	
Northeast (school)	0.27	
South (school)	0.07	
Individual-level variables (TFS)		
Variable name	Correlation with campus affluence (LIS)	Correlation with campus affluence (HIS)
High standardized test score	0.25	0.30
Female	-0.08	-0.04
Asian	0.11	0.01
Latino	0.03	0.01
Black	-0.14	-0.06
Other race	0.05	0.01
Jewish	0.05	0.06
Catholic	0.10	0.10
Evangelical	-0.14	-0.12
Other or no religion	0.06	0.00
English as a second language	0.06	-0.01
Age 17 or less	0.02	0.00
Age 19	-0.03	-0.02
Age 20	-0.03	0.00
Social science major	-0.06	-0.02
Humanities major	0.03	0.01
Science major	0.04	-0.01
Business major	0.02	0.03
Attend to make money	-0.03	-0.02
Political discussion	0.14	0.09
Passive political engagement	0.10	0.07
Interest in keeping up with political affairs	0.14	0.14
Campaigning	0.05	0.02
Interest in becoming a community leader	0.08	0.07
Protest	0.07	0.06

HERI-CPS Comparison

One important question concerning the HERI data is the extent to which it is representative of all college students in the United States. As described by HERI, the data we use reflects the “the nation’s largest and oldest empirical study of higher education, involving data on some 1,900 institutions and over 15 million students... and is regarded as the most

comprehensive source of information on college students.”¹² As the HERI dataset is the most comprehensive dataset available on college students, it is difficult to compare it to a more accurate benchmark. However, we were able to make some comparisons between the HERI data and the Current Population Survey (CPS). To facilitate this comparison, we focused on respondents to the CPS who were between the ages of 22-24 in the years covered by the HERI survey and who reported having college degrees. This approximates the sample of college seniors found in our HERI data. We focused on two basic characteristics that could be analyzed in both the HERI and CPS data: gender and race. The table below shows the proportion of females as well as the proportion belonging to different race and gender groups between the surveys. The proportions line up very closely, providing evidence that the HERI data is representative of the larger population of college students.

Characteristic	HERI	CPS
Female	61%	58%
Asian	4%	5%
Latino	3%	7%
Black	4%	7%
White	83%	83%

Visualizing Data

Next we present the relationship between the percentage of affluent students in a cohort and changes in political participation from freshman to senior year among low-income and high-income students. Figure 2 plots the predicted senior-year scores controlling for freshman levels for those outcomes for which we have a lagged dependent variable, which include protesting, passive engagement, and campaign participation. This mode of analysis is consistent with our lagged dependent variable models in the main paper. Here we observe a positive relationship between passive participation and campus affluence, replicating the findings of the main analysis, but no such relationship for protesting. Figure 3 shows the results for organizational leadership, voting, and elected to student office again controlling for the proxy measures of the lagged dependent variables used in the main analysis. Here we observe a positive slope for student organization leadership, replicating that finding from the main analysis, as well as a positive slope for voting. These plots are largely consistent with our findings, showing a weakly positive relationship between campus affluence and adjusted senior-year participation for passive engagement, organizational leadership, and voting.

¹² More information about the data can be found on the [HERI website](#).

Figure 2: Adjusted Senior-year Participation by Campus Affluence (Individual Level)





Figure 3: Adjusted Senior-year Participation by Campus Affluence (Individual Level)



Measuring Financial Aid

This section describes the process used to measure financial aid using the HERI data. The freshman year survey asks about financial aid using the following question: “How much of your first year’s educational expenses (room, board, tuition, and fees) do you expect to cover from each of the sources listed below?” Students then assign a dollar amount to each of the following sources:

1. Parents, other relatives, or friends
2. Spouse
3. Savings from summer work
4. Other savings
5. Part-time job on campus
6. Part-time job off campus
7. Full-time job while in college
8. Pell Grant
9. Supplemental Educational Opportunity Grant
10. State Scholarship or Grant
11. College Work-Study Grant
12. College Grant/Scholarship (other than above)
13. Vocational Rehabilitation funds
14. Other private grant
15. Other Government Aid (ROTC, BIA, GI/military benefits, etc.)
16. Stafford Loan (GSL)
17. Perkins Loan
18. Other College Loan
19. Other Loan
20. Other Than above.

Students indicate the dollar amount for each category using the options in the table below. The options shifted over the course of the years in our study, as shown in the table. We imputed a dollar amount for each category (also shown in the Table below) to facilitate the measurement of the proportion of low-income students’ total educational expenses covered by aid from the college, e.g. the “financial aid ratio.”

Freshman Survey Years 1989-1991		Freshman Survey Years 1992-2000	
Response	Imputed	Response	Imputed
“None”	\$0	“None”	\$0
“Under \$500”	\$250	“Under \$500	\$250
“\$500 to \$999”	\$750	“\$500 to \$1,499”	\$1000
“\$1,000 to \$1,499”	\$1250	“\$1,500 to \$3,000”	\$2250
“\$1,500 to \$2,000”	\$1750	“More than \$3,000”	\$4000
“More than \$2,000 “	\$2250		

To calculate the financial aid ratio, we took the amount of money respondents received in “college/grant scholarship funds” (category 12 above) and divided it by the sum of the total amount of money respondents attributed to the other 20 categories combined.¹³ We took this sum (the denominator in calculating the college aid ratio) to represent the total amount of money the student expected to spend on educational expenses in their first year. The resulting “college aid ratio” measures the proportion of the student’s educational expenses that are covered by aid from the college in the form of grants and scholarships.

Intervening Outcomes Results

We examine a set of additional non-participatory individual outcomes, consistent with the mechanisms proposed in the paper. The results are displayed in Appendix Table 12 (p. 56). Where possible, we prioritize outcome measures that are available in both freshman and senior year, in order to correct for potential baseline variation. For the academic mechanism, we create a measure of “academic competence,” based on an index of two self-rated items ($\alpha = 0.61$): academic ability and intellectual ability, which are available for both freshman and senior year. For the financial mechanism, we use a measure of students’ reported hours per week of working for pay while in college, which is available until 2004. Since this measure is only available during senior year, we use a measure of the size of students’ financial aid package that included working part-time on campus as the freshman year control.

To test the psychological mechanism, we include a self-reported measure of students’ freshman and senior year emotional health, and an index ($\alpha = 0.72$) of students’ “motivation to lead,” which includes their self-rated drive to achieve, competitiveness, leadership ability, and public speaking ability. For the social mechanism we utilize two different measures, in order to capture slightly different aspects of the social mechanism – whether students fit in to their college, and how this might affect their social satisfaction. One measure is students’ self-rated social self-confidence, available for both the freshman and senior year surveys, which is an indirect measure of how integrated students are to their college’s social environment. Second, we create a scale of students’ satisfaction with their college’s social environment, which is an index ($\alpha = 0.68$) of two senior year items: satisfaction with the college’s sense of community and with the overall college experience. As a proxy for this scale at the freshman level, we include students’ self-rated social popularity. For all of the measures described above, a higher value indicates greater academic competence, emotional health, social satisfaction, social self-confidence, stronger motivation to lead, and fewer hours worked for pay while in college.

We also evaluate two aggregate outcomes, as presented in Appendix Table 13 (p. 57). These outcomes are passive political engagement and the financial aid ratio, which is the ratio for low-income students of the amount of financial aid received from the school in grants and scholarships relative to the total amount paid to attend the school. These two outcomes are measured at the freshman year, at the cohort level, and the analysis retains the cohort-level

¹³ We did not include “College Work-Study” as part of the aid coming from the college because Work-Study funds originate from the government rather than the college itself.

control variables used in the main analysis, while using the number of individuals in each cohort that responded to the outcome measure as a weight in the analysis.

Appendix Table 14 (p. 58) displays the results from additional robustness analyses conducted using these outcomes. Here, we alter the academic, financial, psychological and social measures slightly, in order to evaluate the sensitivity of the previous results. For “academic competence,” we use an index ($\alpha = 0.73$) based on students’ self-rated changes in their critical thinking and analytical skills during college, measured in senior year. While this measure does not have a freshman year equivalent, we use students’ high school GPA, creating a binary measure based on a median split, as a proxy of their academic competence when entering college. We measure “hours working for pay” by combining our previous measure, which extended until 2004, with two items included in the senior year CSS survey from 2005 onward – the number of hours that students worked for pay on and off campus. This combined measure rests on the assumption that these are equivalent measures. Also, there is no adequate proxy for students’ incoming financial situation from 2005 onward, thus we are forced to analyze this combined outcome without a lagged dependent variable.

Next, we combine the self-rated emotional health measure from above with two indicators of psychological difficulty, creating an index of psychological health ($\alpha = 0.64$). The two items are students’ self-rated frequency of experiencing depression or loneliness while in college, as measured on a three-point scale. These items suffer from more missingness than the emotional health self-rating, and they do not offer freshman year equivalents. This leads us to utilize the students’ self-rated emotional health when entering college as the lagged DV for the larger senior year scale. Finally, we create a “social well-being” index ($\alpha = 0.71$), which combines the self-rated social self-confidence measure with the self-rated social popularity measure, from above. Unfortunately, the latter item is only available 1994-1995 and 1999-2005 for the senior survey (though not for the freshman TFS survey), thus reducing our final sample considerably. However, for robustness purposes it remains a useful measure. As before, all measures are coded such that higher values indicate greater academic competence, psychological health, social well-being, and fewer hours working for pay while in college.

The results, presented in Appendix Table 14 (p. 58), support our previous findings. Affluent schools are associated with greater academic competence across all three income groups, but the effect is largest among low-income students. Similarly, the effect of affluent schools on psychological health and social well-being is large and positive, though only marginally significant among low-income students. The largest difference from the previous results appears in the model on “working less for pay,” where low-income students now display a positive effect of affluence. Given that this model rests on multiple outcome measures and does not include a lagged dependent variable, these results should be viewed with caution.

Mediation Results

We use mediation analysis to extend the intervening variables analysis in the main paper. Table 1 in the main paper identifies five variables that are positively associated with campus affluence, which could potentially explain the positive effects of campus affluence on low-income students’ political participation. These include measures of the psychological

mechanism (emotional health and motivation to lead, measured at the individual level), the academic mechanism (academic competence, measured at the individual level), the social mechanism (social self-confidence, measured at the individual level), and the political mechanism (the cohort political norm).

Given the promising results for each of these variables, we examine each as a potential mediator. We test for potential mediation effects using the method described by Imai et al. (2010), implemented using the “mediation” package in R. We run mediation analyses for passive engagement, voting in national elections, and protest involvement, the three outcomes for which we observed evidence of an effect of campus affluence for low income students.¹⁴ While we observe effects of campus affluence on student organization leadership in the main analysis, we have insufficient data to run mediation tests for this outcome.

Each mediation analysis proceeds as follows. All of the mediators are measured as aggregate cohort-level variables. We measure the mediators at the cohort level because the aggregate cohort-level variables are more strongly correlated with campus affluence than the individual-level variables. We only include respondents where we have at least 25 students in the cohort to measure the mediating variables. With the exception of the cohort political norm, all the mediators are measured in two ways: as a measure of the aggregate level in the CSS senior year survey and as a measure of the aggregate level of change between the TFS freshman and CSS senior surveys. In measuring the cohort political norm, we use TFS data. This aligns with the use of TFS data to measure the cohort political norm in the intervening variables analysis. As explained in the main paper, we choose to measure this variable in freshman year because it tests a hypothesis about characteristics of the campus in place at the beginning of the student’s college experience. This allows us to assess whether students who matriculate to more affluent campuses are also matriculating to campuses with stronger norms of political participation, which in turn contributes to the positive effects of campus affluence we observe in the main analysis.

The models are then run as follows. First, we fit an outcome model with the political participation measure as the dependent variable and campus affluence and the mediator as independent variables. We next fit a mediator model where the mediator is the dependent variable and campus affluence is the independent variable. The outcome and mediator models both use random effects with random intercepts at the school-level only and contain the standard covariates from the basic model. This formal mediation test requires a binary or continuous numeric treatment, so affluence is dichotomized to compare the top affluence category (*More than 55% affluent = 1*) with the bottom affluence category (*Less than 23% affluent = 0*), omitting respondents attending schools between 23% and 55% affluent. This specification differs somewhat from the main. However, these changes are necessitated by the requirement for a binary or continuous treatment.

The results are presented in Appendix Table 6 (p. 32). The results for the cohort political norm are largely consistent with those discussed in the main paper, where we report that controlling for the cohort’s freshman level of passive engagement, reduces the positive effects

¹⁴ While the effects of campus affluence on voting are insignificant in the main analysis, we include this outcome in the mediation analysis because of the magnitude of the effect and the theoretical importance of voting.

of campus affluence by 15%. In Appendix Table 6 we similarly observe that cohort political norm mediates 21% of the effect of campus affluence on low-income students' passive engagement. We also note that, overall, there are no instances in which any of the mediators has a significant Average Causal Mediation Effect for low-income students. None of these variables can explain a substantial share of the effect of campus affluence, suggesting that it is largely a direct effect rather than one that is mediated by any of these variables.

Table 6: Mediation Results

Mediator	Outcome	ACME	ADE	TE	PM	ACME	ADE	TE	PM	ACME	ADE	TE	PM
Psychological Mechanism													
		Low-Income				Middle-Income				High-Income			
Cohort emotional health (CSS)	Passive	0.00	0.04**	0.04**	-1%	0	0.03***	0.03***	1%	0	0.02***	0.02***	6%
	Voting	0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-4%	0	0.04	0.04	6%	0	0.04	0.04	2%
	Protest	0.01	0.07*	0.08*	8%	0	0.04*	0.05**	8%	0	0.03	0.03*	0%
Cohort emotional health (TFS-CSS)	Passive	0	0.04***	0.04***	0%	0	0.03***	0.03***	-2%	0	0.03***	0.03***	-3%
	Voting	0	0	0	1%	0	0.05*	0.05*	-1%	0	0.05*	0.05*	-2%
	Protest	0	0.08*	0.08*	0%	0	0.04	0.04	-4%	0	0.03	0.03	-2%
Cohort motivation to lead (CSS)	Passive	0.01	0.03	0.04	4%	0	0.03***	0.03***	4%	0	0.04***	0.04***	0%
	Voting	0	-0.03	-0.02	0%	0	0.06*	0.06*	0%	0	0.06*	0.06*	-1%
	Protest	0	0.07	0.08	5%	0.01	0.04	0.05*	14%	0	0.02	0.02	0%
Cohort motivation to lead (TFS-CSS)	Passive	0	0.04	0.04	0%	0	0.03***	0.03***	-2%	0	0.03***	0.03***	4%
	Voting	0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0%	0	0.07*	0.07*	0%	-0.02*	0.06***	0.05	-32%
	Protest	0	0.08*	0.08*	0%	0	0.04	0.04	-4%	0	0.02	0.02	-12%
Academic Mechanism													
		Low-Income				Middle-Income				High-Income			
Cohort academic competence (CSS)	Passive	0.01	0.04*	0.04*	1%	0	0.03***	0.03***	-3%	0	0.02*	0.03***	17%
	Voting	0.01	0.01	0.02	13%	0.01	0.05*	0.05*	3%	0.03*	0.03	0.05*	47%*
	Protest	0.03	0.07	0.09*	28%*	0.01	0.04*	0.05*	16%	0	0.03	0.03*	10%
Cohort academic competence (TFS-CSS)	Passive	0	0.04***	0.04***	1%	0	0.03***	0.03***	-5%	0	0.03***	0.03*	-5%
	Voting	0	0.01	0.01	2%	0	0.05*	0.05*	5%	0	0.05*	0.05*	0%
	Protest	-0.01	0.08*	0.08*	-6%	0	0.05*	0.04*	-9%	0	0.03*	0.03	-8%
Social Mechanism													
		Low-Income				Middle-Income				High-Income			
Cohort social self-confidence (CSS)	Passive	0	0.04*	0.04***	8%	0	0.03***	0.03***	5%	0.01	0.02*	0.02***	14%*
	Voting	0	0.02	0.02	-2%	0	0.05***	0.05***	-2%	-0.01	0.06*	0.06*	-9%
	Protest	0.01	0.07*	0.07*	7%	0.01***	0.04*	0.05***	28%***	0.01	0.03	0.03*	18%
Cohort social self-confidence (TFS-CSS)	Passive	0.00	0.04***	0.04***	3%	0	0.03***	0.03***	-6%	0	0.03**	0.03***	0%
	Voting	0	0.01	0.01	0%	0	0.05*	0.05***	5%	0	0.05*	0.05*	0%
	Protest	-0.01	0.08*	0.07*	-8%	0	0.05**	0.04**	-7%	0	0.03*	0.03*	-3%
Political Mechanism													
		Low-Income				Middle-Income				High-Income			
Cohort political norm (TFS)	Passive	0.01	0.03*	0.04***	21%	0	0.03***	0.02***	-16%	-0.01*	0.03***	0.03***	-26%*
	Voting	-0.01	0.03	0.03	-4%	0.02	0.03	0.04*	37%	0.01	0.03	0.04	28%
	Protest	-0.01	0.09*	0.08*	-14%	0	0.05*	0.05***	-1%	0	0.04*	0.04***	2%

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$. ACME=Avg. Causal Mediation Effect, ADE=Avg. Direct Effect, TE=Total Effect, PM=Proportion Mediated. Instances where the TE is different from the sum of the ACME and ADE are due to rounding of the numbers entered into the table.

Moderation Results

As described in the main paper, we examine a set of potential moderating variables that align with each of the mechanisms proposed in the paper: academic, financial, institutional, psychological, and social. These tests have the potential to reveal the circumstances under which campus affluence is more or less likely to affect the political participation of low-income students. Potential moderators are restricted to variables that are unlikely to be caused by campus affluence.

Specifically, where possible, we identified moderators that were measured simultaneously with campus affluence during the students' freshman year and examined each of these moderating variables at both the individual and aggregate level. In addition, we only analyzed moderators that were correlated with campus affluence at 0.20 or less.

For consistency, all moderators are coded as binary variables, where 1 indicates that the observation is above the median level for the moderator. The results are substantively similar when tercile variables were used in place of binary variables. Full details on the coding of moderator variables are provided in Appendix Table 3 above (starting on p. 11).

The results of the moderator analysis are presented in the form of predicted effects in Table 2 of the main paper. The full predicted effects are presented in Appendix Table 21 below (p. 67). These predicted effects are based on the regression models provided below (starting on p. 59). We provide a basic discussion of the moderator results in the main paper and a more detailed discussion here.

Psychological Mechanism

We assess the psychological mechanism using students' self-perception of their emotional health, and their motivation to lead, which combines students' self-rated drive to achieve, competitiveness, leadership ability, and public speaking ability ($\alpha = 0.63$). These items were measured at the individual-level. The cohort-level measure is too highly correlated with campus affluence: 0.30 in the case of cohort emotional health, and 0.41 in the case of cohort motivation to lead. By contrast, individual emotional health is correlated with campus affluence at 0.04, while individual motivation to lead is correlated with campus affluence at 0.13. Neither individual-level variable has consistent moderating effects (Appendix Table 21, Rows 1-2, p. 67).

Academic Mechanism

We assess the academic mechanism using a moderating variable measuring academic competence. This variable measures the students' self-perception of their academic and intellectual ability, relative to others their age ($\alpha = 0.61$). This variable is measured only at the individual level (correlation with campus affluence = 0.12). The cohort-level version is too highly correlated with campus affluence at 0.46. There is no evidence for a consistent negative or positive moderating effect of individual academic competence on low-income students' political participation (Appendix Table 21, Row 3, p. 67).

Social Mechanism

We assess the social mechanism using self-rated social self-confidence, measured at the individual and aggregate levels. Neither of these variables is highly correlated with campus affluence, with correlations of 0.03 at the individual level and 0.18 at the cohort level. Again, none of these variables has consistent moderating effects (Appendix Table 21, Rows 4-5, p. 67).

Financial Mechanism

We use three separate variables to assess the financial mechanism. Two of these variables measure individual level financial circumstances. These include the financial aid ratio, or relative level of grant aid the student receives from the college (the amount of grant aid divided by their total cost of attending college) and the student's level of financial concern over their ability to finance college, correlated with campus affluence at 0.20 and -0.02 respectively. An additional aggregate variable measures the average scores for financial concern among low-income students at a school, which is correlated with campus affluence at -0.16. The marginal effects are shown in Appendix Table 21, Row 6-8 (p. 67).

There is some suggestive evidence for a moderating effect of financial aid. Specifically, the marginal effect of campus affluence on low-income students' passive engagement and protest involvement is higher for low-income students who receive high levels of financial aid (Appendix Table 21, Row 6, p. 67). This finding is counterbalanced by evidence that the marginal effect of campus affluence on low-income students' voting is lower for low-income students who receive high levels of financial aid. The interaction of financial aid and campus affluence on voting is negative, not because aid detracts from the benefits of campus affluence, but because aid does not matter in affluent campuses and helps on non-affluent campuses. Specifically, regardless of the aid a student receives on affluent campuses, those campuses benefit students who would otherwise attend non-affluent schools with low aid. The predicted turnout rates for low-income students are as follows (based on the "Individual Financial Aid" model in Appendix Table 18, p. 62:

- Predicted turnout at affluent campuses: Low Financial Aid 65%, High Financial Aid 62%
- Predicted turnout at non-affluent campuses: Low Financial Aid 56%, High Financial Aid 66%

These probabilities indicate that the negative interaction does not suggest that affluent colleges decrease low-income students' turnout if they provide them with more financial aid.

Institutional Mechanism

We assess the stigmatizing institutional practices mechanism by measuring whether the school keeps dorms and dining halls open during breaks (a binary measure). Keeping dorms and dining halls open during breaks is an important service for low-income students, who are often unable to afford traveling home or for vacation during breaks. We collected data for this variable by contacting schools directly. Its correlation with campus affluence is -0.05. This variable has no consistent moderating effect (Appendix Table 21, Row 9, p. 67).

Political Mechanism

While we considered using the cohort's political norm as a moderator, we were unable to do so as it is too highly correlated with campus affluence at 0.39.

Additional Tests

In addition to the tests presented in the main paper, we performed several supplementary moderation tests. We evaluate whether students' and cohorts' political ideology affects the influence of school affluence on political participation. We use an individual-level measure of political ideology, coded as "conservative" for students who are "conservative" or "far right," and "liberal" for "liberal" and "far left" students, omitting self-reported "middle of the road" students. This variable is also examined at the cohort-level, where a "conservative" value constitutes a cohort with more conservative than liberal students, and vice versa for a "liberal" value. The individual-level ideology moderator is correlated with campus affluence at -0.11 , while the cohort-level version is correlated with campus affluence at 0.03 . The expectation is low-income students are less likely to feel at home in conservative environments, which might exacerbate the negative affluence effect. However, conservative low-income students are more likely to feel at home in affluent environments, mitigating the potential negative effect of affluence on participation. There is no consistent evidence for a moderating effect with either of these measures, although the two significant moderating results run counter to an expected marginalization effect, as the marginal effect of campus affluence is lower on low-income students' passive engagement for conservative students, and higher on low-income students' organizational leadership in the context of conservative cohorts (Appendix Table 20, p. 65).


We also assess whether students who are first-generation students (i.e., neither parent attended college) display a different effect of school affluence, given the greater academic, social and psychological difficulty one might expect first-generation college students to experience. This individual-level measure is correlated with campus affluence at -0.13 . It has no consistent moderating effects (Appendix Table 20, p. 66).

Finally, we analyzed the moderating impact of the institutional mechanism by including an additional measure of schools' financial assistance. For each school, we measured the ratio of the average loan amounts incurred by low-income students, relative to high-income students. We note that this measure relies on senior-year data, as loan amounts are only measured in the senior survey. This measure is correlated with campus affluence at -0.02 . As Appendix Table 20 (pp. 66), shows, the marginal effect of campus affluence on low-income students' protesting is lower for low-income students who attend schools with higher loan ratios, i.e. where low-income students take out a large amount of loan debt relative to higher income students. At the same time, the marginal effect of campus affluence on low-income students' organizational leadership is higher for low-income students who attend schools with higher loan ratios. We note that the results for this moderator should be taken with caution: This variable is only available in the senior year survey. As a consequence, the exogeneity assumption required for a moderator is less certain to hold.

Results for Model With No Controls

We also estimate the main analysis without controls, as a baseline. These models include random intercepts for schools and cohorts, as well as graduation-year fixed effects, in addition to the lagged dependent variable and our main variable of interest (campus affluence). Appendix Figure 4 displays the results. We focus here on the effects for low-income students. The positive effects of campus affluence hold on leading a student organization, become less statistically certain and somewhat smaller on protest and passive engagement, and become negative though non-significant on voting. Campus affluence continues to have no effect on campaigning or participating in student government. Overall, some of the effects of campus affluence on low-income students become somewhat smaller and less statistically certain. We still find no negative effects of campus affluence on low-income students and continue to find a robust positive effect on leading campus organizations.

Figure 4: Marginal Effect of Majority-Affluent Campuses on Six Types of Political Engagement (No Controls)



Low-Income Subset Analysis

As a robustness check, we re-estimate the six main models for subsets of low-income students who are unlikely to select into schools for reason related to either campus affluence or the propensity to become more politically engaged. In the first of these analyses, we look at low-income students who indicated that (1) “wanting to live close to home,” (2) “the athletics department recruited me,” (3) “could not afford first choice,” were “somewhat important” or “very important” reasons for selecting a college. These variables are good candidates for a subset analysis because they not correlated with school affluence for the low-income student sample (correlation < 0.20). Students who chose to attend a college for these reasons are thus unlikely to have chosen a college for reasons associated with campus affluence.


Appendix Table 8 (p. 50) presents the regression results of this analysis, which largely replicate the main findings. The marginal effects appear in Figure 2 in the main paper. First, for “leading a student organization”, the results replicate in magnitude for low-income students who wanted to live near home and could not afford their first-choice. For low-income students who were recruited for athletics, the effect is larger than the effect measured with the full low-income student sample and is also statistically significant. For “protesting,” which could only be re-estimated for the subset of low-income students who wanted to live close to home, the subset effect is not statistically significant, but is similar in magnitude to the effect in the full sample. The re-estimated coefficients for “passive engagement” are similar in magnitude to the main results across subsets. For “voting,” like the main results, the re-estimated coefficients are positive but not statistically significant, and larger for all three subsets than the full low-income student sample. The null result is replicated for “campaigning,” which could only be re-estimated for the subset who wanted to live close to home. Finally, for “elected to student government,” the results replicate in magnitude and statistical significance for low-income students who wanted to live close to home, but not for those who were recruited for athletics: the re-estimated coefficient is large and negative, but not statistically significant.

In addition, we examine the effects of campus affluence among the subsets of low-income students who entered freshman year with different levels of political engagement. We form subsets based on students’ response to an item that asks the importance of “keeping up to date with political affairs” in freshman year. We identify three subsets based on the distribution of respondents: those with low political interest who answered “not important” (24%), those with medium political interest who answered “somewhat important” (42%), and those with high political interest who answered “very important” or “essential” (35%). Too few low-income students (11%) answered “essential” to be able to treat that as its own category.

Figure 5 shows the results, contrasting the marginal effects observed in our main model in red (those from Figure 1 in the main paper) to those observed in models run on these three subsets. The regression results appear in Appendix Table 9 (p. 51). The results for these subsets are similar to those for low-income students as a whole (we are unable to run this analysis for “leading a student organization” as there are too few students). Across all three subsets, we observe similarly sized effects for both “passive engagement” and “protesting”, the two outcomes other than “leading a student organization” for which we observed significant positive effects for low-income students in the main analysis (the effect on “protesting” is insignificant here, likely due in part to the small sample size). We also continue to observe null

effects for “voting”, “campaigning”, and “elected to student government.” These results make clear that our results are not driven by students with either high or low levels of political engagement being likely to enroll at affluent colleges. The results generally look the same independent of low-income students’ engagement with politics prior to college.

Figure 5: Marginal Effect of Majority-Affluent Campuses on Low-Income Students by TFS Political Interest



Model Controlling for Freshman Cohort Political Norm

In this section we ask whether the cohort’s norm of political engagement contributes to the effects we find for campus affluence. To test that possibility, Appendix Table 10 (p. 52) includes a control in our main model for the average level of passive political engagement within a student’s freshman year cohort. We label this variable the *Cohort Political Norm*. There are a few changes in the results from adding this variable. The effects of campus affluence on two outcomes – *passive engagement* and *leading a student organization* – decline in value, but the overall change in the magnitude of the coefficient for *More than 55 perc. affluent* is modest in both cases. There is a 15% decrease in the effect of *More than 55 perc. affluent* for *passive engagement* (from .046 to .039) and a 27% decrease in the effect of *More than 55 perc. affluent* for *leading a student organization* (from .907 to .661). The latter effect also loses statistical significance. The effects of *More than 55 perc. affluent* for the other outcomes remain similar in size and statistical significance. These results suggest that the effects of campus affluence do not generally rest on the levels of political activity on campus.

As an additional test, Appendix Table 10 (p. 52) also includes a control for the average level of voter turnout within a student’s cohort. Turnout is measured here by aggregating responses to the variable measuring whether the student voted in a national election. Again we find limited evidence of mediation. In particular, the three significant and positive effects we observed of *More than 55 perc. Affluent* on low-income students in the main analysis on

passive engagement, protesting, and leading a student organization all remain statistically significant after we add the new variable or *Cohort Turnout Rate*. As we might expect, *Cohort Turnout Rate* does have a positive effect on whether low-income students turnout to vote. However, in general it does not appear to account for any of the effects of campus affluence we find. This provides further evidence that the effects of campus affluence do not generally rest on the levels of political activity on campus.

Instrumental Variable Analysis

We conduct an instrumental variable analysis using distance from home as an instrument for attending an affluent school. We conduct this test using three different measures of “distance from home”: a continuous measure of distance in miles, a binary indicator of “less than 50 miles,” and a binary indicator of “less than 100 miles”. See Appendix Table 4 (p. 20) for the descriptive statistics, and Appendix Table 11 (pp. 53-55) for the results.

This analysis requires two assumptions. First, we assume that distance from school to home is a good instrument for school affluence. The observed correlation between distance from home and school affluence, and the results of the first-stage regression, provide some support for this assumption (Appendix Table 11, p. 53-55). Second, we assume that distance from home only influences political outcomes through school affluence. We make this assumption tentatively, given that there are many possible factors that can influence political outcomes. However, we argue that distance from home is unlikely to have a direct effect on political outcomes, or to have an effect on political outcomes through other mechanisms.

There are two reasons why distance from home might, on average, have a null direct effect on the political outcomes of interest in our study. First, while being close to home might increase interest in local politics, most of our outcomes are concerned with campus politics or national politics. Second, and of greater importance, being close to home is unlikely to influence political outcomes through other factors, such as school pride and involvement with campus social life. While students who attend local colleges may know more people on campus, they may also travel home more frequently, such that local students will be no more or less likely to be engaged on campus than students from farther away. For these reasons, it is reasonable to assume that distance from home might, on average, have a null direct effect on the political outcomes of interest in our study.

The campus affluence effects estimated in the second stage of the instrumental variables analysis (Appendix Table 11, pp. 53-55) generally replicate the significant positive effects of campus affluence on low-income students’ passive engagement, protesting, and student organization leadership that we found in the main analysis, as well as the null effect on campaign participation. In this analysis we also find evidence for a significant negative effect of campus affluence on low-income students’ voting, and a significant positive effect on low-income students’ participation in student government.

We note that this analysis rests on strong assumptions about the relationship between distance from home, campus affluence, and political engagement. Never-the-less, we still think this analysis is useful as one element of our broader empirical strategy.

Main Model with Interactions

As an extension of the results presented in the main paper, we run models on the full sample where we interact campus affluence with students' parental income. For these models, we create a binary campus affluence variable (*High Campus Affluence*), which is coded 0 for students attending the least affluent schools (<23% affluent) and 1 for students attending the most affluent schools (>55% affluent). Students who are not at the least or the most affluent schools are dropped from the model. We interact *High Campus Affluence* with a variable measuring students' parental income, which has three categories: *Low-Income* (omitted category), *Middle-Income*, and *High-Income*. This model allows us to assess whether the effects of attending the most affluent schools (relative to the least affluent schools) on low-income students are significantly different from the effects on middle-income and high-income students.

The results are in Appendix Table 22 (p. 68). Figure 1 in the main paper suggests two outcomes for which the effects of campus affluence on low-income students are significantly more positive for low-income students than they are for middle-income and high-income students: protesting and leading a student organization. In the interaction models presented here we do observe that *High Campus Affluence* has an effect on low-income students' protesting that is significantly greater than its effects on either middle-income or low-income students. There is also a similarly sized interaction effect for leading a student organization, but it fails to reach statistical significance due in part to the smaller sample size. Finally, we also observe a significant interaction effect for elected to student government, but we do not regard this result as substantively meaningful as the effect of campus affluence on low-income students' chances of being elected is indistinguishable from zero (see Figure 1).

This aligns with our overall finding in the main paper: there are clear instances where low-income students benefit from attending affluent campuses, but overall it does not appear that these benefits are systematically greater than those received by middle-income and high-income students.

Race and Ethnicity Analysis

It is important to consider the possibility that the effects on low-income students may differ depending on the race and ethnicity of students. In particular, it is possible that campus affluence may have especially negative effects on students who are both low-income and African American. To see if this is the case, we run models that interact our campus affluence variable with an indicator variable for being a Black student (Appendix Table 23 on p. 69). We find no statistically significant interaction effects, suggesting that the effects of campus affluence on low-income students do not differ systematically based on the race of students.

Attrition

Attrition is a possible problem in our study, since our sample is restricted to individuals who successfully completed both the freshman and senior surveys. Since certain subgroups of students are less likely to graduate – in particular, minorities and those of lower socioeconomic status (Bowen et al. 2005) – it is possible that our results are biased due to panel attrition. Given our interest in the explanatory effect of school affluence, we need to establish whether such attrition is associated with school affluence for each income group. Previous studies have used data from CIRP to determine the effect of factors such as race, gender and socioeconomic status on the propensity to complete the senior survey, looking either at a single school (Porter and Whitcomb 2005) or the full set of schools in a limited period (Sharkness 2012). However, these studies differ in their conclusions on the effect on race and SES on panel attrition. Moreover, neither study analyzed the relationship of school affluence on panel attrition.

In order to conduct such an analysis, we first matched individual respondents in the TFS-CSS panel sample with those in the complete TFS sample.¹⁵ There were 506,057 subjects in the TFS sample with subject IDs, after also excluding all schools where neither the TFS nor the CSS were administered (where fewer than 100 individuals took the TFS and fewer than 20 individuals took the CSS).¹⁶ This ensures that the TFS sample that we are left with represents all the subjects (for whom we have identifiers) who took the TFS. Of these subjects, 74,073 actually completed the CSS, which means that, after matching subjects in the panel sample with those in the freshman only sample, we are left with around 29% of the final panel successfully matched to the TFS sample.¹⁷ Such a match rate is comparable to that found by others, using the same data (e.g., Sharkness 2012). Note that we are unable to distinguish between two sources of non-response: Students who did not take the CSS because they dropped out of college and students who graduated without taking the CSS for whatever reason (e.g., personal choice or the survey was never offered to them their senior year). For our purposes, however, such differences are less important, as long as we can properly model non-response.

To first confirm that attrition is not driving our results, we analyzed the reduced sample of TFS subjects in order to determine the predictors of attrition from our panel. It turns out that low income subjects are significantly less likely to stay in the panel (i.e. complete the CSS survey), as are Hispanics (compared to Whites). However, as Appendix Table 24 (p. 70) shows, we see that school affluence does not affect the propensity to stay in the panel, both when estimated for the full sample, and each individual income subgroup separately. This is initial confirmation that any attrition in our sample is unlikely to bias our school affluence effects.

Next, we estimated weights, based on inverse propensity scores, to correct for the attrition in our sample. The weights were created using a multilevel-analysis with all relevant covariates available in the TFS sample. This model was either estimated for all three income groups together (with income indicators as predictors) or using a separate model for each

¹⁵ Recall that our CSS sample is restricted to graduating seniors who were citizens, attended school full time, and took the senior survey at least 3 years after the freshman survey.

¹⁶ The results remain unchanged when not excluding such schools.

¹⁷ This number is actually higher, since we only had subject IDs for 202,372 subjects in the panel, not the full 252,726 students. As such, the actual match rate is 37%.

income group. The outcome predicted is whether or not students took the CSS survey, and the inverses of the predicted probabilities for each individual serve as the weights for the subsequent analysis. This ensures that the weights produced correct for the potential biasing differences between those that took the senior year survey and those that did not, based on a model with both individual-level and school-level controls, including random effects for each cohort and school.¹⁸

Finally, the main models were re-estimated, using these weights. Unfortunately, the TFS only includes subject IDs until the 1999 survey, so we are unable to produce weights for the more recent half of our panel sample. Consequently, we are unable to re-estimate the model on “Leading a Student Organization”, and the other results must be compared to the main effects without weights for comparable survey years. The main results using the weights are presented in Figure 6 and the results without weights for comparable survey years are presented in Figure 7. As these figures show, the results are nearly identical across model specifications, indicating that the differences across income groups were not significant.

More specifically, the effect of school affluence does not substantively change when using either of the weights. If anything, the effect of campus affluence on participation for low-income students becomes stronger with the inclusion of the weights, as the percentage point effect more than doubles on passive engagement. The effect of campus affluence on elected to student government becomes also large and positive (albeit insignificant) with the inclusion of weights. For middle-income students, meanwhile, the effects, if anything, seem to be more negative, as the positive effect on voting is no longer significant when using weights and the effect on elected to student government becomes large and negative (although also insignificant). The effects of high-income students are generally unchanged with the inclusion of weights. In sum, correcting for panel attrition, which is unrelated to school affluence, does not significantly change our results, at least for the years in which we are able to identify students across the panel and the larger freshman year survey.

¹⁸ In other words, using the weights ensures that subjects who took the TFS and CSS are mostly comparable to subjects that took only the TFS, but who may have had the option to take the CSS later on.

Figure 6: Marginal Effect of Majority-Affluence Campuses on Six Types of Political Engagement with Attrition Weights, By Student's Household Income





Figure 7: Marginal Effect of Majority-Affluence Campuses on Six Types of Political Engagement using Same Survey Years as Weighted Models, By Student's Household Income



1 Full Model Results (Figure 1)

Table 7: The Effect of Campus Affluence on Political Participation

	Passive Engagement	Voting	Campaigning	Protesting	Elected S.G.	Leading Org.
Low-Income						
Intercept	0.266*** (0.047)	0.692 (0.713)	-6.533*** (1.800)	-3.572*** (0.650)	-3.052* (1.544)	-1.584 (1.615)
Lagged DV	0.491*** (0.008)	1.319*** (0.093)	1.514*** (0.162)	1.534*** (0.083)	1.437*** (0.113)	1.390*** (0.189)
23-32 perc. affluent	0.007 (0.006)	0.167 (0.104)	0.356 (0.242)	-0.018 (0.087)	-0.132 (0.126)	0.116 (0.234)
32-42 perc. affluent	0.017* (0.007)	0.083 (0.111)	0.324 (0.274)	-0.002 (0.097)	-0.153 (0.150)	0.414 (0.244)
42-55 perc. affluent	0.026** (0.008)	0.237 (0.128)	0.355 (0.288)	0.048 (0.114)	-0.309 (0.185)	0.793** (0.282)
More than 55 perc. affluent	0.046*** (0.010)	0.187 (0.156)	0.244 (0.397)	0.306* (0.148)	-0.037 (0.244)	0.907** (0.323)
High standardized test score	-0.003 (0.005)	0.385*** (0.081)	-0.036 (0.179)	-0.351*** (0.067)	0.089 (0.093)	0.562* (0.244)
Missing test score	0.008 (0.005)	-0.138 (0.079)	-0.153 (0.197)	0.007 (0.065)	-0.144 (0.103)	-0.225 (0.197)
Female	-0.014*** (0.004)	0.198*** (0.059)	-0.359* (0.144)	0.002 (0.053)	-0.223** (0.079)	0.172 (0.131)
Asian	0.006 (0.008)	-0.939*** (0.122)	0.584 (0.305)	0.143 (0.114)	0.003 (0.181)	-0.516* (0.233)
Latino	0.046*** (0.007)	-0.165 (0.110)	0.653* (0.271)	0.623*** (0.093)	0.094 (0.155)	-0.068 (0.218)
Black	0.063*** (0.007)	-0.359*** (0.109)	0.514* (0.249)	0.873*** (0.088)	0.343** (0.133)	0.156 (0.252)
Other race	0.034*** (0.006)	-0.259* (0.102)	0.198 (0.244)	0.372*** (0.087)	0.186 (0.131)	-0.338 (0.186)
Jewish	-0.024 (0.020)	0.078 (0.386)	2.524*** (0.626)	0.228 (0.253)	0.315 (0.361)	0.118 (0.819)
Catholic	0.000 (0.005)	0.027 (0.075)	0.098 (0.193)	0.071 (0.068)	-0.103 (0.101)	-0.000 (0.162)
Evangelical	0.001 (0.006)	0.099 (0.098)	0.312 (0.259)	0.053 (0.086)	-0.053 (0.125)	-0.022 (0.222)
Other or no religion	0.002 (0.005)	-0.039 (0.078)	0.312 (0.186)	0.213** (0.068)	-0.179 (0.103)	-0.023 (0.163)
English second language	0.013* (0.007)	-0.257* (0.103)	-0.093 (0.251)	0.149 (0.088)	-0.243 (0.143)	-0.053 (0.201)
Aged 17 or less	0.015 (0.011)	-0.253 (0.168)	-0.578 (0.539)	0.019 (0.144)	0.371 (0.202)	0.135 (0.370)
Aged 19	0.007 (0.004)	0.058 (0.064)	-0.340* (0.164)	-0.092 (0.056)	0.098 (0.081)	-0.138 (0.134)
Aged 20	0.008 (0.015)	-0.160 (0.256)	-0.250 (0.630)	-0.551* (0.226)	-0.019 (0.322)	-1.188 (0.787)
Social science major	0.013* (0.005)	-0.005 (0.087)	0.399 (0.214)	-0.001 (0.073)	0.235* (0.112)	0.204 (0.184)
Humanities major	-0.006 (0.007)	-0.063 (0.112)	-0.000 (0.277)	-0.078 (0.094)	0.048 (0.147)	-0.065 (0.219)
Science major	-0.018*** (0.005)	-0.147 (0.082)	0.028 (0.221)	-0.096 (0.073)	0.064 (0.114)	0.131 (0.163)
Business major	-0.022*** (0.006)	-0.209* (0.096)	-0.117 (0.259)	-0.078 (0.085)	0.188 (0.129)	0.041 (0.201)

Attend to make money	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.115* (0.058)	-0.035 (0.139)	-0.208*** (0.050)	-0.057 (0.075)	0.040 (0.126)
Proportion high standardized test score	-0.029 (0.016)	-0.587* (0.237)	-0.617 (0.604)	0.252 (0.234)	0.013 (0.408)	-0.579 (0.507)
Proportion Asian	-0.005 (0.006)	0.069 (0.090)	-0.249 (0.232)	-0.085 (0.081)	-0.035 (0.136)	-0.064 (0.198)
Proportion Latino	0.010 (0.007)	-0.008 (0.108)	-0.167 (0.269)	0.024 (0.099)	-0.298 (0.171)	-0.221 (0.225)
Proportion other race	-0.004 (0.006)	-0.097 (0.105)	0.039 (0.241)	-0.015 (0.090)	0.265 (0.141)	-0.129 (0.193)
Proportion Jewish	-0.006 (0.007)	0.110 (0.100)	-0.022 (0.245)	0.122 (0.090)	-0.151 (0.166)	0.078 (0.244)
Proportion Catholic	-0.004 (0.006)	0.046 (0.094)	0.277 (0.221)	0.187* (0.087)	-0.042 (0.157)	-0.548** (0.197)
Proportion Evangelical	-0.003 (0.006)	0.004 (0.103)	0.233 (0.252)	-0.133 (0.093)	-0.035 (0.143)	-0.218 (0.242)
Proportion other or no religion	-0.002 (0.007)	0.024 (0.100)	0.349 (0.240)	0.200* (0.091)	0.271 (0.152)	-0.106 (0.190)
Proportion English second languages	-0.003 (0.037)	0.559 (0.579)	-1.039 (1.266)	-1.398** (0.506)	-0.227 (0.921)	2.443 (1.504)
Proportion aged 17 or less	-0.042 (0.201)	4.518 (3.060)	4.510 (7.697)	2.627 (2.649)	6.225 (4.029)	-12.222 (11.465)
Proportion aged 19	0.024 (0.037)	0.091 (0.565)	-0.682 (1.240)	1.137* (0.524)	0.361 (0.889)	0.413 (1.265)
Proportion aged 20	-0.279* (0.111)	-1.691 (1.663)	-5.478 (4.323)	2.870 (1.524)	-0.938 (2.444)	0.190 (5.512)
Proportion social science major	-0.082 (0.053)	-0.187 (0.784)	3.836 (2.140)	0.553 (0.726)	2.383* (1.138)	2.389 (2.058)
Proportion humanities major	-0.038 (0.048)	0.104 (0.727)	3.493 (1.792)	-0.068 (0.662)	1.443 (1.109)	1.022 (1.646)
Proportion science major	-0.053 (0.043)	-0.319 (0.632)	3.098 (1.709)	-0.265 (0.595)	0.669 (0.973)	2.476 (1.522)
Proportion business major	-0.043 (0.055)	-0.233 (0.844)	3.757 (2.317)	0.307 (0.736)	0.351 (1.278)	3.980 (2.100)
Proportion attending to make money	-0.034 (0.027)	-0.758 (0.408)	1.148 (1.030)	0.969* (0.383)	0.269 (0.593)	-0.996 (0.933)
Mostly female	0.028** (0.009)	0.300* (0.147)	0.352 (0.312)	0.315** (0.120)	0.608** (0.193)	0.293 (0.386)
Mostly Black	0.078*** (0.015)	0.761*** (0.209)	0.460 (0.448)	0.339 (0.190)	-0.349 (0.375)	0.989 (0.877)
Large student body	-0.011 (0.007)	0.116 (0.106)	0.217 (0.265)	0.102 (0.100)	-0.330 (0.194)	-0.324 (0.225)
Public	0.013 (0.008)	0.273* (0.114)	-0.036 (0.295)	0.020 (0.105)	-0.255 (0.205)	0.079 (0.272)
College	0.005 (0.007)	0.177 (0.104)	0.132 (0.251)	0.160 (0.104)	-0.477* (0.199)	-0.170 (0.223)
Northeast	0.006 (0.006)	-0.374*** (0.088)	-0.027 (0.213)	0.125 (0.082)	0.066 (0.142)	0.003 (0.188)
South	0.000 (0.007)	-0.315** (0.100)	0.026 (0.238)	-0.143 (0.093)	0.057 (0.150)	0.193 (0.237)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Num. obs.	13363	7560	3232	11822	7842	1479
Num. groups: Freshman Cohorts	2182	1362	582	1962	1247	243
Num. groups: Schools	510	453	287	473	324	152

	Passive Engagement	Voting	Campaigning	Protesting	Elected S.G.	Leading Org.
Middle-Income						
Intercept	0.211*** (0.026)	0.797 (0.418)	-2.794** (0.865)	-3.600*** (0.415)	-1.568* (0.740)	-1.333 (0.801)
Lagged DV	0.509*** (0.003)	1.284*** (0.040)	1.617*** (0.057)	1.759*** (0.035)	1.655*** (0.044)	1.467*** (0.074)
23-32 perc. affluent	0.008* (0.003)	0.218*** (0.057)	0.269* (0.121)	-0.007 (0.049)	-0.039 (0.058)	0.165 (0.112)
32-42 perc. affluent	0.009** (0.004)	0.221*** (0.062)	0.194 (0.133)	-0.032 (0.057)	-0.037 (0.072)	0.321** (0.116)
42-55 perc. affluent	0.017*** (0.004)	0.260*** (0.071)	0.268 (0.145)	0.026 (0.068)	-0.044 (0.091)	0.407** (0.144)
More than 55 perc. affluent	0.017** (0.005)	0.322*** (0.087)	0.373* (0.189)	0.018 (0.088)	-0.019 (0.118)	0.667*** (0.162)
High standardized test score	-0.006*** (0.002)	0.260*** (0.029)	-0.050 (0.060)	-0.325*** (0.023)	0.352*** (0.031)	0.447*** (0.074)
Missing test score	0.000 (0.002)	-0.113** (0.039)	-0.031 (0.087)	0.070* (0.031)	-0.101* (0.047)	0.041 (0.079)
Female	-0.014*** (0.001)	0.190*** (0.024)	-0.404*** (0.053)	0.003 (0.021)	-0.131*** (0.029)	0.172*** (0.046)
Asian	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.845*** (0.059)	0.062 (0.147)	0.118* (0.057)	0.071 (0.084)	0.225* (0.107)
Latino	0.029*** (0.004)	-0.288*** (0.059)	0.045 (0.146)	0.389*** (0.052)	0.045 (0.082)	-0.276* (0.112)
Black	0.060*** (0.004)	-0.233*** (0.066)	0.085 (0.152)	0.681*** (0.052)	0.357*** (0.076)	0.112 (0.128)
Other race	0.015*** (0.003)	-0.282*** (0.046)	0.197* (0.096)	0.247*** (0.039)	0.155** (0.056)	-0.006 (0.077)
Jewish	0.008 (0.007)	0.331* (0.142)	-0.092 (0.292)	0.209* (0.106)	0.329* (0.158)	-0.300 (0.202)
Catholic	0.002 (0.002)	-0.115*** (0.030)	-0.019 (0.067)	0.149*** (0.026)	0.053 (0.036)	-0.086 (0.057)
Evangelical	0.002 (0.003)	0.047 (0.047)	0.074 (0.118)	0.069 (0.040)	-0.097 (0.053)	0.153 (0.097)
Other or no religion	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.144*** (0.035)	-0.077 (0.076)	0.072* (0.030)	-0.081 (0.042)	-0.301*** (0.063)
English second language	0.011** (0.004)	-0.306*** (0.060)	-0.033 (0.147)	0.185*** (0.053)	-0.221** (0.083)	0.047 (0.117)
Aged 17 or less	0.001 (0.005)	-0.179* (0.078)	-0.053 (0.193)	-0.020 (0.070)	0.092 (0.093)	0.266 (0.183)
Aged 19	0.002 (0.001)	0.110*** (0.027)	-0.081 (0.059)	0.010 (0.022)	-0.095** (0.031)	-0.036 (0.048)
Aged 20	0.029** (0.010)	-0.151 (0.168)	0.397 (0.359)	0.191 (0.136)	-0.255 (0.217)	-0.290 (0.316)
Social science major	0.009*** (0.002)	0.051 (0.036)	0.247** (0.077)	0.089** (0.030)	0.044 (0.041)	0.038 (0.068)
Humanities major	-0.000 (0.003)	0.083 (0.046)	0.074 (0.098)	0.138*** (0.037)	-0.146** (0.053)	0.085 (0.083)
Science major	-0.024*** (0.002)	-0.083* (0.034)	-0.359*** (0.080)	-0.079** (0.029)	-0.086* (0.041)	0.044 (0.060)
Business major	-0.024*** (0.002)	-0.129** (0.040)	-0.202* (0.094)	-0.101** (0.035)	-0.006 (0.048)	0.078 (0.076)
Attend to make money	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.129*** (0.024)	0.104 (0.053)	-0.129*** (0.020)	-0.111*** (0.028)	-0.221*** (0.046)
Proportion high standardized test score	0.025** (0.009)	-0.192 (0.133)	-0.130 (0.302)	0.405* (0.160)	-0.500* (0.233)	-0.100 (0.207)

Proportion Asian	-0.003 (0.003)	0.037 (0.051)	-0.022 (0.114)	0.014 (0.050)	-0.158* (0.068)	-0.206* (0.104)
Proportion Latino	-0.000 (0.004)	0.011 (0.064)	0.001 (0.141)	-0.006 (0.063)	0.015 (0.084)	-0.260* (0.109)
Proportion other race	0.006 (0.003)	0.004 (0.059)	0.136 (0.120)	0.119* (0.056)	0.104 (0.073)	-0.058 (0.086)
Proportion Jewish	-0.008* (0.004)	0.039 (0.061)	-0.074 (0.121)	0.086 (0.063)	0.078 (0.095)	0.127 (0.121)
Proportion Catholic	0.004 (0.004)	0.001 (0.059)	0.148 (0.112)	0.050 (0.060)	-0.193* (0.091)	-0.275* (0.108)
Proportion Evangelical	-0.003 (0.004)	0.040 (0.059)	0.010 (0.124)	-0.204*** (0.059)	-0.004 (0.081)	-0.055 (0.124)
Proportion other or no religion	0.002 (0.004)	0.133* (0.057)	0.196 (0.118)	0.032 (0.060)	-0.047 (0.083)	0.030 (0.091)
Proportion English second languages	0.026 (0.027)	0.877* (0.417)	-0.090 (0.880)	-1.031* (0.430)	0.554 (0.608)	2.201* (0.884)
Proportion aged 17 or less	-0.077 (0.104)	0.255 (1.699)	-7.903* (3.996)	-1.345 (1.574)	-1.368 (2.030)	4.366 (5.526)
Proportion aged 19	0.034 (0.021)	0.507 (0.330)	0.007 (0.644)	0.341 (0.335)	-0.425 (0.479)	1.598** (0.603)
Proportion aged 20	0.048 (0.059)	-1.584 (0.936)	-0.879 (2.127)	1.223 (0.909)	1.254 (1.249)	-1.914 (2.537)
Proportion social science major	-0.036 (0.031)	-0.184 (0.474)	0.317 (1.039)	0.802 (0.476)	0.615 (0.654)	0.568 (1.001)
Proportion humanities major	-0.040 (0.028)	0.006 (0.432)	0.094 (0.897)	0.359 (0.446)	0.369 (0.674)	-1.522 (0.816)
Proportion science major	-0.043 (0.024)	0.040 (0.377)	0.576 (0.837)	-0.114 (0.389)	0.259 (0.552)	0.130 (0.776)
Proportion business major	0.002 (0.030)	0.072 (0.482)	-0.170 (1.124)	-0.265 (0.480)	-0.005 (0.668)	-0.709 (1.011)
Proportion attending to make money	-0.027 (0.015)	-0.980*** (0.237)	0.221 (0.513)	1.171*** (0.249)	-0.083 (0.346)	0.712 (0.441)
Mostly female	0.018** (0.006)	0.087 (0.096)	0.214 (0.175)	0.094 (0.091)	0.639*** (0.132)	0.181 (0.220)
Mostly Black	0.065*** (0.011)	0.769*** (0.164)	1.451*** (0.308)	0.416** (0.158)	-0.348 (0.271)	0.251 (0.480)
Large student body	-0.007 (0.005)	0.103 (0.070)	-0.203 (0.139)	-0.077 (0.080)	-0.582*** (0.127)	0.114 (0.128)
Public	0.004 (0.005)	0.253*** (0.072)	-0.183 (0.159)	-0.054 (0.079)	-0.041 (0.129)	-0.310* (0.147)
College	-0.002 (0.005)	0.047 (0.066)	-0.260 (0.133)	0.069 (0.079)	-0.217 (0.124)	0.099 (0.108)
Northeast	0.002 (0.004)	-0.315*** (0.054)	0.173 (0.108)	0.084 (0.059)	-0.041 (0.091)	-0.114 (0.102)
South	0.000 (0.004)	-0.199*** (0.059)	0.086 (0.116)	0.015 (0.063)	0.193* (0.093)	-0.047 (0.116)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Num. obs.	91257	47260	22778	80504	55592	10403
Num. groups: Freshman Cohorts	2695	1823	740	2434	1566	335
Num. groups: Schools	571	510	319	533	358	185

	Passive Engagement	Voting	Campaigning	Protesting	Elected S.G.	Leading Org.
High-Income						
Intercept	0.219*** (0.029)	1.428** (0.500)	-3.116*** (0.900)	-3.432*** (0.484)	-2.756*** (0.745)	-0.859 (0.846)
Lagged DV	0.499*** (0.003)	1.234*** (0.037)	1.395*** (0.052)	1.871*** (0.036)	1.532*** (0.044)	1.285*** (0.072)
23-32 perc. affluent	0.007 (0.005)	0.101 (0.086)	0.183 (0.171)	0.070 (0.074)	-0.008 (0.084)	0.165 (0.158)
32-42 perc. affluent	0.009 (0.005)	0.151 (0.088)	0.073 (0.171)	-0.043 (0.078)	-0.109 (0.093)	0.175 (0.150)
42-55 perc. affluent	0.016** (0.005)	0.187* (0.095)	0.105 (0.175)	0.104 (0.086)	-0.212* (0.106)	0.289 (0.166)
More than 55 perc. affluent	0.025*** (0.006)	0.257* (0.107)	-0.008 (0.202)	0.095 (0.104)	-0.182 (0.124)	0.419* (0.182)
High standardized test score	-0.006*** (0.002)	0.237*** (0.028)	-0.039 (0.056)	-0.281*** (0.023)	0.310*** (0.031)	0.351*** (0.076)
Missing test score	0.005 (0.002)	-0.078 (0.043)	-0.045 (0.093)	0.113** (0.035)	-0.101 (0.054)	-0.091 (0.096)
Female	-0.008*** (0.001)	0.242*** (0.022)	-0.358*** (0.048)	-0.027 (0.020)	0.005 (0.028)	0.225*** (0.043)
Asian	0.004 (0.003)	-0.645*** (0.055)	-0.002 (0.133)	0.200*** (0.053)	0.213** (0.075)	0.301* (0.119)
Latino	0.021*** (0.005)	-0.218** (0.078)	0.037 (0.179)	0.127 (0.074)	-0.020 (0.114)	-0.084 (0.153)
Black	0.058*** (0.006)	-0.374*** (0.100)	0.187 (0.232)	0.591*** (0.083)	0.473*** (0.119)	0.131 (0.227)
Other race	0.011*** (0.003)	-0.150** (0.050)	0.224* (0.098)	0.210*** (0.043)	0.079 (0.062)	-0.010 (0.080)
Jewish	0.006 (0.004)	0.380*** (0.091)	0.129 (0.151)	0.207** (0.065)	-0.006 (0.112)	-0.107 (0.137)
Catholic	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.075* (0.029)	-0.037 (0.062)	0.062* (0.026)	0.035 (0.036)	0.037 (0.057)
Evangelical	-0.008* (0.003)	-0.035 (0.060)	-0.374* (0.162)	0.014 (0.053)	-0.053 (0.067)	-0.220 (0.130)
Other or no religion	-0.007*** (0.002)	-0.123*** (0.036)	0.016 (0.071)	0.008 (0.031)	-0.112** (0.043)	-0.305*** (0.066)
English second language	0.013** (0.005)	-0.376*** (0.076)	-0.135 (0.194)	0.195** (0.071)	0.106 (0.103)	-0.250 (0.179)
Aged 17 or less	0.011* (0.005)	0.024 (0.081)	-0.267 (0.207)	-0.007 (0.071)	0.106 (0.095)	0.122 (0.195)
Aged 19	0.004** (0.001)	0.186*** (0.026)	-0.020 (0.054)	0.046* (0.022)	0.026 (0.030)	-0.012 (0.046)
Aged 20	0.014 (0.012)	-0.155 (0.191)	0.254 (0.409)	0.224 (0.171)	-0.401 (0.280)	-0.783* (0.394)
Social science major	0.014*** (0.002)	0.208*** (0.036)	0.456*** (0.072)	0.119*** (0.030)	0.097* (0.042)	0.055 (0.073)
Humanities major	0.002 (0.002)	0.098* (0.044)	0.026 (0.092)	0.142*** (0.036)	-0.136* (0.054)	0.091 (0.088)
Science major	-0.024*** (0.002)	0.040 (0.032)	-0.361*** (0.076)	-0.081** (0.030)	-0.098* (0.042)	0.020 (0.061)
Business major	-0.020*** (0.002)	-0.067 (0.036)	-0.210* (0.083)	-0.089** (0.034)	0.003 (0.045)	0.068 (0.069)
Attend to make money	-0.008*** (0.001)	-0.109*** (0.023)	0.019 (0.048)	-0.194*** (0.020)	-0.044 (0.027)	-0.217*** (0.045)
Proportion high standardized test score	0.006 (0.009)	-0.336* (0.139)	-0.055 (0.274)	-0.264 (0.167)	-0.227 (0.228)	0.073 (0.210)

Proportion Asian	0.001 (0.003)	0.049 (0.052)	-0.017 (0.101)	0.023 (0.056)	-0.096 (0.072)	-0.147 (0.096)
Proportion Latino	0.003 (0.004)	-0.044 (0.069)	0.108 (0.129)	-0.169* (0.072)	-0.204* (0.084)	-0.314** (0.108)
Proportion other race	0.006 (0.004)	-0.020 (0.064)	0.092 (0.115)	0.158* (0.065)	0.101 (0.076)	-0.148 (0.085)
Proportion Jewish	-0.003 (0.004)	0.088 (0.067)	-0.038 (0.110)	0.149* (0.066)	-0.039 (0.089)	0.258* (0.113)
Proportion Catholic	0.005 (0.004)	0.026 (0.072)	0.046 (0.114)	0.248*** (0.068)	0.066 (0.099)	-0.397*** (0.106)
Proportion Evangelical	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.059 (0.074)	-0.123 (0.132)	-0.080 (0.071)	0.111 (0.093)	0.052 (0.142)
Proportion other or no religion	-0.001 (0.004)	0.150* (0.065)	0.201 (0.112)	0.138* (0.068)	0.183* (0.091)	0.081 (0.089)
Proportion English second languages	-0.019 (0.033)	1.715** (0.564)	-0.863 (0.982)	-0.869 (0.564)	-0.006 (0.733)	2.239* (0.939)
Proportion aged 17 or less	-0.313** (0.116)	-3.434 (1.973)	-1.209 (4.216)	-3.034 (1.930)	2.469 (2.195)	-0.330 (6.066)
Proportion aged 19	0.016 (0.023)	0.529 (0.406)	-0.365 (0.659)	0.296 (0.398)	0.168 (0.548)	1.544* (0.650)
Proportion aged 20	-0.010 (0.068)	-1.675 (1.121)	-1.870 (2.228)	-0.006 (1.119)	0.587 (1.467)	-6.537* (3.090)
Proportion social science major	-0.016 (0.034)	-0.730 (0.577)	1.489 (1.124)	1.247* (0.561)	1.541* (0.745)	0.141 (1.063)
Proportion humanities major	-0.011 (0.031)	-0.825 (0.521)	1.801 (0.953)	0.744 (0.510)	0.958 (0.753)	-1.616 (0.884)
Proportion science major	-0.024 (0.027)	-0.323 (0.450)	1.432 (0.888)	0.348 (0.451)	1.020 (0.613)	0.105 (0.810)
Proportion business major	-0.014 (0.032)	-0.745 (0.552)	1.830 (1.187)	-0.214 (0.542)	1.063 (0.717)	-0.756 (0.984)
Proportion attending to make money	-0.022 (0.017)	-1.104*** (0.288)	-0.229 (0.536)	0.645* (0.289)	0.455 (0.389)	0.791 (0.494)
Mostly female	0.029*** (0.007)	-0.052 (0.125)	0.287 (0.194)	0.153 (0.106)	0.630*** (0.148)	0.269 (0.263)
Mostly Black	0.056*** (0.014)	1.007*** (0.232)	0.820* (0.405)	0.429* (0.202)	-0.495 (0.310)	0.972 (0.682)
Large student body	-0.009 (0.005)	0.106 (0.083)	-0.301* (0.134)	-0.055 (0.084)	-0.508*** (0.130)	0.048 (0.115)
Public	0.008 (0.005)	0.188* (0.086)	-0.089 (0.156)	-0.001 (0.086)	0.001 (0.134)	-0.428** (0.151)
College	-0.001 (0.005)	0.125 (0.074)	-0.339** (0.128)	0.048 (0.083)	-0.153 (0.126)	-0.098 (0.093)
Northeast	0.000 (0.004)	-0.353*** (0.066)	0.145 (0.110)	0.050 (0.064)	-0.102 (0.096)	-0.236* (0.101)
South	0.003 (0.004)	-0.167* (0.071)	0.168 (0.118)	0.002 (0.068)	0.168 (0.096)	0.013 (0.115)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Num. obs.	96391	56344	22487	85082	54774	11061
Num. groups: Freshman Cohorts	2546	1669	669	2298	1483	304
Num. groups: Schools	543	490	300	508	346	172

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$. Standard errors in parenthesis.

2 Low-Income Student Subset Tables

Table 8: The Effect of Campus Affluence on Political Participation for Low-Income Subsets

Wanted to live near home						
	Passive Engagement	Voting	Campaigning	Protesting	Elected S.G.	Leading Org.
Lagged DV	0.492*** (0.012)	1.453*** (0.141)	1.703*** (0.242)	1.568*** (0.122)	1.554*** (0.174)	1.451*** (0.268)
23-32 perc. affluent	0.020* (0.008)	0.269 (0.140)	0.421 (0.335)	-0.075 (0.117)	-0.059 (0.168)	0.310 (0.335)
32-42 perc. affluent	0.019* (0.009)	0.303* (0.154)	0.281 (0.398)	-0.051 (0.135)	-0.169 (0.203)	0.406 (0.353)
42-55 perc. affluent	0.035*** (0.011)	0.279 (0.180)	0.623 (0.411)	-0.021 (0.161)	-0.269 (0.247)	0.798 (0.424)
More than 55 perc. affluent	0.064*** (0.014)	0.372 (0.221)	0.136 (0.572)	0.202 (0.208)	0.013 (0.328)	0.727 (0.481)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Num. obs.	6510	3636	1646	5709	3823	759
Num. groups: Freshman Cohorts	1818	1095	474	1639	1065	194
Num. groups: Schools	453	391	258	417	303	124
Recruited for athletics						
	Passive Engagement	Voting	Campaigning	Protesting	Elected S.G.	Leading Org.
Lagged DV	0.351*** (0.031)	1.917*** (0.338)	-	-	1.309* (0.532)	1.832* (0.819)
23-32 perc. affluent	0.017 (0.020)	0.081 (0.315)	-	-	-0.109 (0.494)	0.910 (1.124)
32-42 perc. affluent	0.046* (0.023)	0.101 (0.346)	-	-	0.509 (0.578)	2.039* (0.993)
42-55 perc. affluent	0.033 (0.026)	0.507 (0.388)	-	-	-1.243 (0.772)	2.957* (1.211)
More than 55 perc. affluent	0.077* (0.036)	0.440 (0.508)	-	-	-2.107 (1.177)	3.584* (1.396)
Controls	Yes	Yes	-	-	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	-	-	Yes	Yes
Num. obs.	927	613	-	-	533	172
Num. groups: Freshman Cohorts	530	365	-	-	297	93
Num. groups: Schools	249	215	-	-	155	70
Could not afford first-choice						
	Passive Engagement	Voting	Campaigning	Protesting	Elected S.G.	Leading Org.
Lagged DV	0.460*** (0.064)	3.888*** (0.906)	-	-	-	2.238*** (0.553)
23-32 perc. affluent	0.013 (0.058)	1.573 (1.187)	-	-	-	-0.439 (0.707)
32-42 perc. affluent	0.027 (0.057)	1.948 (1.352)	-	-	-	0.788 (0.714)
42-55 perc. affluent	0.030 (0.071)	0.994 (1.688)	-	-	-	1.092 (0.865)
More than 55 perc. affluent	0.086 (0.075)	0.861 (1.569)	-	-	-	1.828 (0.937)
Controls	Yes	Yes	-	-	-	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	-	-	-	Yes
Num. obs.	282	177	-	-	-	292
Num. groups: Freshman Cohorts	117	68	-	-	-	120
Num. groups: Schools	94	68	-	-	-	98

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table 9: The Effect of Campus Affluence on Political Participation for Low-Income Subsets
(Continued)

Low Political Interest Freshman Year						
	Passive Engagement	Voting	Campaigning	Protesting	Elected S.G.	Leading Org.
Intercept	0.417*** (0.093)	1.965 (1.365)	-10.698** (3.678)	-3.296* (1.341)	-1.902 (1.998)	-
23-32 perc. affluent	0.018 (0.012)	0.262 (0.176)	0.299 (0.491)	-0.185 (0.164)	-0.256 (0.231)	-
32-42 perc. affluent	0.025 (0.013)	0.150 (0.194)	0.923 (0.497)	-0.273 (0.192)	-0.611* (0.293)	-
42-55 perc. affluent	0.040* (0.016)	0.098 (0.240)	1.364* (0.579)	-0.164 (0.235)	-0.516 (0.370)	-
More than 55 perc. affluent	0.073*** (0.021)	-0.056 (0.303)	0.680 (0.739)	0.286 (0.311)	-0.170 (0.494)	-
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Num. obs.	3131	1656	1478	2784	2272	-
Num. groups: Freshman Cohorts	1396	792	719	1258	1009	-
Num. groups: Schools	396	328	321	374	327	-
Medium Political Interest Freshman Year						
	Passive Engagement	Voting	Campaigning	Protesting	Elected S.G.	Leading Org.
Intercept	0.357*** (0.074)	0.498 (1.095)	-4.078 (2.170)	-4.173*** (0.954)	-3.445** (1.305)	-
23-32 perc. affluent	0.008 (0.010)	0.092 (0.154)	0.432 (0.274)	0.040 (0.127)	-0.221 (0.163)	-
32-42 perc. affluent	0.008 (0.011)	0.042 (0.167)	0.134 (0.314)	-0.004 (0.142)	-0.400* (0.192)	-
42-55 perc. affluent	0.040** (0.013)	0.165 (0.193)	0.363 (0.359)	0.046 (0.167)	-0.432 (0.231)	-
More than 55 perc. affluent	0.057*** (0.016)	0.048 (0.232)	0.455 (0.436)	0.356 (0.218)	-0.369 (0.311)	-
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Num. obs.	5570	3140	2784	5019	4120	-
Num. groups: Freshman Cohorts	1762	1068	965	1595	1288	-
Num. groups: Schools	444	387	379	414	373	-
High Political Interest Freshman Year						
	Passive Engagement	Voting	Campaigning	Protesting	Elected S.G.	Leading Org.
Intercept	0.577*** (0.083)	1.313 (1.232)	-3.746* (1.512)	-1.840 (0.946)	-2.462* (1.205)	-
23-32 perc. affluent	0.008 (0.013)	0.119 (0.209)	0.206 (0.227)	0.067 (0.148)	-0.086 (0.174)	-
32-42 perc. affluent	0.022 (0.013)	-0.095 (0.216)	0.179 (0.241)	0.117 (0.155)	-0.161 (0.189)	-
42-55 perc. affluent	0.017 (0.015)	0.228 (0.237)	0.097 (0.264)	0.162 (0.172)	-0.041 (0.211)	-
More than 55 perc. affluent	0.038* (0.019)	0.357 (0.280)	0.044 (0.317)	0.334 (0.223)	0.293 (0.281)	-
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Num. obs.	4555	2764	2536	4062	3219	-
Num. groups: Freshman Cohorts	1546	932	882	1387	1107	-
Num. groups: Schools	433	371	377	403	360	-

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table 10: The Effect of Campus Affluence Controlling for Cohort Political Activity

Cohort Political Norm						
	Passive Engagement	Voting	Campaigning	Protesting	Elected SG	Leading Org.
Lagged DV	0.489*** (0.008)	1.314*** (0.093)	1.506*** (0.162)	1.537*** (0.084)	1.442*** (0.113)	1.363*** (0.190)
23-32 perc. affluent	0.005 (0.006)	0.159 (0.104)	0.267 (0.245)	-0.014 (0.088)	-0.108 (0.127)	0.091 (0.235)
32-42 perc. affluent	0.014 (0.007)	0.069 (0.114)	0.177 (0.280)	0.005 (0.100)	-0.107 (0.154)	0.404 (0.245)
42-55 perc. affluent	0.022* (0.009)	0.210 (0.137)	0.136 (0.302)	0.057 (0.119)	-0.238 (0.192)	0.583 (0.302)
More than 55 perc. affluent	0.039*** (0.011)	0.152 (0.168)	0.006 (0.408)	0.319* (0.153)	0.049 (0.252)	0.661 (0.347)
Cohort Political Norm (TFS)	0.140 (0.076)	0.652 (1.145)	6.604* (2.869)	-0.291 (1.076)	-2.176 (1.740)	4.908 (2.540)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Num. obs.	13363	7560	3232	11822	7842	1479
Num. groups: Freshman Cohorts	2182	1362	582	1962	1247	243
Num. groups: Schools	510	453	287	473	324	152
Cohort Voter Turnout						
	Passive Engagement	Voting	Campaigning	Protesting	Elected SG	Leading Org.
Lagged DV	0.482*** (0.010)	1.250*** (0.097)	1.466*** (0.183)	1.554*** (0.104)	1.557*** (0.145)	1.312*** (0.215)
23-32 perc. affluent	0.014 (0.009)	-0.052 (0.111)	0.345 (0.301)	-0.047 (0.116)	-0.363* (0.175)	0.160 (0.318)
32-42 perc. affluent	0.023* (0.009)	-0.144 (0.116)	0.318 (0.350)	0.072 (0.125)	-0.118 (0.188)	0.566 (0.340)
42-55 perc. affluent	0.033** (0.011)	-0.009 (0.134)	0.636 (0.360)	0.180 (0.141)	-0.371 (0.222)	0.926* (0.386)
More than 55 perc. affluent	0.058*** (0.013)	-0.142 (0.161)	0.671 (0.493)	0.526** (0.181)	-0.332 (0.295)	1.004* (0.427)
Cohort Turnout Rate	-0.022 (0.030)	3.535*** (0.384)	-0.688 (1.091)	-0.700 (0.398)	-0.354 (0.639)	-0.838 (1.140)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Num. obs.	8963	6909	2509	7787	4732	1140
Num. groups: Freshman cohorts	1184	991	367	1064	644	139
Num. groups: Schools	339	340	198	318	232	89

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

3 Instrumental Variable Tables

Table 11: The Effect of Distance from Home as Instrument

	Continuous Distance	Less than 100 miles	Less than 50 miles
Correlations: instruments and affluence			
Quintile affluence - Low-Income Students	0.19	-0.18	-0.15
Quintile affluence - Full Sample	0.26	-0.23	-0.20
Binary affluence - Low-Income Students	0.19	-0.17	-0.14
Binary affluence - Full Sample	0.24	-0.21	-0.19
Stage 1, without controls			
Constant	0.023** (0.008)	0.274*** (0.004)	0.242*** (0.004)
Distance from home	0.057*** (0.002)	-0.137*** (0.006)	-0.113*** (0.006)
Controls	No	No	No
Year Fixed Effects	No	No	No
Adj. R ²	0.035	0.029	0.018
Num. obs.	17088	17088	17088
RMSE	0.393	0.395	0.397
Weak Instruments F test	604.58***	499.61***	312.54***
Wu-Hausman	26.99***	23.02***	12.64***
Stage 1, with controls			
Constant	-0.522*** (0.059)	-0.470*** (0.058)	-0.473*** (0.058)
Distance from home	0.012*** (0.002)	-0.027*** (0.005)	-0.024*** (0.005)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adj. R ²	0.557	0.557	0.556
Num. obs.	13646	13646	13646
RMSE	0.269	0.269	0.269
Weak Instruments F test	35.36***	24.88***	19.43***
Wu-Hausman	20.88***	12.10***	14.90***
Stage 2, IV effect on Passive Engagement Index			
Intercept	0.554*** (0.090)	0.519*** (0.095)	0.578*** (0.114)
Attending affluent school	0.575*** (0.149)	0.502** (0.165)	0.626** (0.207)
Lagged DV	0.477*** (0.011)	0.479*** (0.011)	0.476*** (0.012)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adj. R ²	-0.164	-0.056	-0.248
Num. obs.	13182	13182	13182
RMSE	0.243	0.232	0.252

	Continuous Distance	Less than 100 miles	Less than 50 miles
Stage 2, IV effect on Voting			
Intercept	-0.001 (0.294)	0.036 (0.299)	-0.060 (0.381)
Attending affluent school	-2.079*** (0.588)	-1.970** (0.629)	-2.249* (0.894)
Lagged DV	0.302*** (0.032)	0.299*** (0.032)	0.306*** (0.037)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adj. R ²	-1.472	-1.313	-1.738
Num. obs.	7457	7457	7457
RMSE	0.734	0.710	0.772
Stage 2, IV effect on Campaigning			
Intercept	-0.575 (2.808)	0.307 (2.830)	0.684 (3.939)
Attending affluent school	-1.917 (13.679)	2.399 (13.759)	4.243 (19.104)
Lagged DV	0.260 (0.571)	0.080 (0.575)	0.003 (0.799)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adj. R ²	-2.526	-4.091	-12.868
Num. obs.	3184	3184	3184
RMSE	0.549	0.660	1.090
Stage 2, IV effect on Student Government Participation			
Intercept	0.736 (0.427)	0.785 (0.548)	0.900 (0.554)
Attending affluent school	1.550* (0.635)	1.639 (0.879)	1.845* (0.873)
Lagged DV	0.148*** (0.021)	0.147*** (0.023)	0.144*** (0.024)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adj. R ²	-1.133	-1.275	-1.635
Num. obs.	7739	7739	7739
RMSE	0.506	0.522	0.562

	Continuous Distance	Less than 100 miles	Less than 50 miles
Stage 2, IV effect on Leading a Student Organization			
Intercept	0.820 (0.487)	0.660 (0.419)	1.039 (0.649)
Attending affluent school	1.491** (0.493)	1.001* (0.395)	2.160* (0.984)
Lagged DV	0.315*** (0.053)	0.311*** (0.046)	0.319*** (0.065)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adj. R ²	-0.634	-0.227	-1.460
Num. obs.	1458	1458	1458
RMSE	0.626	0.542	0.768
Stage 2, IV effect on Protesting			
Intercept	0.370 (0.235)	0.313 (0.267)	0.405 (0.274)
Attending affluent school	1.595** (0.585)	1.421* (0.709)	1.700* (0.716)
Lagged DV	0.243*** (0.020)	0.245*** (0.019)	0.242*** (0.021)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adj. R ²	-0.825	-0.635	-0.950
Num. obs.	11661	11661	11661
RMSE	0.568	0.538	0.588

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$. Standard errors in parenthesis.

4 Full Model Results for (Intervening Variables Analysis)

Table 12: Individual-Level Intervening Outcomes

	Academic Comp.	Motivation to Lead	Working Less	Emotional Health	Social Satisfaction	Social Confidence
Low-Income						
Intercept	0.370*** (0.034)	0.211*** (0.036)	0.033 (0.121)	0.552*** (0.051)	0.667*** (0.066)	0.344*** (0.050)
Lagged DV	0.473*** (0.008)	0.576*** (0.008)	0.051*** (0.014)	0.357*** (0.008)	0.090*** (0.009)	0.439*** (0.008)
23-32 perc. affluent	0.009* (0.004)	0.007 (0.005)	-0.011 (0.014)	0.014* (0.007)	0.004 (0.008)	0.010 (0.006)
32-42 perc. affluent	0.007 (0.005)	0.015** (0.005)	0.004 (0.016)	0.019** (0.007)	-0.005 (0.009)	0.015* (0.007)
42-55 perc. affluent	0.013* (0.006)	0.021*** (0.006)	0.015 (0.020)	0.024** (0.009)	0.004 (0.011)	0.021* (0.009)
More than 55 perc. affluent	0.027*** (0.007)	0.025** (0.008)	0.021 (0.026)	0.038*** (0.011)	0.002 (0.013)	0.031** (0.011)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Num. obs.	12713	9066	7142	12770	11464	12768
Num. groups: Freshman Cohorts	2055	1512	1366	2054	1861	2055
Num. groups: Schools	500	423	405	501	482	502
Middle-Income						
Intercept	0.401*** (0.017)	0.289*** (0.020)	0.077 (0.073)	0.488*** (0.023)	0.702*** (0.040)	0.401*** (0.023)
Lagged DV	0.464*** (0.003)	0.589*** (0.003)	0.129*** (0.006)	0.384*** (0.003)	0.093*** (0.004)	0.455*** (0.003)
23-32 perc. affluent	0.006** (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)	0.014 (0.007)	0.002 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.004)	0.002 (0.003)
32-42 perc. affluent	0.009*** (0.002)	0.002 (0.003)	0.034*** (0.009)	0.004 (0.003)	0.003 (0.005)	0.000 (0.003)
42-55 perc. affluent	0.012*** (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.047*** (0.011)	0.007 (0.004)	0.003 (0.006)	0.009* (0.004)
More than 55 perc. affluent	0.014*** (0.004)	0.005 (0.004)	0.065*** (0.015)	0.006 (0.005)	0.002 (0.008)	0.011* (0.005)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Num. obs.	87696	64192	48274	87956	77640	87930
Num. groups: Freshman Cohorts	2549	1906	1736	2326	2326	2549
Num. groups: Schools	564	486	472	564	547	564
High-Income						
Intercept	0.391*** (0.020)	0.279*** (0.021)	0.059 (0.097)	0.432*** (0.025)	0.652*** (0.047)	0.379*** (0.026)
Lagged DV	0.470*** (0.003)	0.586*** (0.003)	0.274*** (0.008)	0.391*** (0.003)	0.094*** (0.004)	0.455*** (0.003)
23-32 perc. affluent	0.008* (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.019 (0.012)	0.006 (0.005)	0.007 (0.006)	0.013** (0.005)
32-42 perc. affluent	0.009** (0.003)	-0.000 (0.003)	0.033* (0.013)	0.007 (0.005)	0.021** (0.007)	0.008 (0.005)
42-55 perc. affluent	0.011** (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	0.053*** (0.015)	0.013** (0.005)	0.028*** (0.008)	0.014** (0.005)
More than 55 perc. affluent	0.013** (0.004)	0.006 (0.005)	0.080*** (0.018)	0.016** (0.006)	0.032*** (0.009)	0.018** (0.006)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Num. obs.	91379	63022	40118	91674	81630	91645
Num. groups: Freshman Cohorts	2402	1783	1591	2197	2198	2404
Num. groups: Schools	539	466	449	539	529	539

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$. Standard errors in parenthesis.

Table 13: Aggregate-Level Intervening Outcomes

	TFS Cohort Passive Engagement	TFS Cohort Aid Ratio
Intercept	0.441*** (0.043)	0.233** (0.083)
23-32 perc. affluent	0.017*** (0.005)	0.006 (0.011)
32-42 perc. affluent	0.016** (0.005)	-0.002 (0.012)
42-55 perc. affluent	0.043*** (0.006)	0.018 (0.015)
More than 55 perc. affluent	0.057*** (0.008)	-0.036 (0.020)
Controls	Yes	Yes
Year fixed-effects	Yes	Yes
Num. Cohorts	4010	2439
Num. Schools	637	511

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$. Standard errors in parenthesis.

Table 14: Intervening Outcomes, Robustness Analysis

	Academic competence (Self-Rated Changes)	Working Less for Pay	Psychological Health	Social Well-Being
Low-Income				
Intercept	0.786*** (0.039)	0.136 (0.083)	0.500*** (0.054)	0.296*** (0.056)
Lagged DV	0.012*** (0.003)		0.285*** (0.009)	0.507*** (0.011)
23-32 perc. affluent	0.003 (0.005)	0.006 (0.010)	0.003 (0.007)	0.009 (0.007)
32-42 perc. affluent	0.016** (0.006)	0.017 (0.011)	0.003 (0.008)	0.018* (0.008)
42-55 perc. affluent	0.018** (0.007)	0.032* (0.014)	0.002 (0.009)	0.025* (0.010)
More than 55 perc. affluent	0.022* (0.009)	0.045** (0.017)	0.022 (0.012)	0.020 (0.013)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Num. obs.	12042	13599	11213	6510
Num. groups: Freshman Cohortss	1971	2191	1835	1093
Num. groups: Schools	478	513	463	304
Middle-Income				
Intercept	0.771*** (0.021)	0.214*** (0.050)	0.510*** (0.026)	0.357*** (0.024)
Lagged DV	0.012*** (0.001)		0.285*** (0.003)	0.516*** (0.004)
23-32 perc. affluent	0.005* (0.002)	0.014** (0.005)	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)
32-42 perc. affluent	0.009*** (0.003)	0.032*** (0.006)	-0.008* (0.004)	-0.002 (0.003)
42-55 perc. affluent	0.012*** (0.003)	0.042*** (0.008)	-0.006 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)
More than 55 perc. affluent	0.012** (0.004)	0.052*** (0.010)	-0.008 (0.006)	0.004 (0.005)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Num. obs.	81601	92321	77179	50061
Num. groups: Freshman Cohortss	2438	2701	2292	1451
Num. groups: Schools	533	573	524	341
High-Income				
Intercept	0.778*** (0.023)	0.358*** (0.064)	0.493*** (0.028)	0.298*** (0.028)
Lagged DV	0.012*** (0.001)		0.288*** (0.003)	0.523*** (0.004)
23-32 perc. affluent	0.008* (0.004)	0.023** (0.008)	-0.005 (0.005)	0.007 (0.004)
32-42 perc. affluent	0.012** (0.004)	0.047*** (0.009)	-0.011* (0.005)	0.001 (0.005)
42-55 perc. affluent	0.013** (0.004)	0.066*** (0.010)	-0.012* (0.005)	0.011* (0.005)
More than 55 perc. affluent	0.013** (0.005)	0.085*** (0.012)	-0.010 (0.006)	0.012* (0.006)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Num. obs.	86221	97685	80268	47236
Num. groups: Freshman Cohorts	2299	2548	2161	1362
Num. groups: Schools	508	543	504	329

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$. Standard errors in parenthesis.

5 Moderation Model Tables

Table 15: Psychological Mechanism

	Passive Engagement	Voting	Campaigning	Protesting	Elected S.G.	Leading Org.
Individual Emotional Health						
Intercept	0.267*** (0.048)	0.722 (0.714)	-4.213 (2.157)	-3.100*** (0.654)	-3.184* (1.543)	-1.361 (1.626)
Lagged DV	0.490*** (0.008)	1.301*** (0.094)	1.661*** (0.187)	1.514*** (0.086)	1.457*** (0.114)	1.414*** (0.192)
23-32 perc. affluent	0.008 (0.007)	0.159 (0.110)	0.255 (0.289)	-0.057 (0.093)	-0.163 (0.133)	0.075 (0.247)
32-42 perc. affluent	0.022** (0.007)	0.119 (0.117)	0.474 (0.333)	-0.077 (0.104)	-0.148 (0.156)	0.400 (0.257)
42-55 perc. affluent	0.028** (0.009)	0.234 (0.134)	0.417 (0.346)	0.032 (0.119)	-0.357 (0.191)	0.768** (0.293)
More than 55 perc. affluent	0.049*** (0.011)	0.162 (0.160)	0.365 (0.477)	0.286 (0.152)	-0.088 (0.247)	0.907** (0.333)
Ind. Emotional Health	0.026* (0.011)	0.107 (0.172)	0.768* (0.382)	0.139 (0.137)	-0.284 (0.193)	-0.392 (0.364)
23-32 perc. affluent X Ind. Emotional Health	-0.013 (0.015)	0.027 (0.239)	-0.312 (0.540)	0.155 (0.195)	0.236 (0.277)	0.623 (0.580)
32-42 perc. affluent X Ind. Emotional Health	-0.024 (0.015)	-0.284 (0.235)	-1.360 (0.702)	0.045 (0.202)	0.004 (0.297)	0.249 (0.477)
42-55 perc. affluent X Ind. Emotional Health	-0.037* (0.015)	-0.065 (0.241)	-1.238* (0.593)	-0.195 (0.199)	0.302 (0.281)	0.381 (0.535)
More than 55 perc. affluent X Ind. Emotional Health	-0.025 (0.014)	-0.044 (0.221)	-0.770 (0.582)	-0.014 (0.187)	0.349 (0.276)	0.349 (0.468)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Num. obs.	12603	7460	2507	11065	7820	1472
Num. groups: Freshman Cohorts	2047	1323	451	1828	1246	237
Num. groups: Schools	498	450	248	459	324	152
Individual Motivation to Lead						
Intercept	0.271*** (0.056)	0.793 (0.900)	-4.283 (2.640)	-2.809*** (0.705)	-3.483* (1.592)	-
Lagged DV	0.475*** (0.010)	1.286*** (0.119)	1.656*** (0.233)	1.407*** (0.095)	1.155*** (0.126)	-
23-32 perc. affluent	0.012 (0.009)	0.158 (0.148)	0.030 (0.436)	0.024 (0.115)	-0.013 (0.168)	-
32-42 perc. affluent	0.020* (0.010)	0.140 (0.159)	0.511 (0.484)	-0.100 (0.129)	-0.352 (0.208)	-
42-55 perc. affluent	0.024* (0.011)	0.131 (0.183)	0.128 (0.495)	-0.061 (0.146)	-0.620* (0.251)	-
More than 55 perc. affluent	0.035* (0.014)	0.027 (0.229)	0.170 (0.652)	0.277 (0.181)	-0.188 (0.300)	-
Ind. Motivation to Lead	0.023** (0.009)	0.081 (0.146)	0.539 (0.374)	0.102 (0.107)	0.474*** (0.143)	-
23-32 perc. affluent X Ind. Motivation to Lead	-0.012 (0.012)	-0.005 (0.206)	0.070 (0.526)	-0.045 (0.158)	-0.245 (0.210)	-
32-42 perc. affluent X Ind. Motivation to Lead	0.010 (0.012)	-0.209 (0.209)	-0.938 (0.614)	0.177 (0.162)	0.224 (0.232)	-
42-55 perc. affluent X Ind. Motivation to Lead	-0.003 (0.013)	0.127 (0.213)	-0.555 (0.541)	0.105 (0.163)	0.416 (0.244)	-
More than 55 perc. affluent X Ind. Motivation to Lead	0.008 (0.013)	0.161 (0.211)	-0.536 (0.600)	0.039 (0.163)	0.162 (0.240)	-
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Num. obs.	9133	4691	1896	9026	7079	-
Num. groups: Freshman Cohorts	1525	913	357	1518	1128	-
Num. groups: Schools	428	372	204	426	319	-

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table 16: Academic Mechanism

Individual Academic Competence	Passive Engagement	Voting	Campaigning	Protesting	Elected S.G.	Leading Org.
Intercept	0.274*** (0.047)	0.798 (0.720)	-4.477* (2.181)	-3.033*** (0.653)	-3.052* (1.538)	-1.115 (1.635)
Lagged DV	0.490*** (0.009)	1.284*** (0.094)	1.629*** (0.188)	1.515*** (0.086)	1.349*** (0.115)	1.337*** (0.195)
23-32 perc. affluent	0.007 (0.007)	0.172 (0.111)	0.244 (0.302)	-0.006 (0.094)	-0.220 (0.140)	0.066 (0.253)
32-42 perc. affluent	0.020** (0.008)	0.081 (0.119)	0.424 (0.351)	-0.072 (0.105)	-0.202 (0.163)	0.417 (0.261)
42-55 perc. affluent	0.026** (0.009)	0.238 (0.135)	0.263 (0.355)	0.031 (0.120)	-0.314 (0.194)	0.806** (0.298)
More than 55 perc. affluent	0.044*** (0.011)	0.136 (0.162)	0.523 (0.481)	0.259 (0.153)	-0.133 (0.253)	0.844* (0.336)
Ind. Academic Competence	0.006 (0.010)	0.314 (0.185)	0.535 (0.366)	-0.092 (0.135)	0.091 (0.170)	0.163 (0.361)
23-32 perc. affluent X Ind. Academic Competence	-0.003 (0.014)	-0.128 (0.240)	-0.113 (0.503)	-0.020 (0.189)	0.366 (0.235)	0.404 (0.525)
32-42 perc. affluent X Ind. Academic Competence	-0.005 (0.014)	-0.122 (0.241)	-0.609 (0.582)	0.118 (0.193)	0.218 (0.250)	-0.043 (0.458)
42-55 perc. affluent X Ind. Academic Competence	-0.013 (0.013)	-0.076 (0.237)	-0.165 (0.519)	-0.060 (0.188)	0.093 (0.245)	-0.123 (0.490)
More than 55 perc. affluent X Ind. Academic Competence	0.001 (0.013)	-0.013 (0.219)	-1.008 (0.543)	0.178 (0.174)	0.353 (0.237)	0.270 (0.445)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Num. obs.	12566	7439	2501	11043	7797	1462
Num. groups: Freshman Cohorts	2048	1325	451	1832	1247	237
Num. groups: Schools	497	449	248	461	324	152

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$. Standard errors in parenthesis.

Table 17: Social Mechanism

	Passive Engagement	Voting	Campaigning	Protesting	Elected S.G.	Leading Org.
Individual Social Self-Confidence						
Intercept	0.269*** (0.048)	0.785 (0.716)	-4.657* (2.178)	-3.192*** (0.653)	-3.120* (1.539)	-1.308 (1.634)
Lagged DV	0.479*** (0.009)	1.306*** (0.094)	1.626*** (0.188)	1.494*** (0.086)	1.361*** (0.116)	1.295*** (0.196)
23-32 perc. affluent	0.008 (0.008)	0.110 (0.124)	0.519 (0.362)	0.074 (0.108)	-0.137 (0.157)	0.021 (0.291)
32-42 perc. affluent	0.018* (0.008)	0.052 (0.133)	0.805 (0.416)	-0.072 (0.122)	-0.067 (0.181)	0.351 (0.280)
42-55 perc. affluent	0.021* (0.009)	0.197 (0.148)	0.424 (0.423)	0.120 (0.133)	-0.293 (0.213)	0.708* (0.322)
More than 55 perc. affluent	0.046*** (0.012)	0.081 (0.171)	0.735 (0.542)	0.258 (0.164)	-0.220 (0.268)	0.825* (0.351)
Ind. Self-Confidence	0.026*** (0.008)	-0.099 (0.128)	0.711* (0.341)	0.286** (0.102)	0.153 (0.139)	0.076 (0.281)
23-32 perc. affluent X Ind. Self-Confidence	-0.003 (0.011)	0.129 (0.176)	-0.501 (0.458)	-0.193 (0.148)	0.062 (0.204)	0.286 (0.408)
32-42 perc. affluent X Ind. Self-Confidence	0.002 (0.011)	0.060 (0.178)	-1.048* (0.529)	0.030 (0.153)	-0.147 (0.216)	0.210 (0.371)
42-55 perc. affluent X Ind. Self-Confidence	0.005 (0.011)	0.093 (0.178)	-0.373 (0.466)	-0.239 (0.149)	0.016 (0.215)	0.274 (0.396)
More than 55 perc. affluent X Ind. Self-Confidence	-0.002 (0.011)	0.215 (0.168)	-0.872 (0.493)	0.073 (0.145)	0.433* (0.215)	0.333 (0.363)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Num. obs.	12604	7461	2509	11068	7821	1471
Num. groups: Freshman Cohorts	2048	1325	451	1830	1246	237
Num. groups: Schools	499	451	248	461	324	152
Aggregate Social Self-Confidence						
Intercept	0.248*** (0.051)	0.577 (0.747)	-6.405** (1.997)	-3.569*** (0.688)	-3.397* (1.583)	-0.582 (1.744)
Lagged DV	0.491*** (0.008)	1.302*** (0.096)	1.548*** (0.169)	1.536*** (0.086)	1.455*** (0.115)	1.382*** (0.195)
23-32 perc. affluent	0.015 (0.008)	0.166 (0.131)	0.383 (0.360)	0.024 (0.111)	-0.102 (0.157)	0.081 (0.356)
32-42 perc. affluent	0.027** (0.009)	0.220 (0.141)	0.456 (0.383)	0.054 (0.126)	-0.230 (0.191)	0.335 (0.325)
42-55 perc. affluent	0.034** (0.011)	0.411* (0.161)	0.828* (0.398)	0.155 (0.143)	-0.275 (0.227)	0.493 (0.420)
More than 55 perc. affluent	0.055*** (0.013)	0.471* (0.200)	0.719 (0.510)	0.396* (0.178)	-0.127 (0.285)	0.582 (0.505)
Agg. Self-Confidence	0.017 (0.010)	0.106 (0.171)	0.254 (0.401)	0.079 (0.133)	-0.065 (0.192)	-0.515 (0.316)
23-32 perc. affluent X Agg. Self-Confidence	-0.019 (0.013)	0.126 (0.215)	0.079 (0.488)	-0.116 (0.179)	-0.109 (0.262)	0.327 (0.469)
32-42 perc. affluent X Agg. Self-Confidence	-0.022 (0.013)	-0.210 (0.218)	-0.092 (0.530)	-0.091 (0.178)	0.159 (0.269)	0.400 (0.412)
42-55 perc. affluent X Agg. Self-Confidence	-0.017 (0.013)	-0.227 (0.218)	-0.702 (0.474)	-0.254 (0.176)	-0.097 (0.274)	0.734 (0.476)
More than 55 perc. affluent X Agg. Self-Confidence	-0.018 (0.013)	-0.335 (0.218)	-0.408 (0.502)	-0.152 (0.176)	0.148 (0.275)	0.766 (0.530)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Num. obs.	12591	7147	2962	11118	7571	1409
Num. groups: Freshman Cohorts	1794	1124	478	1617	1096	196
Num. groups: Schools	402	356	233	374	283	120

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$. Standard errors in parenthesis.

Table 18: Financial Mechanism

	Passive Engagement	Voting	Campaigning	Protesting	Elected S.G.	Leading Org.
Individual Financial Aid						
Intercept	0.314*** (0.057)	1.171 (0.977)	-3.068 (2.681)	-2.504** (0.785)	-3.213* (1.617)	-
Lagged DV	0.498*** (0.010)	1.215*** (0.124)	1.688*** (0.234)	1.415*** (0.102)	1.456*** (0.128)	-
23-32 perc. affluent	0.002 (0.009)	0.359* (0.163)	0.503 (0.410)	-0.082 (0.123)	-0.127 (0.177)	-
32-42 perc. affluent	-0.002 (0.010)	0.237 (0.172)	0.235 (0.494)	-0.191 (0.137)	-0.334 (0.209)	-
42-55 perc. affluent	-0.001 (0.012)	0.283 (0.206)	-0.158 (0.504)	-0.189 (0.161)	-0.518* (0.252)	-
More than 55 perc. affluent	0.004 (0.015)	0.384 (0.260)	-0.011 (0.719)	-0.049 (0.203)	0.183 (0.303)	-
Ind. Financial Aid	-0.023* (0.009)	0.442** (0.162)	0.551 (0.380)	-0.375** (0.125)	0.104 (0.155)	-
23-32 perc. affluent X Ind. Financial Aid	0.012 (0.013)	-0.351 (0.222)	-0.914 (0.544)	0.191 (0.176)	0.032 (0.226)	-
32-42 perc. affluent X Ind. Financial Aid	0.042** (0.013)	-0.316 (0.228)	-0.652 (0.631)	0.297 (0.181)	0.254 (0.246)	-
42-55 perc. affluent X Ind. Financial Aid	0.042** (0.014)	-0.233 (0.236)	-0.336 (0.558)	0.300 (0.183)	0.162 (0.259)	-
More than 55 perc. affluent X Ind. Financial Aid	0.055*** (0.015)	-0.541* (0.242)	-0.451 (0.650)	0.557** (0.188)	-0.301 (0.253)	-
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Year fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Num. obs.	8028	3907	1859	7934	5971	-
Num. groups: Freshman Cohorts	1405	810	355	1394	1009	-
Num. groups: Schools	418	357	204	413	307	-
	Passive Engagement	Voting	Campaigning	Protesting	Elected S.G.	Leading Org.
Individual Financial Concern						
Intercept	0.272*** (0.057)	-0.222 (1.088)	-5.935** (1.833)	-3.352*** (0.799)	-3.335* (1.554)	-1.903 (1.648)
Lagged DV	0.502*** (0.009)	1.379*** (0.110)	1.531*** (0.164)	1.604*** (0.093)	1.478*** (0.114)	1.402*** (0.191)
23-32 perc. affluent	0.018 (0.016)	0.183 (0.288)	-0.666 (0.633)	0.104 (0.237)	-0.189 (0.331)	0.132 (0.586)
32-42 perc. affluent	0.008 (0.017)	0.063 (0.299)	-0.194 (0.582)	-0.049 (0.254)	0.125 (0.325)	0.995 (0.565)
42-55 perc. affluent	0.039* (0.017)	0.328 (0.306)	0.336 (0.539)	-0.027 (0.256)	-0.434 (0.373)	1.627** (0.585)
More than 55 perc. affluent	0.078*** (0.018)	0.383 (0.308)	-0.118 (0.622)	0.366 (0.264)	0.203 (0.382)	1.060 (0.547)
Ind. Financial Concern	0.014 (0.012)	0.155 (0.227)	-0.619 (0.424)	0.138 (0.171)	0.383 (0.220)	0.062 (0.422)
23-32 perc. affluent X Ind. Financial Concern	-0.010 (0.017)	-0.079 (0.302)	1.170 (0.660)	-0.159 (0.247)	0.028 (0.339)	-0.019 (0.616)
32-42 perc. affluent X Ind. Financial Concern	0.015 (0.017)	0.076 (0.312)	0.504 (0.611)	0.035 (0.260)	-0.318 (0.329)	-0.683 (0.576)
42-55 perc. affluent X Ind. Financial Concern	-0.009 (0.017)	-0.290 (0.309)	0.033 (0.554)	0.164 (0.251)	0.141 (0.360)	-1.005 (0.589)
More than 55 perc. affluent X Ind. Financial Concern	-0.034* (0.017)	-0.339 (0.290)	0.378 (0.569)	0.020 (0.235)	-0.289 (0.334)	-0.203 (0.524)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Num. obs.	11077	5739	3192	9599	7693	1473
Num. groups: Freshman Cohorts	1800	1031	578	1584	1242	243
Num. groups: Schools	422	354	286	376	323	152

	Passive Engagement	Voting	Campaigning	Protesting	Elected S.G.	Leading Org.
Aggregate Low-Income Financial Concern						
Intercept	0.269*** (0.048)	0.819 (0.722)	-6.453*** (1.810)	-3.521*** (0.644)	-3.302* (1.534)	-2.388 (1.689)
Lagged DV	0.491*** (0.008)	1.318*** (0.093)	1.512*** (0.162)	1.536*** (0.083)	1.437*** (0.113)	1.379*** (0.191)
23-32 perc. affluent	0.002 (0.009)	0.095 (0.149)	0.167 (0.356)	-0.066 (0.121)	0.332 (0.185)	0.102 (0.361)
32-42 perc. affluent	0.004 (0.009)	0.176 (0.149)	0.183 (0.396)	-0.302* (0.132)	0.297 (0.209)	0.354 (0.339)
42-55 perc. affluent	0.018 (0.011)	0.261 (0.170)	0.275 (0.402)	-0.144 (0.151)	-0.030 (0.252)	0.893* (0.348)
More than 55 perc. affluent	0.039** (0.012)	0.111 (0.186)	-0.050 (0.519)	0.183 (0.176)	0.165 (0.294)	0.717 (0.390)
Agg. L.I. Financial Concern	-0.016 (0.010)	0.011 (0.155)	-0.238 (0.382)	-0.337** (0.128)	0.499* (0.202)	-0.035 (0.330)
23-32 perc. affluent X Agg. L.I. Financial Concern	0.010 (0.012)	0.132 (0.195)	0.308 (0.458)	0.103 (0.161)	-0.828*** (0.244)	0.065 (0.479)
32-42 perc. affluent X Agg. L.I. Financial Concern	0.025* (0.012)	-0.220 (0.204)	0.232 (0.484)	0.614*** (0.171)	-0.815** (0.272)	0.041 (0.452)
42-55 perc. affluent X Agg. L.I. Financial Concern	0.017 (0.013)	-0.082 (0.207)	0.080 (0.477)	0.393* (0.174)	-0.475 (0.287)	-0.466 (0.463)
More than 55 perc. affluent X Agg. L.I. Financial Concern	0.012 (0.014)	0.151 (0.208)	0.519 (0.532)	0.264 (0.182)	-0.313 (0.308)	0.401 (0.470)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Num. obs.	13330	7529	3230	11810	7842	1458
Num. groups: Freshman Cohorts	2175	1357	581	1959	1247	238
Num. groups: Schools	504	448	286	470	324	148

Table 19: Institutional Mechanism

	Passive Engagement	Voting	Campaigning	Protesting	Elected S.G.	Leading Org.
Dorms & Dining Halls						
Intercept	0.332*** (0.056)	0.866 (0.886)	-5.722* (2.303)	-3.689*** (0.737)	-3.654* (1.790)	-5.076 (2.696)
Lagged DV	0.494*** (0.009)	1.314*** (0.106)	1.540*** (0.186)	1.557*** (0.094)	1.466*** (0.127)	1.098*** (0.241)
23-32 perc. affluent	-0.008 (0.010)	0.271 (0.171)	0.626 (0.412)	-0.033 (0.133)	-0.089 (0.198)	0.273 (0.537)
32-42 perc. affluent	0.001 (0.010)	0.044 (0.168)	0.360 (0.428)	-0.075 (0.137)	-0.316 (0.217)	1.023* (0.500)
42-55 perc. affluent	0.003 (0.012)	0.225 (0.191)	0.573 (0.464)	-0.087 (0.156)	-0.522* (0.258)	1.459* (0.636)
More than 55 perc. affluent	0.022 (0.015)	0.192 (0.224)	0.448 (0.600)	0.079 (0.194)	-0.161 (0.327)	1.830** (0.638)
Dorms & Dining Halls	-0.034** (0.011)	-0.081 (0.175)	-0.057 (0.490)	0.053 (0.142)	0.099 (0.243)	0.823 (0.536)
23-32 perc. affluent X Dorms & Dining Halls	0.029* (0.014)	0.016 (0.234)	-0.788 (0.646)	-0.044 (0.191)	-0.249 (0.296)	0.204 (0.706)
32-42 perc. affluent X Dorms & Dining Halls	0.015 (0.016)	0.341 (0.247)	-0.108 (0.693)	0.120 (0.210)	-0.305 (0.378)	-0.540 (0.656)
42-55 perc. affluent X Dorms & Dining Halls	0.047** (0.015)	0.200 (0.243)	-0.437 (0.625)	0.129 (0.199)	0.091 (0.368)	-0.642 (0.759)
More than 55 perc. affluent X Dorms & Dining Halls	0.034* (0.014)	0.049 (0.220)	-0.139 (0.597)	0.163 (0.186)	-0.174 (0.340)	-1.102 (0.705)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Year fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Num. obs.	10214	5722	2503	9212	6324	940
Num. groups: Freshman Cohorts	1456	926	408	1339	881	133
Num. groups: Schools	227	221	161	226	172	76

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$. Standard errors in parenthesis.

Table 20: Additional Tests

	Passive Engagement	Voting	Campaigning	Protesting	Elected S.G.	Leading Org.
Individual Political Ideology						
Intercept	0.248*** (0.063)	1.205 (0.993)	-5.141* (2.543)	-3.123*** (0.871)	-1.909 (1.858)	0.358 (2.395)
Lagged DV	0.485*** (0.011)	1.363*** (0.132)	1.771*** (0.218)	1.420*** (0.118)	1.616*** (0.156)	1.279*** (0.264)
23-32 perc. affluent	0.034** (0.012)	0.116 (0.205)	0.192 (0.441)	0.039 (0.163)	-0.297 (0.234)	0.222 (0.439)
32-42 perc. affluent	0.042** (0.013)	-0.164 (0.209)	0.276 (0.463)	0.176 (0.166)	-0.335 (0.245)	0.334 (0.468)
42-55 perc. affluent	0.070*** (0.014)	0.191 (0.228)	0.267 (0.472)	0.189 (0.184)	-0.307 (0.261)	0.289 (0.488)
More than 55 perc. affluent	0.081*** (0.017)	-0.057 (0.256)	0.512 (0.596)	0.426 (0.225)	-0.365 (0.338)	0.515 (0.554)
Ind. Political Ideology	0.029* (0.012)	-0.198 (0.203)	-0.840 (0.523)	-0.078 (0.158)	-0.188 (0.215)	-0.488 (0.434)
23-32 perc. affluent X Ind. Political Ideology	-0.048** (0.016)	0.156 (0.262)	0.137 (0.655)	-0.146 (0.219)	0.235 (0.299)	0.365 (0.593)
32-42 perc. affluent X Ind. Political Ideology	-0.038* (0.016)	0.369 (0.266)	0.570 (0.681)	-0.332 (0.225)	0.249 (0.313)	0.022 (0.554)
42-55 perc. affluent X Ind. Political Ideology	-0.080*** (0.016)	-0.037 (0.272)	0.984 (0.636)	-0.300 (0.222)	0.092 (0.305)	0.567 (0.610)
More than 55 perc. affluent X Ind. Political Ideology	-0.068*** (0.016)	0.134 (0.258)	0.469 (0.665)	-0.248 (0.218)	0.392 (0.316)	0.580 (0.542)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Num. obs.	6633	3792	1578	5771	3768	822
Num. groups: Freshman Cohorts	1132	1151	474	1668	1051	208
Num. groups: Schools	470	407	248	435	298	139
Aggregate Political Ideology						
Intercept	0.255*** (0.051)	0.470 (0.757)	-6.634*** (1.942)	-3.795*** (0.649)	-4.051* (1.597)	0.771 (1.808)
Lagged DV	0.490*** (0.008)	1.288*** (0.097)	1.562*** (0.170)	1.546*** (0.086)	1.494*** (0.117)	1.357*** (0.196)
23-32 perc. affluent	0.013 (0.009)	0.285* (0.145)	0.230 (0.331)	0.008 (0.115)	-0.396* (0.180)	-0.267 (0.364)
32-42 perc. affluent	0.024* (0.010)	0.234 (0.156)	0.198 (0.366)	0.095 (0.125)	-0.541* (0.215)	-0.160 (0.382)
42-55 perc. affluent	0.031** (0.011)	0.495** (0.174)	0.492 (0.359)	0.158 (0.139)	-0.447 (0.239)	0.020 (0.411)
More than 55 perc. affluent	0.057*** (0.013)	0.461* (0.202)	0.371 (0.465)	0.427* (0.170)	-0.199 (0.293)	0.165 (0.449)
Agg. Political Ideology	0.002 (0.011)	0.175 (0.179)	-0.262 (0.469)	-0.098 (0.147)	-0.260 (0.229)	-1.147** (0.392)
23-32 perc. affluent X Agg. Political Ideology	-0.012 (0.013)	-0.215 (0.211)	0.199 (0.523)	-0.117 (0.176)	0.537* (0.257)	0.302 (0.494)
32-42 perc. affluent X Agg. Political Ideology	-0.015 (0.013)	-0.218 (0.216)	0.381 (0.544)	-0.211 (0.179)	0.758** (0.286)	0.742 (0.462)
42-55 perc. affluent X Agg. Political Ideology	-0.006 (0.014)	-0.363 (0.229)	-0.394 (0.536)	-0.272 (0.186)	0.195 (0.300)	1.528** (0.593)
More than 55 perc. affluent X Agg. Political Ideology	-0.021 (0.014)	-0.403 (0.221)	-0.150 (0.570)	-0.283 (0.184)	0.339 (0.306)	1.266** (0.484)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Num. obs.	12506	6999	3005	11047	7432	1397
Num. groups: Freshman Cohorts	1779	1097	488	1605	1070	192
Num. groups: Schools	404	351	243	377	279	118

	Passive Engagement	Voting	Campaigning	Protesting	Elected S.G.	Leading Org.
Individual First-Generation						
Intercept	0.252*** (0.047)	0.758 (0.733)	-6.032*** (1.829)	-3.541*** (0.668)	-3.276* (1.548)	-1.640 (1.657)
Lagged DV	0.492*** (0.008)	1.316*** (0.095)	1.471*** (0.166)	1.542*** (0.085)	1.447*** (0.115)	1.400*** (0.194)
23-32 perc. affluent	0.012 (0.008)	0.212 (0.134)	0.001 (0.306)	0.001 (0.112)	-0.117 (0.150)	0.206 (0.289)
32-42 perc. affluent	0.019* (0.008)	0.023 (0.138)	0.204 (0.327)	0.033 (0.119)	-0.243 (0.173)	0.657* (0.283)
42-55 perc. affluent	0.029** (0.009)	0.259 (0.150)	0.062 (0.330)	0.081 (0.132)	-0.432* (0.203)	1.052** (0.323)
More than 55 perc. affluent	0.047*** (0.011)	0.247 (0.173)	0.059 (0.430)	0.364* (0.162)	-0.176 (0.259)	1.134** (0.356)
Ind. First Generation	0.006 (0.008)	-0.057 (0.130)	-0.445 (0.332)	0.166 (0.105)	-0.251 (0.142)	0.425 (0.285)
23-32 perc. affluent X Ind. First Generation	-0.013 (0.011)	-0.141 (0.176)	0.733 (0.437)	-0.012 (0.149)	-0.128 (0.215)	-0.091 (0.424)
32-42 perc. affluent X Ind. First Generation	-0.004 (0.011)	0.174 (0.181)	0.104 (0.470)	-0.095 (0.155)	0.133 (0.228)	-0.586 (0.386)
42-55 perc. affluent X Ind. First Generation	-0.006 (0.011)	-0.130 (0.184)	0.746 (0.434)	-0.090 (0.153)	0.222 (0.230)	-0.618 (0.427)
More than 55 perc. affluent X Ind. First Generation	-0.010 (0.011)	-0.261 (0.176)	0.367 (0.467)	-0.119 (0.152)	0.228 (0.234)	-0.529 (0.384)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Num. obs.	12920	7307	3133	11438	7604	1425
Num. groups: Freshman Cohorts	2169	1346	580	1951	1242	240
Num. groups: Schools	508	450	287	472	323	151
School Loan Ratio (Low-Income Over High-Income)						
Intercept	0.266*** (0.052)	0.813 (0.772)	-6.939*** (2.093)	-3.679*** (0.664)	-2.776 (1.575)	-1.674 (2.179)
Lagged DV	0.492*** (0.009)	1.389*** (0.101)	1.574*** (0.174)	1.532*** (0.088)	1.467*** (0.118)	1.104*** (0.223)
23-32 perc. affluent	0.011 (0.009)	0.187 (0.146)	0.329 (0.392)	-0.079 (0.125)	-0.049 (0.183)	0.178 (0.401)
32-42 perc. affluent	0.016 (0.010)	0.002 (0.156)	0.303 (0.417)	0.043 (0.135)	-0.125 (0.217)	0.330 (0.395)
42-55 perc. affluent	0.024* (0.011)	0.100 (0.172)	0.579 (0.421)	0.130 (0.142)	-0.568* (0.247)	0.825* (0.418)
More than 55 perc. affluent	0.040** (0.013)	0.093 (0.182)	0.671 (0.503)	0.410* (0.163)	-0.227 (0.285)	0.921* (0.445)
School Loan Ratio	0.013 (0.010)	0.040 (0.160)	0.229 (0.437)	0.153 (0.126)	0.254 (0.199)	-1.203* (0.553)
23-32 perc. affluent X School Loan Ratio	-0.015 (0.013)	-0.081 (0.216)	0.040 (0.565)	0.094 (0.173)	-0.262 (0.255)	0.849 (0.831)
32-42 perc. affluent X School Loan Ratio	-0.013 (0.014)	0.012 (0.215)	0.047 (0.579)	-0.069 (0.178)	-0.232 (0.281)	1.448* (0.643)
42-55 perc. affluent X School Loan Ratio	-0.011 (0.014)	0.003 (0.221)	-0.350 (0.552)	-0.233 (0.177)	0.207 (0.298)	1.139 (0.675)
More than 55 perc. affluent X School Loan Ratio	-0.012 (0.014)	-0.227 (0.204)	-0.834 (0.552)	-0.346* (0.168)	0.192 (0.296)	1.538* (0.640)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Num. obs.	11658	6473	2866	10522	7261	1074
Num. groups: Freshman Cohorts	1769	1090	494	1636	1114	151
Num. groups: Schools	276	263	214	273	240	85

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$. Standard errors in parenthesis.

Table 21: Marginal Effect of Majority-Affluent Campuses on Low-Income Students' Political Engagement at Low and High Levels of Moderating Variables

Psych. Mechanism	Passive Engagement			Voting			Campaigning			Protesting			Student Government			Leading Organization		
	Low	High	Diff.	Low	High	Diff.	Low	High	Diff.	Low	High	Diff.	Low	High	Diff.	Low	High	Diff.
Indiv. Emotional Health	0.05	0.02	-0.03	0.03	0.02	-0.01	0.02	-0.04	-0.06	0.05	0.05	0.00	-0.01	0.03	0.04	0.19	0.27	0.08
Indiv. Motivation to Lead	0.03	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.03	0.01	-0.03	-0.04	0.05	0.06	0.01	-0.02	0	0.02	--	--	--
Academic Mechanism	Low	High	Diff.	Low	High	Diff.	Low	High	Diff.	Low	High	Diff.	Low	High	Diff.	Low	High	Diff.
Indiv. Academic Comp.	0.04	0.04	0	0.03	0.02	-0.01	0.04	-0.03	-0.07	0.04	0.07	0.03	-0.01	0.03	0.04	0.18	0.23	0.05
Social Mechanism	Low	High	Diff.	Low	High	Diff.	Low	High	Diff.	Low	High	Diff.	Low	High	Diff.	Low	High	Diff.
Indiv. Social Self-Conf.	0.05	0.04	-0.01	0.02	0.06	0.04	0.05	-0.01	-0.06	0.04	0.06	0.02	-0.02	0.03	0.05*	0.18	0.24	0.06
Agg. Social Self-Conf.	0.06	0.04	-0.02	0.09	0.03	-0.06	0.05	0.02	-0.03	0.07	0.04	-0.03	-0.01	0.00	0.01	0.12	0.29	0.17
Financial Mechanism	Low	High	Diff.	Low	High	Diff.	Low	High	Diff.	Low	High	Diff.	Low	High	Diff.	Low	High	Diff.
Indiv. Financial Aid Ratio	0.00	0.06	0.06***	0.08	-0.03	-0.11*	0	-0.03	-0.03	-0.01	0.08	0.09**	0.02	-0.01	-0.03	--	--	--
Indiv. Financial Concern	0.08	0.04	-0.04*	0.07	0.01	-0.06	-0.01	0.02	0.03	0.06	0.07	0.01	0.02	-0.01	-0.03	0.22	0.18	-0.04
Agg. L.I. Financial Concern	0.04	0.05	0.01	0.04	0.03	-0.01	0.00	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.07	0.04	0.02	-0.02	-0.04	0.15	0.23	0.08
Institutional Mechanism	Low	High	Diff.	Low	High	Diff.	Low	High	Diff.	Low	High	Diff.	Low	High	Diff.	Low	High	Diff.
Dorms & Dining Halls	0.02	0.06	0.04*	0.04	0.05	0.01	0.03	0.02	-0.01	0.01	0.04	0.03	-0.02	-0.04	-0.02	0.38	0.15	-0.23

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$. The difference is assessed with the p-value for the coefficient that interacts the indicator for More than 55 percent affluent with the indicator for a high level for the moderator.

6 Main Model with Interactions

Table 22: The Effect of Campus Affluence on Political Participation

	Passive Engagement	Voting	Campaigning	Protesting	Elected S.G.	Leading Org.
Low-Income						
(Intercept)	0.190*** (0.036)	0.374 (0.609)	-3.261** (1.044)	-3.277*** (0.579)	-2.815** (0.857)	-1.240 (0.931)
Lagged DV	0.507*** (0.003)	1.300*** (0.037)	1.451*** (0.053)	1.828*** (0.035)	1.572*** (0.045)	1.316*** (0.070)
High Campus Affluence	0.031*** (0.008)	0.075 (0.130)	0.168 (0.269)	0.551*** (0.126)	0.208 (0.178)	1.010*** (0.243)
Middle-Income	-0.004 (0.004)	0.045 (0.072)	0.048 (0.178)	-0.022 (0.058)	0.159* (0.075)	0.106 (0.146)
High-Income	0.007 (0.005)	0.240** (0.089)	0.365 (0.210)	-0.022 (0.072)	0.208* (0.090)	0.121 (0.170)
High Campus Affluence X Middle-Income	-0.001 (0.006)	0.176 (0.092)	0.115 (0.231)	-0.192* (0.079)	-0.334** (0.113)	-0.240 (0.189)
High Campus Affluence X High-Income	-0.005 (0.006)	0.028 (0.105)	-0.120 (0.254)	-0.259** (0.089)	-0.323** (0.122)	-0.282 (0.206)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Num. obs.	95916	57240	23585	83773	52156	11890
Num. groups: Freshman Cohorts	1121	778	315	1014	651	140
Num. groups: Schools	295	240	154	277	203	86

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$.

7 Black Student Interaction Models

Table 23: Black Student Interaction Models

	Passive Engagement	Voting	Campaigning	Protesting	Elected SG	Leading Org.
(Intercept)	0.264*** (0.047)	0.727 (0.715)	-6.345*** (1.806)	-3.577*** (0.650)	-3.135* (1.544)	-1.577 (1.619)
Lagged DV	0.491*** (0.008)	1.318*** (0.093)	1.515*** (0.162)	1.536*** (0.083)	1.441*** (0.113)	1.391*** (0.190)
23-32 perc. affluent	0.011 (0.007)	0.167 (0.110)	0.313 (0.278)	-0.005 (0.093)	-0.133 (0.132)	0.209 (0.245)
32-42 perc. affluent	0.022** (0.007)	0.057 (0.116)	0.369 (0.299)	-0.026 (0.103)	-0.105 (0.154)	0.471 (0.253)
42-55 perc. affluent	0.029*** (0.008)	0.240 (0.132)	0.382 (0.321)	0.100 (0.118)	-0.317 (0.190)	0.838** (0.288)
More than 55 perc. affluent	0.050*** (0.011)	0.206 (0.161)	0.316 (0.426)	0.333* (0.151)	-0.126 (0.250)	0.905** (0.331)
Black	0.091*** (0.013)	-0.337 (0.217)	0.752 (0.465)	0.930*** (0.169)	0.307 (0.240)	0.384 (0.413)
23-32 perc. affluent X Black	-0.036* (0.017)	-0.014 (0.267)	0.271 (0.539)	-0.058 (0.216)	-0.019 (0.329)	-0.841 (0.617)
32-42 perc. affluent X Black	-0.051** (0.019)	0.277 (0.298)	-0.339 (0.653)	0.238 (0.226)	-0.718 (0.425)	-0.586 (0.654)
42-55 perc. affluent X Black	-0.011 (0.020)	-0.047 (0.354)	-0.221 (0.610)	-0.462 (0.250)	-0.032 (0.369)	-0.184 (1.018)
More than 55 perc. affluent X Black	-0.034 (0.018)	-0.225 (0.276)	-1.076 (0.777)	-0.097 (0.223)	0.596 (0.329)	0.489 (0.758)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Num. obs.	13363	7560	3232	11822	7842	1479
Num. groups: Freshman cohorts	2182	1362	582	1962	1247	243
Num. groups: Schools	510	453	287	473	324	152

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

8 Attrition

Table 24: The Effect of Income and Campus Affluence on Taking Senior Year Survey

	Individual-level	Full	Full	Low-Income	Middle-Income	High-Income
Middle-Income	0.231*** (0.019)	0.282*** (0.021)	0.242*** (0.046)	–	–	–
High-Income	0.308*** (0.019)	0.255*** (0.022)	0.233*** (0.055)	–	–	–
23-32 perc. affluent	–	0.048 (0.126)	0.033 (0.138)	0.238 (0.140)	0.052 (0.125)	0.028 (0.147)
32-42 perc. affluent	–	–0.246 (0.144)	–0.311* (0.154)	–0.116 (0.159)	–0.219 (0.143)	–0.282 (0.162)
42-55 perc. affluent	–	–0.060 (0.174)	–0.058 (0.184)	0.183 (0.192)	–0.042 (0.174)	–0.110 (0.194)
More than 55 perc. affluent	–	–0.087 (0.228)	–0.195 (0.237)	0.101 (0.251)	–0.008 (0.227)	–0.158 (0.250)
Middle-Income X 23-32 perc. affluent	–	–	0.033 (0.062)	–	–	–
Middle-Income X 32-42 perc. affluent	–	–	0.078 (0.064)	–	–	–
Middle-Income X 42-55 perc. affluent	–	–	–0.001 (0.068)	–	–	–
Middle-Income X More than 55 perc. affluent	–	–	0.105 (0.076)	–	–	–
High-Income X 23-32 perc. affluent	–	–	–0.023 (0.071)	–	–	–
High-Income X 32-42 perc. affluent	–	–	0.052 (0.071)	–	–	–
High-Income X 42-55 perc. affluent	–	–	–0.017 (0.074)	–	–	–
– High-Income X More than 55 perc. affluent	–	–	0.114 (0.080)	–	–	–
Controls and Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Num. obs.	370175	370175	370175	30947	176672	162556
Num. groups: Freshman Cohorts	–	912	912	911	912	912
Num. groups: Schools	–	310	310	310	310	310

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

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