

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF AUTHORITARIANISM AND SUPPORT FOR ILLIBERAL POLICIES AND PARTIES

Stanley Feldman, Vittorio Mérola, and Justin Dollman

Introduction

Illiberal governments may take hold as a result of the actions of politicians and political elites without the support of the public. Authoritarian inclined politicians may assume control of governments campaigning as democrats and then utilize the political mechanisms at their disposal to restrict political freedoms, punish those who challenge the government, and weaken electoral institutions to keep themselves in power. In many cases, however, illiberal politicians and parties are supported by substantial numbers, even majorities, of voters. That suggests that there must be at least tacit public support for policies that reduce political liberties and increase the control of a central government over social and political life.

Why, if given the option, will some people choose to vote for politicians and parties that will limit the ability of the public to fully exercise their freedoms and liberty? Political psychology has provided one major perspective on this question through research that dates back over 80 years.

In the aftermath of the Holocaust and the Nazi experience in Germany social scientists grappled with the question of why so many ordinary Germans supported the Nazi Party. A large body of research has explored one explanation that focuses on a phenomenon called the authoritarian personality – a predisposition that involves deference to the authorities, prejudice and intolerance, and adherence to conventional views of morality and social norms. The earliest detailed discussion of authoritarianism is Erich Fromm's *Escape from Freedom* (1941). Working from a psycho-dynamic perspective, Fromm explained authoritarianism as a response to the breakdown of traditional social structures brought about by industrialization and modernization.

Research on authoritarianism was propelled by the publication in 1950 of *The Authoritarian Personality* (Adorno et al. 1950). This study of almost a thousand pages began as an investigation into the roots of anti-Semitism. Having found that anti-Semitism is not a distinct orientation but rather a piece of a more general ethnocentrism, Adorno et al. went on to explain this phenomenon based on a personality syndrome that they attributed to childrearing practices understood through Freudian psychodynamics. Along with their explanation, Adorno et al.

developed a self-report measure of authoritarianism, the Fascist-scale, immortalized as the F-scale. An enormous literature soon developed that examined the correlates of authoritarianism as measured by the F-scale and similar measures.

Research on authoritarianism waned in the 1970s and early 1980s due to questions about its theoretical foundation and measurement. Renewed interest in the concept has resurfaced in recent years. A major reason for the revitalization of the study of authoritarianism has been the research studies reported by a Canadian social psychologist, Bob Altemeyer (1981; 1988; 1996). From years of studies, Altemeyer developed a more reliable measure of authoritarianism and advanced a new conceptualization based on social learning theory. Rejecting Adorno et al.'s Freudian framework, Altemeyer (1988) offered a simpler conceptualization that sees *authoritarianism as a social attitude* (or cluster of attitudes) that is learned through interactions with parents, peers, schools, the media, and through experiences with people who hold conventional and unconventional beliefs and lifestyles. His measure of Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) is more reliable than previous scales and corrects significant measurement problems present in the F-scale.

The increased use of Altemeyer's authoritarianism measure is evidence of the general perception that he has created a superior scale that, at a minimum, has overcome the methodological problems that have plagued this research for almost 50 years. Armed with a sounder measure that can be easily included in studies, researchers have examined the relationships between authoritarianism and prejudice, intolerance, punitiveness, and much else (see Duckitt 2009 for a recent review of the history of research on authoritarianism). At the same time, research using the RWA measure shows little evidence of drawing on Altemeyer's social learning explanation. Continuing the empirical bent of much of the research conducted in the wake of *The Authoritarian Personality*, researchers adopting Altemeyer's new measure have just substituted a psychometrically better-grounded scale for a weak one. The focus of the research seems to be little influenced beyond that.

The absence of a strong theoretical foundation for studying authoritarianism is especially problematic for attempts to understand public support for anti-democratic parties and politicians.

If authoritarianism is a stable predisposition, why has there been growing support for right-wing populists in recent years? Viewing authoritarianism narrowly as a psychological construct does not provide a basis for specifying the conditions under which authoritarianism – the psychological predisposition – becomes politically relevant. We therefore start by detailing a newer understanding of the authoritarianism personality phenomenon that specifies the conditions under which it becomes a significant factor in public support for illiberal governments. We then review recent studies that examine the relationship between authoritarianism and support for illiberal policies and political parties.

The Conceptualization of Authoritarianism as a Psychological Predisposition

Recent efforts in psychology and political science to develop a theoretical foundation for authoritarianism have identified the basic characteristics of this dimension in very similar ways (Duckitt 1989; Feldman 2003; Stellmacher and Petzel 2005; Stenner 2005). An early, clear statement of the defining characteristics of authoritarianism by Duckitt defines the end points of the continuum as follows:

At one extreme would be the belief that the purely personal needs, inclinations, and values of group members should be subordinated as completely as possible to the

cohesion of the group and its requirements. At the other extreme would be the belief that the requirements of group cohesion should be subordinated as completely as possible to the autonomy and self-regulation of the individual member.

1989, 71

How should we understand a dimension defined by these opposing extremes? As Nunn, Crocket, and Williams (1978, 7) state: “every society inevitably confronts the problem of how much individual freedom is possible and how much social control is needed.” We suggest that the tension between *group conformity* (people following the same collective set of rules and authorities) and *individual autonomy* is a characteristic dilemma of human society that is reflected in people’s relative value preferences.

What is the nature of this tension? For a start, maximizing personal autonomy requires minimizing constraints on people’s behaviour. Though such constraints could be a result of the behaviour of others in society (e.g. crime and violence curbing people’s ability to pursue their personal goals), there is also a set of rules and restrictions that all societies *choose* to place on behaviour that can limit individual freedom. It is easy to understand why people would want to maximize their freedom and autonomy and limit societal restrictions on their behaviour. The opposite end of the authoritarian dimension may be more puzzling. What would motivate people to accept, or even desire, limitations to their freedom? Why should ordinary people worry about conforming to the will of the collective, instead of always following their own desires?

As social theorists have long argued, a fundamental problem for any society is the maintenance of social order. Although it is common to think of social order in terms of the potential for crime and violence, at a more basic level the social order can be thought of as a stable and predictable pattern of interactions among members of society (Wrong 1994). There are three major mechanisms that can maintain social order: force, mutual self-interest, and adherence to a common set of norms (Wrong 1994).

For those who have a positive view of human nature there may be little need for societal rules that go beyond those necessary to protect life and make commerce possible. The classical liberal perspective posits that individuals pursuing their self-interest will lead to a stable social order (Gray 1995). The desire to maximize personal freedom in the absence of strictly enforced rules thus requires having faith that people can create a stable, safe society with a minimum of social regulation of their behaviour. However, a somewhat less optimistic view leads to doubts about the ability of self-interest to sustain a stable social order on its own. Even if you do not believe that people are malevolent or anti-social by nature, it is easy to be skeptical of the consequences of millions of people all pursuing their self-interest. Hence, social theorists since Parsons (1937) have argued that a stable social order is sustained, at least in part, by the existence of social norms that guide the interactions of the members of that society. It is this common set of rules and norms that helps to maintain social stability (Wrong 1994; Etzioni 1996).

The distribution of people on this authoritarianism continuum will be determined by the relative weight of these two beliefs – personal autonomy versus social conformity (Feldman 2003). Or, to put it differently, whether people prioritize individual authority or collective authority. Many people are likely to see merit in balancing personal autonomy and the need for collective norms to regulate behaviour. This would result in a moderate location on the authoritarianism dimension that should make people sensitive to both values. In contrast, some people will so strongly desire personal freedom and autonomy that it will dominate norm enforcement, while others will fear the consequences of unlimited freedom and trade-off a large measure of it for the security of social conformity to societal rules and authorities.

There is a substantial amount of evidence in research on human values that the tension between autonomy and social conformity is reflected in relative value priorities in a wide range of societies where this has been examined. In sociology, Kohn (1977; Kohn and Schooler 1983) studied societal values by probing the values that people consider most important for raising children. Based on several national surveys, he (Kohn and Schooler 1983, 283) concluded that “there is a self-direction/conformity dimension to parental values in all industrialized countries that have to our knowledge been studied and even one society (Taiwan) that was, at the time of inquiry, less industrialized.” Although he had his respondents rank-order child-rearing values, Kohn was clear that conformity and self-direction are part of a broader view of what those children should grow up to be like and, therefore, what values should apply to society more generally. Kohn’s research also demonstrates that child-rearing values can be used as a good, unobtrusive measure of people’s more general value preferences on this dimension.

In psychology, Schwartz has developed and tested the most comprehensive current model of human values. In a first major comparative study, Schwartz (1992) had respondents rate 56 values including ones measuring social conformity (obedience, self-discipline, politeness, and honouring parents and elders) and self-direction (creativity, freedom, choosing own goals, curiosity, and independence) in 40 samples drawn from 20 countries. Analyzing two-dimensional configurations of the 56 values, he found that the conformity and self-direction values formed distinct clusters virtually everywhere. More importantly, they also appear in regions almost directly opposite each other. One of the axes that helps define the cross-national two-dimensional scaling solution is anchored by self-direction and its close neighbour stimulation (varied life, exciting life) at one end, and conformity along with security (social order, family security) at the other.

More recent research using a different measurement instrument and new samples largely replicates the previous result. Values associated with conformity and respect for tradition appear in two-dimensional space directly opposite of values tapping self-direction and stimulation (Schwartz et al. 2012). Rating one of these sets of values very highly is consistently related to much lower ratings of the other set of values. Thus, valuing individual autonomy and freedom is generally inversely related to valuing adherence to societal norms and authorities.

While few people will be able to articulate a coherent philosophy that reconciles these conflicting values, the implicit tug of war between these goals will result in people adopting orientations toward the world that reflect their preferred balance between them. The tension between these two sets of values produces a dimension very similar to the definition offered by Duckitt (1989), anchored at one end by the desire for unlimited personal autonomy and at the other by strict conformity to societal rules of behaviour.

It is the *relative priorities* attached to the values of social conformity and personal autonomy that defines this dimension. In isolation, most people are likely to place a high value on personal autonomy, particularly in more individualistic, Western societies. The key to this conceptualization is the ways in which people respond when they are forced to confront the trade-off between these values. *How highly will people value personal autonomy when it comes into conflict with their desire for social conformity?*

Social Conformity/Autonomy and Illiberalism

We can derive several clear predictions from this conceptualization and provide a basis for reviewing research on connections between authoritarianism and illiberalism. Most relevant to this edited volume, there should be a clear relationship between authoritarianism and support for anti-democratic policies and political parties that advocate limits on individual freedom.

People at opposite ends of this dimension will have very different perspectives on basic issues of freedom and openness to the free expression of political views. Among those people who value personal autonomy over social conformity, for instance, there should be a strong aversion to rules and having to obey the dictates of society. Freedom of expression and behaviour should be widely supported, at least in the abstract.

What about those who strongly value social conformity? Although a preference for social conformity over personal autonomy does not mean that people are completely opposed to freedom of expression, they should be more likely to want to limit diversity in society. Diversity increases the possibility that people are not conforming to existing rules of behaviour, whether formal or informal, which is a potential threat to the maintenance of social order. For those high in authoritarianism, it is critical that people respect and obey traditional social norms and rules. If necessary, that means that the threat of sanctions and the use of punishments may be necessary to keep people from flouting social norms. People who value social conformity should therefore be strong supporters of the government's power to suppress nonconformity. They should be much more likely than those who value autonomy to follow the lead of the government when it wants to increase its control over social behaviour and punish nonconformity. And they should strongly disapprove of governments that permit or encourage nonconforming behaviour.

It is also important to ensure that people are generally obedient. Encouraging a duty to follow social norms greatly facilitates social conformity since the motivation to conform to the general will of society becomes internal. If people are sufficiently deferential to social norms there is no need to monitor everyone or use coercion to keep people in line. For similar reasons, if one does not believe that people are naturally inclined to conform, the way they are raised becomes important. Children should be trained to be obedient, not challenge authority, and accept the way society is.

Authoritarianism and Threat

One problem with much of the psychological research on authoritarianism is that it fails to address a key issue: when do authoritarian predispositions become a source of support for illiberal parties and policies? If people's value priorities are relatively stable, something must act as a trigger to make the desire for social conformity politically relevant. The key factor in this conceptualization is the role of threat. People should respond to threats to their core values by endorsing policies that will control or eliminate the perceived threat.

Threat is an amorphous social science concept. Losing your job, a serious illness, violent crime, a terrorist attack, increasing cultural diversity, and the sight of a large spider can all be threatening to people. What, if anything, do all of these threats have in common? A worsening economy is fundamentally different from increasing cultural or religious diversity. Research on the relationship between threat and authoritarianism has operationalized "threats" in a wide variety of ways that often confuses our understanding of the dynamics of authoritarian predispositions (see Feldman 2013). In this chapter we define threat precisely as those perils that challenge the values anchoring the authoritarianism dimension – personal autonomy and social conformity (Feldman 2003).

Consider first those who value autonomy over social conformity. As just noted, an obvious prediction is that such people would be highly tolerant and supportive of civil liberties. Believing in the need for individual freedom, opposed toward rules that restrict behaviour, and relatively unconcerned with challenges to social conformity, there would appear to be no reason why they should support any sort of restrictive government policies.

However, just because people who value autonomy do not feel the need to defend social conformity does not mean that they are oblivious to the need to maintain a *stable and safe* social order. While a major threat to individual freedom may come from rules and regulations enforced by the government, the actions of other people – conflict and violence – may also limit the pursuit of individual autonomy.

In contrast with those who prize personal autonomy, people who value social conformity prioritize the enforcement of social norms and rules over social freedom. This entails a different authoritarian dynamic wherein threats to traditional norms and values – not threats to individual freedoms – lead to the endorsement of authoritarian policies.

What could be a threat to societal norms and authorities? Most obviously, behaviour that is perceived to be inconsistent with those norms, as well as behaviour that is a challenge to the government's ability to enforce compliance with social rules and regulations. Since obeying the social will is important to the maintenance of social order, any action that may challenge conformity with social rules — either by advocating nonconformity or simply by being non-conformist — could be seen as a threat.

Support for illiberal policies among those who value social conformity over autonomy should be a function of the degree of perceived threat to common norms and societal authorities. As a social or political group deviates from social conventionality they will be seen as a danger to the social will, thus motivating support to suppress the threat. Given their goal of group conformity, however, even absent some combination of nonconformity and challenging behaviour those who value social conformity should still be somewhat more likely to hold anti-democratic attitudes than those who seek personal autonomy, at least in the typical sense of respecting civil liberties and minority rights which might constrain the authority of the group.

Since the goal of those who value social conformity is to protect established rules and authorities, we should find that the desire to repress all sorts of nonconformity will increase as the perception of threats to social conformity increases. Perceived threats may be more diffuse than those presented by any specific group. For example, increasing diversity in society, be it social, demographic, or political, could possibly be viewed as a threat given its potential for nonconforming behaviour, and therefore increase support for illiberal policies and parties among those high in authoritarianism. Rapid social change – for example, changes in gender norms or an increase in the size of minority groups – is therefore likely to increase the desire for anti-democratic policies and parties for people high in authoritarianism.

The role of perceived threat in the dynamics of intolerance highlights a critical feature of this view of authoritarianism: the effect of authoritarianism should be contingent. In statistical terms, there should be an interaction between those who value conformity and perceptions of threat. The effects of authoritarianism on anti-democratic attitudes and political preferences should increase when those high in authoritarianism perceive a threat to social cohesion and group conformity.

The Measurement of Authoritarian Predispositions

As we discussed at the beginning of this chapter, research in psychology has relied on self-report measures of authoritarianism that have been widely used in empirical research studies. The first of these was the F-scale developed by Adorno et al. (1950). More recently, research has turned to the RWA measure developed by Altemeyer (1988). Both ask respondents to agree or disagree with a set of statements intended to reflect high or low levels of authoritarianism. A full version of the RWA scale has 30 agree/disagree questions; researchers have developed shorter

versions as well. While RWA scales typically exhibit high reliability, there are some serious problems with using them to study support for illiberal politicians and parties. One concern is that the measure is not unidimensional. Recent studies have found that, with carefully worded questions, it is possible to distinguish between three related aspects of authoritarianism: adherence to traditional norms and values, punitiveness and intolerance, and obedience to authorities (Duckitt and Bizumic 2013). Thus, it is conceptually unclear which of these components of the RWA scale is driving illiberal attitudes.

More importantly, the significant overlap in content between the RWA scale and contemporary political rhetoric vitiates researchers' pretensions to use RWA scores to explain citizens' illiberal tendencies. Consider the following four items from a recent version of the scale (Altemeyer 1996). Someone high in authoritarianism should agree with the first two statements and disagree with the second two.

Our country desperately needs a mighty leader who will do what has to be done to destroy the radical new ways and sinfulness that are ruining us.

There are many radical, immoral people in our country today, who are trying to ruin it for their own godless purposes, whom the authorities should put out of action.

Homosexuals and feminists should be praised for being brave enough to defy "traditional family values."

Our country needs free thinkers who will have the courage to defy traditional ways, even if this upsets many people.

It is not hard to imagine politicians and political commentators using language very similar to this when making arguments in support of or in opposition to illiberal policies. Research using measures like this make it difficult to draw conclusions about causal direction. Suppose we observe a correlation between scores on a measure using statements like this and support for anti-democratic practices. Is this because authoritarianism leads to anti-democratic attitudes or because people who support illiberal parties are responding to the rhetoric they hear from party leaders (Lenz 2013)?

Recent work in political science (and increasingly in psychology) has used measures of authoritarian predispositions that are more reflective of the basic values that should anchor opposing ends of the authoritarianism continuum and that are less contaminated by political rhetoric. A major version of this follows the work of Kohn (1977; Kohn and Schooler 1983) and uses pairs of childrearing values (CRV) to distinguish people who most value social conformity or personal autonomy.

Although there are a number of qualities that people think children should have, every person thinks that some are *more important* than others. I am going to read you several pairs of desirable qualities for children. Although you may feel that both qualities are important, please tell me which one of each pair you think is *more important* for a child to have.

Independence or Respect for elders?

Curiosity or Good manners?

Obedience or Self-reliance?

Being considerate or Well-behaved?

People who value social conformity over personal autonomy should choose respect for elders, good manners, obedience, and well-behaved in these four paired value questions. This measure has now been included on American National Election Studies presidential year surveys since 1992, on several waves of the most recent British Election Study, and recent national election surveys in Germany, France, and Switzerland. Research using this measure, which we review shortly, shows that it does predict support for illiberal parties and policies. A major advantage of this measure over RWA-type scales is that framing the value choices in terms of childrearing practices reduces the chances that respondents will be influenced by their political views when answering these questions. (In reviewing the literature below, we will therefore distinguish between research based on the CRV and research based on the various versions of the RWA scale, which we will jointly categorize as RWA for simplicity.)

One other value-based measure of authoritarianism used in some research is based on the model of human values advanced by the work of Schwartz (1992; Schwartz et al. 2012). The Portrait Values Questionnaire asks survey respondents how similar they are to short descriptions of a person who reflects a specific value. Questions tapping self-direction and stimulation values (important to think new ideas and being creative; important to try new and different things in life) can be contrasted with conformity, tradition, and security values (important to behave properly; important to do what one is told and follow rules). The relative priorities attached to these two sets of values map directly onto the social conformity/personal autonomy dimension that underlies the authoritarianism continuum.

Authoritarianism and Illiberal Outcomes

Prejudice and Hostility Toward Outgroup Members

Adorno et al.'s *The Authoritarian Personality* (1950), a founding document in the political psychology of authoritarianism, was motivated as an investigation of anti-Semitism, but became a study of generalized ethnocentrism and intolerance. The imprint of this work is noted in the consistent finding of a positive association between authoritarianism and intolerance or prejudice toward members of other social groups in the intervening decades (e.g. Altemeyer 1996).

Based on extensive cross-national data from the second and third waves of the World Value Survey (WVS), Stenner (2005) finds that authoritarianism (CRV) is associated with a lower acceptance of homosexuality (as well as abortion and divorce) and a lower likelihood of wanting to live next to people of a different race or country. Napier and Jost (2008) find a similar result when analyzing the fourth wave of the WVS across various measures of authoritarianism, including one where respondents mention "obedience" as an important value for children to learn. Consistent with these results, Malka et al. (2014) find, with the fifth wave of the WVS, that Schwartz's conservation values (as opposed to openness to change) are associated with a greater aversion to homosexuality, abortion, immigration, and criminals across a sample of 51 countries.

Similarly, Cohen and Smith (2016) find a strong relationship between authoritarianism (CRV) and various measures of prejudice, in particular a decreased support for gay marriage, based on the 2012 Americas Barometer survey fielded across the Western Hemisphere. In the European context, Vasilopoulos and Lachat (2018) found that authoritarianism (CRV) is predictive of ethnic intolerance in France using the French Elections Study, as measured through both an intolerance of Islam (e.g. "Islam is a threat to the West"), and an intolerance of immigrants (e.g. "There are too many immigrants in France"). More generally, using the European Value Survey Tillman (2013) found that authoritarianism (CRV) is associated with stronger views against immigrants and stronger national pride across Europe.

Consistent with these findings, several recent studies in psychology across national samples in Europe have shown similar associations between various measures of prejudice or racism (e.g. subtle or blatant prejudice scales; modern racism scale) and authoritarianism. There is evidence that authoritarianism (RWA) predicts prejudice or negative outgroup attitudes in the Netherlands (Assche et al. 2014; Cornelis and Hiel 2015), Poland (Radkiewicz 2016; Bilewicz et al. 2017), Germany (Asbrock et al. 2012), as well as the United Kingdom and France (Carvacho et al. 2013). Comparable results are found when analyzing convenience (nonrandom) samples of students or adults in the UK (Assche, Dhont, and Pettigrew 2019), Belgium (Roets, Au, and Hiel 2015), and Italy (Passini 2017), as well as in Australia and New Zealand (Duckitt et al. 2010; Bizumic and Duckitt 2018).

The most well-documented connection between authoritarianism and prejudice, however, is found in the US. Analyzing American National Election Studies (ANES) data from 1952 to 2008, Cizmar et al. (2014) show that authoritarianism (CRV) is a strong and consistent predictor of opposition to increasing immigration, LGBT rights, and government protections for affirmative action and civil rights for African Americans. Based on the 2005 nationally representative Citizenship, Involvement and Democracy (CID) Study, Velez and Lavine (2017) find a strong positive association between authoritarianism (CRV) and racial resentment, concern for immigration, and intolerance toward political outgroups, but only in more racially diverse counties, a result we further discuss below (see also Johnston, Newman, and Velez 2015). Using data from a larger online sample of US citizens, Feldman (2020) finds that authoritarianism (CRV) strongly predicts greater support for barring citizenship for children of undocumented immigrants and greater opposition to Muslims building mosques in the US. Recent work using various RWA scales provides further similar evidence of the relationship between authoritarianism and prejudice in the American context (Dunwoody and Funke 2016; Dunwoody and McFarland 2018; Assche, Dhont, and Pettigrew 2019).

Restricting Civil Liberties and Protecting Law and Order

Another anti-democratic attitude which has traditionally been closely associated with an authoritarian disposition is the willingness to restrict civil liberties and accept illiberal actions toward dissenters or presumed enemies of the existing order. Such a willingness to silence opposing views and punish violators of existing rules is consistent with an authoritarian desire to ensure conformity and obedience in society. Much recent evidence supports this argument.

Using two national samples in the US in 2006 and 2008, Hetherington and Suhay (2011) show that authoritarianism (CRV) predicts a greater support for warrantless wiretapping, media censorship, the use of torture, and greater opposition to criticizing the president, although these effects are generally weakened whenever respondents are very worried about personally becoming victims of terrorist attacks, as we discuss below. This pattern is replicated with a national online sample by Feldman (2020), where authoritarianism (CRV) predicts greater support for the use of profiling in airport security, the federal government monitoring phone calls, a requirement that everyone carry a national identity card at all times, and not limiting police officers' authority to use force. While authoritarians do tend to prefer drastic and even violent measures against presumed enemies or violators of existing rules, they are not necessarily more militaristic. Using nationally representative US samples from 1992 to 2008, Cizmar et al. (2014), for example, showed that while authoritarianism predicts greater support for the death penalty, it predicts less support for foreign policy interventionism from 1972 onward, and has a weak or nonexistent effect on support for various prominent wars.

Finally, recent research using versions of the RWA scale also finds a strong association between authoritarianism and the respect for civil liberties. In a striking demonstration of the tendency of authoritarians to support government actions to punish rule violators, Dunwoody and Plane (2019) find across various student and adult convenience samples in the US that higher authoritarian (RWA) values predict a greater willingness to personally take aggressive action against unregistered Muslim or Mexican immigrants if the government were to pass a law requiring them to be registered, even if that law was struck down by the Supreme Court. This includes self-reported willingness to “help hunt down unregistered” Muslims or Mexicans and “turn them over to the police.”

Less dramatically, Cohen and Smith (2016) show that authoritarian citizens across Latin America and North America are less likely to approve of social protests, even legal ones, while exhibiting no less support for democracy or the existing political system. Surprisingly, Bilewicz et al. (2017) find that authoritarianism (RWA) across two national samples in Poland predicts a lower willingness to allow hate speech targeting various groups (Muslims, Jews, Roma, Africans, Ukrainians, LGBT members). At the same time, it also predicts a lower desire to have members of such groups as coworkers, neighbours, or for them to marry one’s relatives. While these findings may appear to be at odds with each other, Bilewicz et al. argue that rejecting hate speech is evidence of a greater sensitivity to group norms which is characteristic of people high in authoritarianism, not an indication of a desire to protect the rights of these particular groups. In short, authoritarians are typically intolerant of any expressions of dissent and willing to help enforce group conformity when necessary.

Support for Illiberal Parties

A great deal of research over the last decade has tried to understand the psychological determinants of populist and radical far-right movements and political parties. There is now ample evidence that authoritarianism is an important factor in this equation. For example, two cross-national studies show that authoritarianism (CRV) increases the likelihood of voting for conservative authoritarian leaders in Latin America (Cohen and Smith 2016) and increases the likelihood of voting for the radical right-wing populist party in a handful of European countries, even when controlling for nationalist sentiment (Dunn 2015).

While, as we show below, the broader political environment can influence the association between authoritarianism and left-right party support, the connection between authoritarian values and “authoritarian parties” has been consistently demonstrated across democracies in the West. Separate studies of individual countries in Europe and North America confirm this pattern. Vasilopoulos et al. (2019) show, using nationally representative data from the French Election Study before and after the terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015, that authoritarianism (CRV) increases the likelihood of voting for the far-right party in France (the National Front, or FN). Similarly, Aichholzer and Zandonella (2016) find that authoritarianism (RWA) predicts greater support for the radical right-wing populist party in Austria, the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), based on the 2013 Austrian election study. Similarly, using a convenience sample of Flemish adults and a national online sample of Dutch citizens, Assche et al. (2019) find that authoritarianism (RWA) predicts support for the Flemish Interest (VB) and the Party for Freedom (PVV), respectively (see also Cornelis and Hiel 2015 for similar effects on PVV support). Bakker, Schumacher, and Rooduijn (2020) find a similar association in the 2015 British Election Study, with authoritarianism (CRV) predicting support for the UK Independence Party (UKIP), the main radical right-wing populist party in the UK at the time (results consistent with Assche, Dhont, and Pettigrew 2019). In addition, Bakker, Rooduijn, and Schumacher (2016) report a

strong association between authoritarianism (CRV) and respondents' favourability toward the US Tea Party movement, based on the 2014 ANES. Finally, using the Schwartz values included in the European Social Survey, Schmidt, Darowska, and Gloris (2017) find that the values of conformity and traditionalism predict greater identification with the radical right-wing populist party in Germany, the Alternative for Germany (AfD), while universalism values predicts lower identification with Law and Justice (PiS), the main radical-right party in Poland. These radical right-wing parties, by merging populist and anti-immigration rhetoric, appear to successfully appeal to the same group conformist values that authoritarian voters hold dear, thus providing a particularly strong match that often overrides existing party loyalties.

Support for Brexit and Trump

In June of 2016 the British people chose to leave the European Union in a nation-wide referendum. In November of the same year, Donald Trump was elected president of the US. Both events inspired a bevy of research into the motivations and profiles of those who supported them, authoritarianism being foremost among such motivations.

Consistent with prior work on the positive link between authoritarianism and anti-EU attitudes (Tillman 2013), research over the last several years has shown a clear role for authoritarian values in predicting a support for Brexit. For example, several cross-sectional convenience samples demonstrate that authoritarianism is associated with a greater dislike for the EU and stronger support for the UK leaving the EU (using CRV, Zmigrod, Rentfrow, and Robbins 2018; using RWA, Golec de Zavala, Guerra, and Simão 2017). Longitudinal convenience samples, with surveys before and after the referendum, show similar results (Assche, Dhont, and Pettigrew 2019). Moreover, convenience samples during the Brexit negotiations with the EU show that authoritarianism (RWA) predicts greater support for negotiating a "hard" Brexit; in particular for outcomes which would give control over passing laws and controlling immigration back to the UK (Peitz, Dhont, and Seyd 2018). All these studies, in addition, find that authoritarianism is consistently associated with stronger national identity, greater anti-immigration views, and, when measured, higher levels of prejudice against outgroups.

Turning to the US, the 2016 American National Election Studies revealed not only a strong positive association between authoritarianism (CRV) and the likelihood of voting for Trump (Bakker, Schumacher, and Rooduijn 2020), but it was also the strongest effect of authoritarianism on a presidential vote since the child rearing values were introduced into the ANES in this format (Knuckey and Hassan 2020). Additional research demonstrates that among Republican respondents authoritarianism (CRV) strongly predicts support for Trump, but not any of the other Republican primary candidates, as shown in national online surveys fielded in December 2015 (MacWilliams 2016) and February 2016 (Feldman 2020).

These results generally hold up when using the RWA-based measures of authoritarianism. Womick et al. (2019) find, by analyzing two national online samples in August and September of 2016, that higher authoritarianism values (RWA) are associated with a greater likelihood of selecting Trump as the preferred candidate from a list of eight potential candidates, even when only analyzing self-identified Republican respondents. However, using a large convenience sample fielded in April 2016, Ludeke, Klitgaard, and Vitriol (2018) do not find a significant effect of authoritarianism (RWA) on the likelihood of voting for Trump, relative to other primary contenders (Kasich, Cruz, Sanders, or Clinton). On the other hand, they do find a significant effect on the likelihood of supporting Cruz (also relative to all other options, for all respondents regardless of partisanship), and a strong positive effect on a feeling thermometer for Trump. Other research based on smaller convenience samples in 2016 or later, using

various versions of the RWA scale, find similarly strong effects of authoritarianism on Trump favourability, as well as the likelihood of a vote for Trump over Clinton (Choma and Hanoch 2017; Crowson and Brandes 2017; Conway and McFarland 2019).

Avenues for Future Research

There are clear theoretical reasons to suspect that the effects of authoritarian predispositions depend on the political and social context. Much attention in the recent literature has focused on exploring and explaining this contextual variation and has greatly increased our understanding of the dynamics of authoritarianism. As we discuss below, however, some of these findings also raise important questions for future research.

Ideological Context

Given that higher levels of authoritarianism are theorized to represent a greater desire to conform to norms and obey authorities that vary across societies, the particular nature of those norms and authorities that constitute an individual's context should shape the attitudinal implications of the authoritarian impulse. Recent work supports such a proposition.

Analogously, Mallinas, Crawford, and Frimer (2020) examined the effects of authoritarian submission across the ideological spectrum. As we previously noted, Duckitt and Bizumic (2013) identified three subcomponents of RWA: adherence to traditional norms and values, punitiveness and intolerance, and obedience to authorities. While traditionalism has an inherent connection to conservative ideology, submission/obedience could be nonpolitical – those on the right and left may value obedience to (different) authorities. Mallinas, Crawford, and Frimer found that while an authoritarian submission scale strongly predicts obeying and respecting authorities regardless of their political nature, liberal respondents were more likely to respect liberal authorities (e.g. civil rights leaders) and conservative respondents were more likely to respect conservative authorities (e.g. the police). As such, any differential association between authoritarianism and obedience to authority across the political spectrum would reflect the ideology of prevalent authorities, instead of being driven by differences in the underlying desire for conformity and submission. In other words, authoritarians should always want to enforce social norms and the respect for collective authorities; whether authoritarianism is ultimately associated with conservative or liberal political ideology depends on the nature of those norms and authorities.

For example, Feldman and Weber (2017) show that while authoritarianism (CRV) is associated with Republican Party identification in the US among Whites, it is correlated with stronger Democratic Party identification among African Americans. Democratic partisanship is a group norm among African Americans and thus increasing authoritarianism leads to a greater conformity to the ingroup norm. This can also be seen through the recent evidence that as general societal norms toward sexual minorities have changed over recent decades in the US, the association between authoritarianism (CRV) and a greater intolerance toward sexual minorities has strongly weakened (Oyamot et al. 2017). Additional evidence that authoritarians conform to group norms is provided by Wronski et al. (2018), based on two online national samples and a student sample. They find that authoritarianism (CRV) is associated with a higher likelihood of voting for Clinton over Sanders during the 2016 Democratic primary, even when controlling for party strength among the Democratic respondents. This relationship may capture a greater ingroup loyalty among authoritarian Democrats, since Clinton was more of a mainstream or prototypical party candidate.

The fit between authoritarian values and the political environment also shapes the effect of the authoritarian predisposition on political participation. Federico, Fisher, and Deason (2017) show that authoritarianism is associated with less political participation (e.g. voting, working for a candidate or party, taking part in a protest, being a member of a political organization) in the US (using the CRV in the 2004 ANES) and in Western Europe (using the Schwartz values in the 2008 ESS) for politically liberal respondents, but not politically conservative respondents. In Eastern Europe, however, authoritarianism is associated with greater political participation (using the same 2008 ESS wave and measure) regardless of respondents' political ideology. This is consistent with the idea that left-wing political parties in the West tend to advocate a rejection of traditional social norms and authorities, unlike left-wing political parties in the East. Thus, there is only a mismatch between authoritarianism and party support (or ideology) in the case of left-wing Westerners (see also Lefkofridi, Wagner, and Willmann 2014).

The role of the "match" between authoritarian disposition and party ideology is strongly highlighted by recent scholarship on US politics which shows that authoritarian values among voters seemingly drives them to sort into different political parties based on the authoritarian appeals made by those parties (Hetherington and Weiler 2009; idem 2015; Johnston, Lavine and Federico 2017). Consequently, these voters might eventually adopt the ideological and attitudinal positions held by their political party, even though their real reason for supporting the party is presumably the initial authoritarian match. As Federico and Tagar (2014) demonstrate with the 2004 and 2008 ANES, authoritarianism (CRV) is associated with a greater likelihood of identifying with the Republican Party in the US, but only among college-educated respondents, who are presumably more likely to be aware of the close affinity in authoritarian values between themselves and the GOP (see also Johnston, Lavine, and Federico 2017).

Similarly, Federico, Fisher, and Deason (2011) show that higher political knowledge increases the positive association between authoritarianism (CRV) and self-reported political conservatism across the 2000 and 2004 ANES. These more politically sophisticated or knowledgeable authoritarians also exhibit a closer match between their personal economic views and those of their political party, although no such interaction effect is present for cultural views (Johnston, Lavine, and Federico 2017; Johnston 2018). This implies that political parties' cultural positions might be "easy" to discern in the political environment, since they are perhaps more obvious or salient, while their economic positions are more complex and "hard" to pinpoint (Johnston and Wronski 2015). This is consistent with the idea that authoritarian citizens sort into political parties based on their authoritarian appeals, which inevitably will be primarily cultural appeals to existing norms and authorities.

With authoritarians sorting into the Republican party, what role is left for authoritarianism among those who identify with left-of-centre political parties and leaders in the US? Analyzing various ANES surveys and an original online national survey, Luttig (2017) found that, among Democrats, authoritarianism (CRV) is associated with a stronger partisan identification, warmer feelings toward the Democratic Party, and a greater intolerance of one's child marrying a Republican, although this effect is often only present among lower levels of educational attainment. This supports the idea that greater authoritarian values represent a stronger desire to conform to the group, regardless of the exact nature of the group. And, as mentioned above, Democratic candidates still vary along an axis of prototypicality and authoritarians will gravitate toward those occupying the more prototypical pole (Wronski et al. 2018).

This is consistent with a more recent line of research that has investigated the existence and nature of "left-wing authoritarianism," a topic which had been greatly debated (see Altemeyer 1996). Work on a left-wing authoritarianism (LWA) scale, created by replacing the conservatively loaded words and groups mentioned in the original RWA scale with liberal equivalents,

has provided initial evidence for LWA. Across various adult and student convenience samples in the US such a scale has been found to associate with prejudice and intolerance, while also predicting liberal political ideology or support for President Obama (Conway et al. 2018; Conway and McFarland 2019).

Threat – Revisited

There has been a good deal of exciting new research on the issue of how different types of threats might activate authoritarian values. In particular, threats of a racial/ethnic or economic nature have been shown to strongly influence the relationship between authoritarian predispositions and anti-democratic attitudes. As mentioned above, research based on the 2005 CID study in the US found that county-level ethnic changes and levels of racial diversity moderate the association between authoritarianism and various measures of anti-immigration attitudes (Johnston, Newman and Velez 2015; Velez and Lavine 2017). Specifically, in counties with higher increases in Hispanic or foreign-born populations in the 1990s authoritarianism was found to be more associated with the perception that immigration is a threat to American culture. A similar pattern emerges in the Netherlands, based on an online national sample (Van Assche et al. 2018) and an online convenience sample (Assche et al. 2014), where authoritarianism (RWA) is only associated with greater PVV support or greater anti-immigration attitudes for high objective or subjective levels of local diversity.

In a word, it seems that when authoritarians encounter more people that are different from themselves they become more likely to display stronger anti-immigration views (see also Velez and Lavine 2017 for causal evidence in this regard). While it is possible that such a reaction is triggered by a desire to maintain social conformity in the face of presumed norm violations by immigrants (bottom-up), it might also be a result of stronger partisan sorting and polarization, such that the ultimate anti-immigration attitudes might simply reflect the adoption of extant group views as political parties become more extreme (top-down). Further work is clearly needed to disentangle the mechanisms linking authoritarian values and anti-immigration attitudes in the context of greater social diversity.

Using student samples in Singapore and Belgium, Roets, Au, and Hiel (2015) found that authoritarianism (RWA and Schwartz values together) is positively associated with multiculturalism and positive affect toward relevant outgroups in the former, while the relationships are reversed in the latter. Such a pattern is consistent with the notion that multiculturalism is ingrained in social norms in Singapore, but contested in Belgium.

An additional piece of evidence in this regard is the research on the dynamics of authoritarianism among minorities in the US. As shown by recent work, Whites reported lower authoritarian values (CRV) than Blacks and Latinos in the 2004 ANES (Henry 2011), and lower than Blacks in the 2008 ANES (Pérez and Hetherington 2014). Additional national surveys in 2010 also show that the association between authoritarianism (CRV) and prejudice or anti-immigration attitudes are lower for Blacks than Whites (Pérez and Hetherington 2014). Such evidence is consistent with African American experience, a discriminated minority exposed to chronic and systematic threat, responding to their circumstances by instilling greater authoritarian values of conformity to the norms of the Black community in order to survive under such threatening circumstances (e.g. Parker and Towler 2019). Because African Americans have a long-standing affiliation with the Democratic Party, the result is that authoritarianism is also associated more with the attitudes and norms of the Democratic Party, resulting in a correlation with prejudice and anti-immigration views different from that of the White US population (Feldman and Weber 2017). It would be interesting to see if these weaker associations

between authoritarianism and racial out-group attitudes are similar among White Democrats, and whether the above-mentioned moderating effect of political sophistication is also exhibited among Black authoritarians. While some treat the different dynamics of the child-rearing scale among Blacks as a sign of its lack of validity (Pérez and Hetherington 2014), it might be a perfect example of the contextual, elite-driven sorting mechanism discussed above.

Finally, it is important to mention recent research on the threat potentially triggered by aversive economic conditions. On the one hand, there is a long line of research seeking to understand the economic antecedents of authoritarian values, going back to Seymour Lipset's early work (Lipset 1959; Napier and Jost 2008). Along those lines, there is now growing evidence of a positive association between authoritarianism and economic inequality. For example, based on five waves of the WVS, Solt (2011) shows that there is a strong positive correlation the world over between net income inequality and authoritarianism, as measured through the desire for children to adopt greater obedience, or support for greater respect for authority in the near future in one's society. Similarly, Sprong et al. (2019) find evidence that higher objective or subjective inequality is associated with a greater wish for a stronger leader, based on student convenience samples across 28 countries. Although merely suggestive of authoritarianism, Andersen and Fetner (2008) found that economic inequality is strongly associated with less tolerance toward homosexuality across the world.

However, the actual mechanism connecting economic inequality and greater authoritarian values remains far from clear. Does inequality heighten concerns with social order, which then makes group conformity more likely to be valued than individual autonomy? Or, is the effect spurious and instead driven by the well-known negative association between inequality and general levels of education, economic development, or ethnic/racial diversity? For example, Ballard-Rosa et al. (2021) demonstrate, based on a large national survey in 2017, that worse local economic conditions in the UK (changes in the labor market due to exposure to Chinese imports) are associated with greater authoritarian values (RWA), even when controlling for local inequality and local immigration (levels or changes). Similar results have also been found in the US (Ballard-Rosa, Jensen, and Scheve 2018). At the same time, Carreras, Irepoglu Carreras, and Bowler (2019) show that increases in gross disposable income at the district-level, measured across 10 or 18 years, are strongly negatively associated with the district "Leave" vote share during the 2016 UK Brexit referendum. These same district-level economic conditions are also associated with lower individual-level nationalism, ethnocentrism, and Euroscepticism in the British Election Study (wave 7, in spring 2016).

It remains unclear whether such effects are about gradual changes to the antecedents of authoritarian values, or whether economic hardship activates authoritarian values by presenting citizens with threatening situations. Unfortunately, none of the studies above are able to convincingly disentangle the sequence of events. Thus, it is unclear if economic difficulties precede the regional variation in authoritarian values, whether the relationship goes in the other direction, or if it is simply spurious. Future work is needed to uncover the hidden, but persistent, connection between economic conditions and authoritarian values.

Conclusion

There is a large body of research that links the psychological construct of authoritarianism to a wide range of illiberal attitudes. While further studies are required to better understand the conditions under which authoritarianism becomes politically potent, the research we have reviewed in this chapter demonstrates large and robust relationships between authoritarianism (measured in several different ways) and minority group prejudice, intolerance of dissent, and

support for anti-democratic parties and politicians. We are not suggesting that variations in authoritarianism fully explain illiberal attitudes or political preferences. Nothing in politics is that simple. However, in a growing number of studies across a number of nations, people high in authoritarianism are substantially more likely to hold anti-democratic attitudes than those who are low in authoritarianism. The clearest demonstration of the effects of authoritarianism can be seen in the studies that find a substantial relationship between authoritarianism and support for right-wing populist leaders and parties in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, the UK, the US, and countries across Latin America.

We have argued that authoritarianism reflects the universal tension between the desire for conformity to group norms and personal autonomy. This conceptualization has important implications for the dynamics of authoritarianism. Threats to social conformity and group cohesion – increasing social diversity or rapid social change – should increase the desire of those high in authoritarianism for politicians and parties who offer illiberal policies that promise to increase adherence to traditional group norms and values. Importantly, since the desire for social conformity is inherently defined for the group a person identifies with, the consequences of authoritarianism should be contextual – it will always increase adherence to ingroup norms and values. Thus, the effects of authoritarianism should depend, in part, on the recent history of a nation, and it may be quite different in minority groups than among members of the majority group. More research is needed to test these hypotheses and better understand the conditions under which authoritarianism is associated with illiberal attitudes and support for anti-democratic parties.

References

- Adorno, Theodor W., Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson, and Nevitt R. Sanford. 1950. *The Authoritarian Personality*. New York: Harper.
- Aichholzer, Julian, and Martina Zandonella. 2016. “Psychological Bases of Support for Radical Right Parties.” *Personality and Individual Differences* 96: 185–190.
- Altemeyer, Bob. 1981. *Right-Wing Authoritarianism*. Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press.
- Altemeyer, Bob. 1988. *Enemies of Freedom: Understanding Right-Wing Authoritarianism*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
- Altemeyer, Bob. 1996. *The Authoritarian Specter*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Andersen, Robert, and Tina Fetner. 2008. “Economic Inequality and Intolerance: Attitudes toward Homosexuality in 35 Democracies.” *American Journal of Political Science* 52(4): 942–958.
- Asbrock, Frank, Oliver Christ, John Duckitt, and Chris G. Sibley. 2012. “Differential Effects of Intergroup Contact for Authoritarians and Social Dominators: A Dual Process Model Perspective.” *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 38(4): 477–490.
- Assche, Jasper Van, Alain Van Hiel, Kristof Dhont, and Arne Roets. 2019. “Broadening the Individual Differences Lens on Party Support and Voting Behavior: Cynicism and Prejudice as Relevant Attitudes Referring to Modern-Day Political Alignments.” *European Journal of Social Psychology* 49(1): 190–199.
- Assche, Jasper Van, Arne Roets, Kristof Dhont, and Alain Van Hiel. 2014. “Diversity and Out-Group Attitudes in the Netherlands: The Role of Authoritarianism and Social Threat in the Neighbourhood.” *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 40(9): 1414–1430.
- Assche, Jasper Van, Kristof Dhont, and Thomas F. Pettigrew. 2019. “The Social- Psychological Bases of Far-Right Support in Europe and the United States.” *Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology* 29(5): 385–401.
- Bakker, Bert N., Gijs Schumacher, and Matthijs Rooduijn. 2020. “The Populist Appeal: Personality and Anti-Establishment Communication.” *The Journal of Politics*. <https://doi.org/10.1086/710014>.
- Bakker, Bert N., Matthijs Rooduijn, and Gijs Schumacher. 2016. “The Psychological Roots of Populist Voting: Evidence from the United States, the Netherlands and Germany.” *European Journal of Political Research* 55(2): 302–320.

- Ballard-Rosa, Cameron, Amalie Jensen, and Kenneth Scheve. 2018. "Economic Decline, Social Identity, and Authoritarian Values in the United States." https://ces.fas.harvard.edu/uploads/files/events/Scheve_for_SC_2018.pdf.
- Ballard-Rosa, Cameron, Mashail Malik, Stephanie Rickard, and Kenneth Scheve. 2021. "The Economic Origins of Authoritarian Values: Evidence from Local Trade Shocks in the United Kingdom." *Comparative Political Studies*. doi.org/10.1177/00104140211024296.
- Bilewicz, Michał, Wiktor Soral, Marta Marchlewska, and Mikołaj Winiewski. 2017. "When Authoritarians Confront Prejudice. Differential Effects of SDO and RWA on Support for Hate-Speech Prohibition." *Political Psychology* 38(1): 87–99.
- Bizumic, Boris, and John Duckitt. 2018. "Investigating Right Wing Authoritarianism with a Very Short Authoritarianism Scale." *Journal of Social and Political Psychology* 6(1): 129–150.
- Carreras, Miguel, Yasemin Irepoglu Carreras, and Shaun Bowler. 2019. "Long-Term Economic Distress, Cultural Backlash, and Support for Brexit." *Comparative Political Studies* 52(9): 1396–1424.
- Carvacho, Héctor, Andreas Zick, Andrés Haye, Roberto González, Jorge Manzi, Caroline Kocik, and Melanie Bertl. 2013. "On the Relation between Social Class and Prejudice: The Roles of Education, Income, and Ideological Attitudes." *European Journal of Social Psychology* 43(4): 272–285.
- Choma, Becky L., and Yaniv Hanoch. 2017. "Cognitive Ability and Authoritarianism: Understanding Support for Trump and Clinton." *Personality and Individual Differences* 106: 287–291.
- Cizmar, Anne M., Geoffrey C. Layman, John McTague, Shanna Pearson-Merkowitz, and Michael Spivey. 2014. "Authoritarianism and American Political Behavior from 1952 to 2008." *Political Research Quarterly* 67(1): 71–83.
- Cohen, Mollie J., and Amy Erica Smith. 2016. "Do Authoritarians Vote for Authoritarians? Evidence from Latin America." *Research and Politics* 3(4): 1–8.
- Conway, Lucian Gideon, and James D. McFarland. 2019. "Do Right-wing and Left-wing Authoritarianism Predict Election Outcomes?: Support for Obama and Trump across Two United States Presidential Elections." *Personality and Individual Differences* 138: 84–87.
- Conway, Lucian Gideon, Shannon C. Houck, Laura Janelle Gornick, and Meredith A. Repke. 2018. "Finding the Loch Ness Monster: Left-Wing Authoritarianism in the United States." *Political Psychology* 39(5): 1049–1067.
- Cornelis, Ilse, and Alain Van Hiel. 2015. "Extreme-Right Voting in Western Europe: The Role of Social-Cultural and Antiegalitarian Attitudes." *Political Psychology* 36(6): 749–760.
- Crowson, Howard Michael, and Joyce A. Brandes. 2017. "Differentiating Between Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton Voters Using Facets of Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Social-Dominance Orientation: A Brief Report." *Psychological Reports* 120(3): 364–373.
- Duckitt, John. 1989. "Authoritarianism and Group Identification: A New View of an Old Construct." *Political Psychology* 10(1): 63–84.
- Duckitt, John. 2009. "Authoritarianism and Dogmatism." In *Handbook of Individual Differences in Social Behavior*, edited by Mark R. Leary and Rick H. Hoyle, 298–317. New York: Guildford Press.
- Duckitt, John, and Boris Bizumic. 2013. "Multidimensionality of Right-Wing Authoritarian Attitudes: Authoritarianism-Conservatism-Traditionalism." *Political Psychology* 34(6): 841–862.
- Duckitt, John, Boris Bizumic, Stephen W. Krauss, and Edna Heled. 2010. "A Tripartite Approach to Right-Wing Authoritarianism: The Authoritarianism-Conservatism-Traditionalism Model." *Political Psychology* 3(5): 685–715.
- Dunn, Kris. 2015. "Preference for Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties Among Exclusive-Nationalists and Authoritarians." *Party Politics* 21(3): 367–380.
- Dunwoody, Philip T., and Friedrich Funke. 2016. "The Aggression-Submission- Conventionalism Scale: Testing a New Three Factor Measure of Authoritarianism." *Journal of Social and Political Psychology* 4(2): 571–600.
- Dunwoody, Philip T., and Sam G. McFarland. 2018. "Support for Anti-Muslim Policies: The Role of Political Traits and Threat Perception." *Political Psychology* 39(1): 89–106.
- Dunwoody, Philip T., and Dennis L. Plane. 2019. "The Influence of Authoritarianism and Outgroup Threat on Political Affiliations and Support for Antidemocratic Policies." *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology* 25(3): 198–210.
- Etzioni, Amitai. 1996. "The Responsive Community: A Communitarian Perspective." *American Sociological Review* 61(1): 1–11.
- Federico, Christopher M., and Michal Reifen Tagar. 2014. "Zeroing in on the Right: Education and the Partisan Expression of Authoritarianism in the United States." *Political Behavior* 36(3): 581–603.

- Federico, Christopher M., Emily L. Fisher and Grace Deason. 2011. "Political Expertise and the Link between the Authoritarian Predisposition and Conservatism." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 75(4): 686–708.
- Federico, Christopher M., Emily L. Fisher, and Grace Deason. 2017. "The Authoritarian Left Withdraws from Politics: Ideological Asymmetry in the Relationship between Authoritarianism and Political Engagement." *The Journal of Politics* 79(3): 1010–1023.
- Feldman, Stanley. 2003. "Enforcing Social Conformity: A Theory of Authoritarianism." *Political Psychology* 24(1): 41–74.
- Feldman, Stanley. 2013. "Comments on: Authoritarianism in Social Context: The Role of Threat." *International Journal of Psychology* 48(1): 55–59.
- Feldman, Stanley. 2020. "Authoritarianism, Threat, and Intolerance." In *At the Forefront of Political Psychology: Essays in Honor of John L. Sullivan*, edited by Eugene Borgida, Christopher Federico, and Joanne Miller, 35–54. New York: Routledge.
- Feldman, Stanley, and Christopher Weber. 2017. "Race and Authoritarianism: Convergent and Divergent Effects among Whites and African Americans." Paper presented at the 2017 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association.
- Fromm, Erich. 1941. *Escape from Freedom*. New York: Farrar & Rinehart, Inc.
- Golec de Zavala, Agnieszka, Rita Guerra, and Cláudia Simão. 2017. "The Relationship between the Brexit Vote and Individual Predictors of Prejudice: Collective Narcissism, Right Wing Authoritarianism, Social Dominance Orientation." *Frontiers in Psychology* 8: 1–14.
- Gray, John. 1995. *Liberalism*, 2nd edition. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Henry, P.J. 2011. "The Role of Stigma in Understanding Ethnicity Differences in Authoritarianism." *Political Psychology* 32(3): 419–438.
- Hetherington, Marc J., and Elizabeth Suhay. 2011. "Authoritarianism, Threat, and Americans' Support for the War on Terror." *American Journal of Political Science* 55(3): 546–560.
- Hetherington, Marc J., and Jonathan D. Weiler. 2009. *Authoritarianism and Polarization in American Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Hetherington, Marc J., and Jonathan D. Weiler. 2015. "Authoritarianism and Polarization in American Politics, Still?" In *American Gridlock: The Sources, Character, and Impact of Political Polarization*, edited by James A. Thurber and Antoine Yoshinaka, 86–112. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Johnston, Christopher D. 2018. "Authoritarianism, Affective Polarization, and Economic Ideology." *Advances in Political Psychology* 39(S1): 219–238.
- Johnston, Christopher D., and Julie Wronski. 2015. "Personality Dispositions and Political Preferences Across Hard and Easy Issues." *Political Psychology* 36(1): 35–53.
- Johnston, Christopher D., Howard G. Lavine, and Christopher M. Federico. 2017. *Open versus Closed: Personality, Identity, and the Politics of Redistribution*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Johnston, Christopher D., Benjamin J. Newman, and Yamil Velez. 2015. "Ethnic Change, Personality, and Polarization Over Immigration in the American Public." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 79(3): 662–686.
- Knuckey, Jonathan, and Komysha Hassan. 2020. "Authoritarianism and Support for Trump in the 2016 Presidential Election." *The Social Science Journal*. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.soscij.2019.06.008>.
- Kohn, Melvin L. 1977. *Class and Conformity: A Study in Values*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Kohn, Melvin L., and Carmi Schooler. 1983. *Work and Personality: An Inquiry into the Impact of Social Stratification*. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
- Lefkofridi, Zoe, Markus Wagner, and Johanna E. Willmann. 2014. "Left-Authoritarians and Policy Representation in Western Europe: Electoral Choice across Ideological Dimensions." *West European Politics* 37(1): 65–90.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1959. "Democracy and Working-Class Authoritarianism." *American Sociological Review* 24(4): 482–501.
- Ludeke, Steven G., Camilla N. Klitgaard, and Joseph Vitriol. 2018. "Comprehensively- measured Authoritarianism Does Predict Vote Choice: The Importance of Authoritarianism's Facets, Ideological Sorting, and the Particular Candidate." *Personality and Individual Differences* 123: 209–216.
- Luttig, Matthew D. 2017. "Authoritarianism and Affective Polarization: A New View on the Origins of Partisan Extremism." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 81(4): 866–895.
- MacWilliams, Matthew C. 2016. "Who Decides When the Party Doesn't? Authoritarian Voters and the Rise of Donald Trump." *PS: Political Science & Politics* 49(4): 716–721.
- Malka, Ariel, Christopher J. Soto, Michael Inzlicht, and Yphtach Lelkes. 2014. "Do Needs for Security and Certainty Predict Cultural and Economic Conservatism? A Cross-National Analysis." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 106(6): 1031–1051.

- Mallinas, Stephanie R., Jarret T. Crawford, and Jeremy A. Frimer. 2020. "Subcomponents of Right-Wing Authoritarianism Differentially Predict Attitudes Toward Obeying Authorities." *Social Psychological and Personality Science* 11(1): 134–143.
- Napier, Jaime L., and John T. Jost. 2008. "The 'Antidemocratic Personality' Revisited: A Cross-National Investigation of Working-Class Authoritarianism." *Journal of Social Issues* 64(3): 595–617.
- Nunn, Clyde Z., Harry J. Crockett, and J. Allen Williams, Jr. 1978. *Tolerance for Nonconformity*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
- Oyamot, Jr., Clifton M., Melinda S. Jackson, Emily L. Fisher, Grace Deason, and Eugene Borgida. 2017. "Social Norms and Egalitarian Values Mitigate Authoritarian Intolerance Toward Sexual Minorities." *Political Psychology* 38(5): 777–794.
- Parker, Christopher Sebastian, and Christopher C. Towler. 2019. "Race and Authoritarianism in American Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science* 22(1): 503–519.
- Parsons, Talcott. 1937. *The Structure of Social Action: A Study in Social Theory with Special Reference to a Group of Recent European Writers*. New York: McGraw Hill.
- Passini, Stefano. 2017. "Different Ways of Being Authoritarian: The Distinct Effects of Authoritarian Dimensions on Values and Prejudice." *Political Psychology* 38(1): 73–86.
- Peitz, Linus, Kristof Dhont, and Ben Seyd. 2018. "The Psychology of Supranationalism: Its Ideological Correlates and Implications for EU Attitudes and Post-Brexit Preferences." *Political Psychology* 39(6): 1305–1322.
- Pérez, Efrén O., and Marc J. Hetherington. 2014. "Authoritarianism in Black and White: Testing the Cross-Racial Validity of the Child Rearing Scale." *Political Analysis* 22(3): 398–412.
- Radkiewicz, Piotr. 2016. "Does Authoritarianism Imply Ethnocentric National Attitudes: A Revised Look at the 'Authoritarian Triad' and Right-Wing Ideology." *European Journal of Social Psychology* 46(2): 224–236.
- Roets, Arne, Evelyn W. M. Au, and Alain Van Hiel. 2015. "Can Authoritarianism Lead to Greater Liking of Out-Groups? The Intriguing Case of Singapore." *Psychological Science* 26(12): 1972–1974.
- Schmidt, Peter, Lucyna Darowska, and Daniel Georg Gloris. 2018. "What Drives Threat, Attitudes towards Migrants and Identification with Populist Parties? Deprivation, Values or Racism? A Comparative Analysis of Poland and Germany." In *New Uncertainties and Anxieties in Europe: Seven Waves of the European Social Survey*, edited by Franciszek Sztabiński, Henryk Domański, and Paweł Sztabiński, 35–93. Berlin: Peter Lang.
- Schwartz, Shalom H. 1992. "Universals in the Content and Structure of Values: Theoretical Advances and Empirical Tests in 20 Countries." *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* 25: 1–65.
- Schwartz, Shalom H. et al. 2012. "Refining the Theory of Basic Individual Values." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 103(4): 663–688.
- Solt, Frederick. 2011. "The Social Origins of Authoritarianism." *Political Research Quarterly* 65(4): 703–713.
- Sprong, Stefanie et al. 2019. "'Our Country Needs a Strong Leader Right Now': Economic Inequality Enhances the Wish for a Strong Leader." *Psychological Science* 30(11): 1625–1637.
- Stellmacher, Jost, and Thomas Petzel. 2005. "Authoritarianism as a Group Phenomenon." *Political Psychology* 26(2): 245–274.
- Stenner, Karen. 2005. *The Authoritarian Dynamic*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Tillman, Erik R. 2013. "Authoritarianism and Citizen Attitudes Towards European Integration." *European Union Politics* 14(4): 566–589.
- Van Assche, Jasper, Kristof Dhont, Alain Van Hiel, and Arne Roets. 2018. "Ethnic Diversity and Support for Populist Parties: The 'Right' Road Through Political Cynicism and Lack of Trust." *Social Psychology* 49(3): 182–189.
- Vasilopoulos, Pavlos, and Romain Lachat. 2018. "Authoritarianism and Political Choice in France." *Acta Politica* 53(4): 612–634.
- Vasilopoulos, Pavlos, George E. Marcus, Nicholas A. Valentino, and Martial Foucault. 2019. "Fear, Anger, and Voting for the Far Right: Evidence from the November 13, 2015 Paris Terror Attacks." *Political Psychology* 40(4): 679–704.
- Velez, Yamil Ricardo, and Howard Lavine. 2017. "Racial Diversity and the Dynamics of Authoritarianism." *The Journal of Politics* 79(2): 519–533.
- Womick, Jake, Tobias Rothmund, Flavio Azevedo, Laura A. King, and John T. Jost. 2019. "Group-Based Dominance and Authoritarian Aggression Predict Support for Donald Trump in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election." *Social Psychological and Personality Science* 10(5): 643–652.

- Wrong, Dennis H. 1994. *The Problem of Order: What Unites and Divides Society*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Wronski, Julie, Alexa Bankert, Karyn Amira, April A. Johnson, and Lindsey C. Levitan. 2018. "A Tale of Two Democrats: How Authoritarianism Divides the Democratic Party." *The Journal of Politics* 80(4): 1384–1388.
- Zmigrod, Leor, Peter J. Rentfrow, and Trevor W. Robbins. 2018. "Cognitive Underpinnings of Nationalistic Ideology in the Context of Brexit." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 115(19): E4532–E4540.